

JPRS-NEA-90-010
13 FEBRUARY 1990



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

19990510 183

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-90-010

CONTENTS

13 FEBRUARY 1990

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

Yerevan Meeting Urges Revision of APM Program [Beirut AZTAG 20 Nov]	1
Intelligentsia Lauded for Opposing APM [Paris GAMK 23 Nov]	1
Armenian Revolutionary Federation Leader Interviewed [Paris GAMK 2-5 Dec]	2
Ramgavar Party Reports on Contacts in ArSSR [Beirut ZARTONK 21 Nov]	3

NEAR EAST

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Interior Ministers Comment on Cairo Session Success [London AL-HAWADITH 15 Dec]	5
Iran Reportedly Sponsors Tunisian Destabilization Effort [London AL-DUSTUR 18 Dec]	7
Strengthening of Syrian Fortifications in Golan Reported [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ 8 Feb]	8

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Palestinian Mood, Views on Intifadah Anniversary [Tel Aviv DAVAR 8 Dec]	8
PLO Position Two Years After Intifadah [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ 8 Dec]	11
Fatah, Hamas Electoral Coalition Sought in East Jerusalem [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV 4 Feb]	12
Abu-al-'Abbas Interviewed on PLF, Intifadah [Algiers AL-SHA'B 25 Dec]	13
Factions Vying for Power in Tulkarm Refugee Camp [Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT 7 Feb]	15

ALGERIA

Minister Discusses Problems Within Health Sector [EL MOUDJAHID 22-23 Dec]	15
Renewed Official Commitment to Youth Development [EL MOUDJAHID 22-23 Dec]	20
Imam El-Ghazali Rejects 'Nationalist Ideologies' [EL MOUDJAHID 7 Dec]	21
Technical Language Committee Established [EL MOUDJAHID 8-9 Dec]	21

EGYPT

NDP Candidates Win Peoples' Assembly By-Elections [AL-AKHBAR 1 Feb]	21
Government's Public Sector Policy Rejected	22
Labor Union Position [AL-AHALI 13 Dec]	22
Editorial Sees Piecemeal Policy [AL-AHALI 13 Dec]	22
Maritime Sovereignty, Antipollution Stance Stressed [AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI 26 Dec]	23
New Measures Restrict Israeli Maritime Activities [AL-HAQIQAH 16 Dec]	23
Shaykh Tantawi on Israelis, Fatwa, Islamic Banking [London AL-DUSTUR 18 Dec]	24
Government Critic Calls Egypt Pluralistic, Not Democratic [AL-AHALI 13 Dec]	26
Firm Contracts for Perfume Exports to USSR [AL-AKHBAR 1 Feb]	26
Editorial Urges Dialogue To Avert Dictatorship [AL-WAFD 29 Dec]	26

ISRAEL

Finance Ministry Official Says Taxation at Maximum Level [MABAT 4 Feb]	27
Police Minister Bar-Lev Profiled [DAVAR 1 Dec]	27
IDF Allegedly Shoots To Kill Suspects [DAVAR 28 Nov]	30
Discipline Problems Reported in IDF [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 27 Nov]	31
Poverty, Social Problems Plague Country [HADASHOT 26 Nov]	32

Destructive Gaps Perceived in Society [HA'ARETZ 5 Dec]	33
Vilner on RAKAH Changes [HADASHOT 26 Nov]	34
Effects of Arab Boycott Examined [HA'ARETZ 28 Nov]	36
Treasury Intervention on Behalf of Koor Examined [THE JERUSALEM POST 12 Jan]	37
Trade With Eastern Europe Increases 30 Percent [DAVAR 7 Feb]	38
Increase of 12.5 Percent in Electronics Exports Reported [DAVAR 7 Feb]	38
Scientists' Emigration Becoming Serious [HA'ARETZ 30 Nov]	38
Position of Rabbi Swisa, CRM Profiled [MA'ARIV 8 Dec]	39

JORDAN

Representative Discusses Party's Role in New Parliament [Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH 3 Dec]	43
---	----

LEBANON

Writer Analyzes American Relations With Ja'ja' [Kuwait AL-QABAS 21 Dec]	45
---	----

MOROCCO

Royal Air Maroc Cargo Services Expanded [MAROC SOIR 25 Dec]	47
Women's Association Holds Regional Conference [MAROC SOIR 25 Dec]	48
Fes Housing Construction Permits Awarded [MAROC SOIR 26 Dec]	49
Private Organization Hosts Debate on Privatization [MAROC SOIR 21 Dec]	49
Water Reserve Statistics Reported [L'OPINION 13 Dec]	49
Inadequate Irrigation Levels Reduce Cotton Production [L'OPINION 6 Dec]	50

QATAR

Information Minister Discusses Censorship, Telecommunications [AL-RAYAH 2 Dec]	51
Plans for Media Expansion [GULF TIMES 3 Dec]	53
Study Surveys Aspects of Industrial Economy [AL-RAYAH 6 Dec]	53

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Nu'man Interviewed on Unification Issues [AL-SHARIQAH AL-KHALIJ 3 Jan]	54
--	----

SOUTH ASIA

BANGLADESH

Paper Reports Ershad Victory Day Message to Nation [THE NEW NATION 16 Dec]	58
Workers Party Fourth Conference [THE NEW NATION 25 Nov]	58
Situation on Dhaka University Campus Considered	58
Government Help Offered [THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER 5 Dec]	58
Campus Violence Deplored [THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER 5 Dec]	59

INDIA

India Finances Three Agalega Island Projects [Port Louis WEEK-END 7 Jan]	60
--	----

IRAN

Economic Talks Held With Austria in Tehran [ETTELA'AT 14 Jan]	60
Minister on New Refineries, Oil Income, Winter Consumption [KEYHAN 17 Dec]	61
Oil Income Increases 30 Percent [KEYHAN 8 Jan]	64
IRI's Largest Oil Platform To Be Reconstructed [KEYHAN 17 Jan]	65
Mines Ministry Prepared To Produce Required Aluminum [ETTELA'AT 14 Jan]	65

New Facilities for Export of Industrial Goods Announced [KEYHAN 22 Jan]	65
Unit To Be Added to Zargan Power Plant in Ahvaz [ETTELA'AT 15 Jan]	66
Industrial Area To Be Built in Zanjan [ETTELA'AT 14 Jan]	66
Industrial Area Inaugurated in Arak [ETTELA'AT 15 Jan]	66
Regulations for Sending Patients Abroad Announced [KEYHAN 8 Jan]	67
Production of Certain Agricultural Products Rises [KEYHAN 22 Jan]	68
Increase in Wheat Production Predicted [ETTELA'AT 14 Jan]	68
Conversation With Chief Justice on New Judicial Decisions [KEYHAN 16 Dec]	68
Goals Set To Boost Tribal Economy [ETTELA'AT 15 Jan]	71
Funds Allocated To Expand Tourism Industry [ETTELA'AT 14 Jan]	72
Qazvin Glass Factory to Double Production Level [ETTELA'AT 14 Jan]	72

Yerevan Meeting Urges Revision of APM Program

46050010A Beirut AZTAG
in Armenian 20 Nov 89 pp 1, 7

["Special report to AZTAG"]

[Text] A meeting was held in Yerevan on 16 November with the participation of the initiating group of the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM] party, the Council of the Congress of the Armenian Intelligentsia and the "Renaissance" organization.

During the meeting, the representatives of the Congress of the Armenian Intelligentsia and the "Renaissance" organization aired their complaints about the APM's Founding Congress. These complaints are summarized in the following basic points:

1. Some phases of the APM Congress proceeded in an undemocratic manner. The most salient example of that was the election of the APM Administrative Council.
2. In its present state, the APM is effectively a new party although it was supposed to be a federation of organizations.
3. The program of the APM cannot be considered a pannational program, because it does not echo the aspirations of all Armenians and its references to the Armenian Diaspora and relations between Armenia and the Diaspora remain deficient. It must be clearly stated whether the solution of our territorial demands from Turkey is a precondition for any contacts with Turkey. The Artsakh issue must be more emphatically stated. The basic and immediate problem that Armenia confronts at present is the issue of Soviet Armenia's sovereignty, not the achievement of independence.
4. The program of the APM party must be revised to make it truly a federation of various organizations and to enable it to incorporate within its structure the maximum possible number of organizations and groupings which are active in Armenian life.

In the light of these views, the participants at the meeting found it appropriate to create opportunities to end the disunity that the APM Congress has created. Motivated by this proposition, the participants expressed disagreement with an initiative by the History Department of the State University of Yerevan to form a new federation of organizations to counter the APM party.

The first draft of the revised declaration of the Congress of the Armenian Intelligentsia will soon be released in Armenia. This declaration can have an impact on the pannational goals to be endorsed.

Intelligentsia Lauded for Opposing APM

46050008A Paris GAMK in Armenian 23 Nov 89 p 1

[Article by M. Ishkhanian: "Motherland's Intelligentsia Acts"]

[Text] It was not only predictable but inevitable.

The truth is that delusions are exposed sooner or later when they slam against the hard reality. Enthusiasm and satisfaction cannot last long when the basis of their origin turns out to be illusory and unfounded.

In Moliere's words, "L'habit ne fait pas le moine."
[Clothes do not make the monk]

It is also a fact that every Armenian who is concerned about the destiny of the Armenian nation cannot remain indifferent to the work that is possible and that is being carried out to merge forces with the purpose of creating a genuine pannational movement. Especially in these critical days, the slightest doubt on this issue is equivalent to a crime.

Discontent was expressed soon after the founding congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM] party. It was not surprising that the first expression of discontent came from the Armenian intelligentsia which set to work, first, to rectify the mistakes that have been committed and, second, to create a true Armenian pannational movement which incorporates different currents and which coordinates their activities.

The Council of the Congress of the Armenian Intelligentsia does not consider the meeting in Yerevan on the first weekend of November and the organization that was born out of it as being pannational. Instead, it has assumed the role of coordinator and organizer so that the forces of the Armenian people are not wasted in these days.

In other words it wants to put an end to the fumbling.

The departure point of the Council is its own declaration whose revised text will be published soon. Its first declaration was complete in terms of being pannational.

An intelligentsia which has issued a declaration of that nature cannot be satisfied with that congress, the program it endorsed or the administrative body it elected because none of them echo the slightest overtones of pannationalism.

Delegates of the Motherland's intelligentsia were present at the APM Congress but could not endorse a pannational program or elect a pannational administrative body, not because they were impotent but because the Congress failed to match their own stature and their voices were, for some reason, muffled.

The said Congress also failed to justify the pretenses they put on, and, as a result, talks are once again under way to create a true pannational movement in the broadest sense of that term.

We have no time to waste. The sooner these talks are crowned with success the better because time is working against us.

At this juncture, constructive criticisms and assessment can only play a beneficial role in clarifying minds and ideas.

The Motherland's intelligentsia has acted.

We, too, should act to create a true pannational movement.

Armenian Revolutionary Federation Leader Interviewed

46050008B Paris GAMK in Armenian 2-5 Dec 89

[Interview with Armenian Revolutionary Federation Bureau "representative" Hrair Marukhian by Montreal HORIZON correspondent Vrej Armen in Athens; date not specified]

[2-3 Dec 89 p 2]

[Text] [HORIZON] Comrade Marukhian, where does the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF] stand at this fateful time of national crisis?

[Marukhian] We must realize that, for understandable reasons, our party was for many years forced to work only in the Diaspora even though its ties always extended to the Motherland—in a thousand strands, so to speak—even during the Stalin era. We have always received our inspiration from the Motherland. Although we have not been physically present in the Motherland, we have always been present ideologically, if secretly, under the most difficult conditions. The proof of that is evident today. Even so, however, our activities have been largely confined to the Diaspora.

With that in mind, we must assert that in the course of the past few decades our party built in the Diaspora footholds thanks to which we can now confidently say—at a time when Armenia is finally at a turning point and when our people in Armenia have great hopes on the Diaspora—that the ARF is prepared to assume the role it is expected to play in all spheres of life in Armenia as well and to do everything that it has done in the past. When necessary, the ARF will do today what it has done in the past to the same extent, on the same scale and for the same goals.

[HORIZON] What are the ARF's present expectations from the Soviet Armenian leadership to extricate Armenia from its present crisis?

[Marukhian] I have expressed the same view on this issue on several occasions. We are deeply convinced that if the present Soviet Armenian leadership fuses with the people rapidly, that is if it can become a true representative of the people and an expressor of the people's aspirations, without, of course, surrendering to the wave of mob mentality, which is understandable under certain

conditions and in certain circumstances—that is always so with all peoples—and if it is prepared to belong to the people, to care for the people and to serve the people's basic needs, then the present leadership of Armenia has a very important historic responsibility and can contribute significantly to the future of Armenia and the demands of the Armenian people.

[HORIZON] Can you elaborate on some of [ARF's] principal demands?

[Marukhian] For example, we are convinced that, thanks to the atmosphere that Gorbachev has created, the present Soviet Armenian leadership can improve the social conditions of the Armenian people much more rapidly and bring them to a level which our people, like any other people, has expected for many years. Such a disposition is not observed in the steps they have taken so far. They must make that disposition more evident. They need to take basic steps in this direction.

Secondly, with regard to the economic strengthening of Armenia, there are tremendous opportunities in terms of integrating the work being carried out in Armenia and the Diaspora and taking advantage of the special situation that has been created by the earthquake disaster—the people say: "There is no evil without some good." It is possible to take advantage of the spirit of unity that this situation has created. The Armenian people have demonstrated surprising and admirable unity over this issue and are willing to continue doing so. Therefore, a more organized posture is expected from the Soviet Armenian leadership in this regard. They must demonstrate that they are prepared to do better planning, that they fully grasp the importance of utilizing these opportunities and that they comprehend the scope of the issue. This work should not be linked to various political considerations as is sometimes observed. This is no time for such considerations and for turning the efforts of one or another organization into political capital. This is not the time for such matters. The leadership in the Motherland must concentrate on taking more effective steps.

The third area I can give as an example—and I can go on giving more examples—is that the Soviet Armenian leadership must be able to take more decisive stances with regard to Armenia's relations with the central authorities and vis a vis other Soviet republics because the conditions are right. It has an additional incentive to do so, because beside the support the Armenians of the Motherland—which depends on whether it expresses their aspirations—it can have the backing of the entire Diaspora if it can correctly judge the Diaspora's political, economic, social and cultural potential. If it does that, then it can argue our case—whether that is the Karabakh issue or other issues—with the central authorities from a much stronger position and make better progress—of course gradually and cautiously. But it must be a bit more decisive.

[HORIZON] Can you define what it should do about the Karabakh issue specifically?

[Marukhian] It has recently been observed that Armenia's government and official representatives have taken a more encouraging and promising stance in relevant meetings. This and some more is, of course, what is expected.

With regard to the Karabakh issue, we believe that, parallel to these postures, more decisive internal steps need to be taken in order to enhance the vigor of the resistance of the Armenians of Karabakh and to erase the impression from the minds of Karabakh Armenians that they have been abandoned—an impression that definitely exists.

[HORIZON] Could you outline the practical steps the ARF is taking with regard to the reconstruction of Armenia and the Karabakh demands?

[Marukhian] We have expressed very specific views with regard to the economic reconstruction and strengthening of Armenia, particularly through our initiative for a scientific conference that is planned to be held in late November or early December. We hope that that conference materializes. There have been statements in the press to that effect, and we have talked about that issue in other interviews. If the planning of Armenia's economic strengthening is not left to chance and if everyone does not turn to every [Diaspora] community for help over every issue—or rather, if they do not make Armenia's strengthening dependent on such help—if appropriate steps are taken after a serious scientific study is carried out, if we harness our resources in the Diaspora to the implementation of that scientifically prepared plan in a harmonious and coordinated manner and with a pannational approach, then Armenia can certainly become an exemplary country, economically, scientifically and technologically, within the next 7 to 10 years. I can go so far as to say—and we all think this way—that, under such conditions, Armenia can become the Switzerland of the Transcaucasus if we take this approach on this matter. The diligence, scientific and technological competence, intellectual talents and educational level of the Armenian nation and its dedication to build its future are important ingredients which, when combined with the resources of our present small Armenia and the possibilities of the Diaspora, can turn Armenia into a model nation.

Therefore, we say that we must examine, within the framework of this plan, what opportunities there are in Armenia in terms of its natural and human resources, the free trade zone proposed by Aganbegyan, investments by Armenians, building a tourism industry and others. Perhaps this is not the place to go into such detail, but we believe it is clear what we mean: Evaluate all the possibilities and needs on a near and long-term basis and then, when everything has been put on paper, determine by what policies, means and methods they can be implemented expeditiously and take the appropriate steps. There is little doubt that this is not the result of the somewhat imaginative feelings of the average emotional Armenian, but the views of circles who know these

matters. We are confident that if Armenia's government demonstrates a more serious approach on these issues, we can implement this plan together.

[4-5 Dec 89 p 2]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [HORIZON] All this obviously has great significance for the Armenian cause. The Armenian cause will now have a new outlook.

[Marukhian] That is definitely true. After all, in the last few decades we became perhaps not the sole inheritors of the Armenian demands but the hardest workers for the cause in a practical sense; we became the investors in the cause and stood on the vanguard of the struggle for our demands as we did in the past after the establishment and the fall of our independence. Today, we can very comfortably discard our sense [of] loneliness because now there is a people which, though divided, has its feet on Armenian land and which can raise its voice much more effectively internationally and otherwise, especially when its voice is echoed by the results accomplished by the 70-year-old battle experience of the Diaspora Armenians. We can make our voice heard in the international arena more effectively if we speak on behalf of the entire Armenian nation and Armenia rather than the dispersed communities of the Diaspora. This gives us greater opportunities especially if it is coupled to the rapid strengthening of Armenia in the coming decade. A strong Armenia can make progress toward regaining its rights much more rapidly than our present dispersed and divided forces. [passage omitted]

Ramgavar Party Reports on Contacts in ArSSR

46050010B Beirut ZARTONK
in Armenian 21 Nov 89 p 1

[Communique by the Central Administration of Democratic Liberal Party issued in Yerevan on 10 November 1989]

[Text] A delegation representing the highest-level leadership of the Democratic Liberal [Ramgavar] Party [DLP] and comprised of comrades H. Setrakian, A. Geunjian, H. Uzunian, H. Avedikian and V. Uzunian, paid an official visit to the Motherland, Soviet Armenia, from 6 through 12 November 1989 and held talks with the representatives of Soviet Armenia's party, government and scientific, economic and intellectual establishments. During its contacts, the DLP delegation had the opportunity to acquaint itself with the current situation in the Armenian Republic, the prospects for the resolution of the Artsakh problem, the status of the ongoing work to alleviate the consequences of the earthquake disaster, the consequences of the blockade imposed by the Azeris against Soviet Armenia and Artsakh, the means of thwarting possible similar blockades in the future as well as the true nature and scope of the new populist movements and internal currents.

The principal meeting in the DLP delegation's contacts was with Suren Arutyunyan, the first secretary of the

Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party, on 7 November. That meeting was also attended by Central Committee Secretary G. Galoyan; Foreign Minister A. Mkrthchyan; K. Dallakyan, chairman of the Committee for Cultural Ties with the Armenian Diaspora [CCTAD]; and other officials. During the meeting, which lasted approximately 3 hours, our delegation outlined the national, economic and political plans which we want to pursue and which, we believe, can extricate Armenia from its present crisis. The Soviet Armenian side was particularly interested in the industrial development plan which Comrade V. Uzunian presented. Comrade V. Uzunian and other DLP comrades wish to pursue the said plan and have already taken practical measures for its realization.

At noon on 9 November, the DLP delegation visited the Mother See of Holy Echmiadzin and was received by the Catholicos of All Armenians. In the course of practical and constructive discussions, our comrades brought to the attention of His Holiness some of the concerns that we and our entire circle feel with respect to the present status of the Armenian Church and the confusion in the Diaspora about the division of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The Holy Pontiff stated that the improvement of ties with Antilias is confined to the level of the two sees and does not, for the moment, extend to the level of the prelacies and that there are still many problems that await resolution in this latter area. This meeting was also attended by Archbishop Nerses Bozabalyan, the secretary of the Mother See and Bishop Garegin Nersisyan, the locum tenens of the Prelacy of Ararat.

On the afternoon of the next day, 10 November, the DLP delegation had a meeting with Prime Minister V. Margaryantz in the presence of Deputy Prime Minister Levon Saakyan, Foreign Economic Relations Chief V.

Khazaryan, CCTAD Chairman K. Dallakyan and other officials. This meeting, which was characterized by a practical and constructive atmosphere, was mutually beneficial for both sides. The Prime Minister expressed his warm support for the DLP's economic plans and, in particular, its proposal to create a Diaspora-Armenia Joint Trade Office. The Prime Minister outlined to our delegates the monumental work that the Soviet Armenian government is carrying out to stave off the economic blockade, to dispatch supplies to Artsakh and to develop Armenia's economy.

The timing of the DLP delegation's visit to Soviet Armenia coincided with the Founding Congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement. Having been invited to the Congress, our delegation attended the first session of the Congress on 6 November, and a representative of our delegation addressed the meeting.

Beside its official contacts outlined above, the DLP delegation also had ample opportunity to make contacts with intellectual and economic circles and the representatives of various movements that have recently been formed. The members of the delegation listened to their views on various national and political issues and aired their own views and impressions on those issues.

For the first time ever, the DLP delegation was given the opportunity to appear in a lengthy interview on Soviet Armenian television. During the interview the members of the delegation outlined the our party's ideology, history, work and plans.

The visit of the DLP delegation was extremely useful and productive and is destined to introduce clarifications, to convey new dispositions and to have a beneficial effect on the critical situation in the Motherland and Diaspora-Armenia relations.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Interior Ministers Comment on Cairo Session Success

90OA0220A London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 15 Dec 89 pp 34-35

[Article by Asamah 'Ajja]

[Text] Cairo—There has been renewed discussion about Egypt and the Arab League. First, the League's secretary-general, Chedli Klibi, visited Egypt, and it was decided that he would attend the meetings of the eighth session of the Arab interior ministers. However, the surprise meeting of the foreign ministers in Tunisia brought about his immediate return. The topic of Egypt and the League has generally been on the agenda in discussions between Klibi, President Mubarak, and Egyptian officials.

Also, Cairo hosted the eighth session of the Arab interior ministers. Egypt had earlier attempted to invite the interior ministers to attend last year's Police Day ceremonies and to participate in the security conference. Some of them actually responded to the invitation, but a communique was issued stating that the meeting and its proceedings were completely outside the league's official framework! This time, matters were different. There was a splendid response, even though it had become customary to hold the meetings of the interior ministers in Tunisia.

Cairo, for its part, strove to make the conference a success and to benefit from the successful tour of the Gulf states made prior to the session by Egyptian Interior Minister, Major General Zaki Badr.

Several Arab interior ministers spoke with AL-HAWADITH about the security challenges facing the Arab nation, namely drugs, terrorism, and organized crime. Most of them emphasized the great success of the first session to be held in Cairo.

Minister Zaki Badr led off, stating to AL-HAWADITH, "I believe that the eighth session of the Arab interior ministers was one of the most successful sessions, in view of Egypt's good preparation for it, the outstanding close relations that bind Egypt with all Arab states, and my recent tour of the Gulf states. There preparations were made for the conference, and discussions were held on the exchange of information and security cooperation pertaining to crime, the fight against drugs, terrorism, organized gangs, including passport forgery gangs, and those who carry out activities that violate security, and numerous other security interests."

Maj. Gen. Zaki Badr added, "We have requested the drafting of a program to exchange information on felonies committed by citizens of one Arab state in another Arab state. The 11-point conference agenda includes the establishment of a regional information exchange center, which is a proposal made by the UN Anti-Narcotics

Fund. Badr called for unified efforts and cooperation between the Arab states in particular and all states in general, because such cooperation is needed in the light of disturbances in the world and the extensive planning of crime." He stated, "President Mubarak has ordered Interior Ministry officials to place all of the ministry's capabilities at the disposal of Arab and African states. This was behind the opening of the training institutes to numerous persons in the Arab states, especially states wishing to benefit from Egypt's scientific and technical advancement, particularly regarding security."

Prince Nayif Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz, the Saudi interior minister and the honorary chairman of the Arab interior ministers, stated to AL-HAWADITH, "I would like to indicate the need for joint Arab action to confront different security problems, because these problems affect development and modernization projects in all the Arab countries. There are numerous positive factors in this regard, including international cooperation to besiege drug smuggling, distribution, and use, and the prominent role of the Arab Interior Ministers Council in supporting this orientation. This is especially true since Arab security is indivisible, and requires consultation and coordination among the Arab states to counter the phenomena and deviations that have become prevalent in contemporary society as a reflection of the mental disturbances of societies that have moved away from the divine, eternal path. I believe that the spread of drugs, sexual diseases, and moral dissolution are symptoms and manifestations of diseases to which the contemporary person is exposed as a result of disregard for religion and moral values." Prince Nayif added, "We have all welcomed the convocation of this meeting in Egypt outside Arab League headquarters, and consider it a living sign of our love and esteem for Egypt's leadership and people, and our recognition of the importance of its Arab and regional role."

Iraqi Interior Minister Samir Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab stated to AL-HAWADITH, "Let me stress that the stability with which Iraq is graced represents a firm base for Arab national security. To be more precise, Iraq's stability is based on a group of plans and programs which have guaranteed the strengthening of the close connection between the segments of society. It is also based on the formation of programs and studies to enhance the capability of the security agencies. This is reflected positively in the reduction of Iraq's rate of crime, premeditated or otherwise. From the very start, we have treated the problem of post-war crime, which appears primarily among peoples that have waged wars outside their territory, in which the citizen moves away from social life or is cut off from society. In our case, there was no separation between combatants at the front and the social depth. Therefore, we did not experience great changes in the behavior of individuals, because the combattant easily found the ability to merge with society again.

"The Iraqi leadership's concern with the application of an Arab security strategy is indicated by its formation of

a permanent committee comprising different state ministries and institutions, which is concerned with outlining scientific programs and plans for implementing decisions regarding that strategy. Generally, the preservation of security, a desire for the safety of the citizen, and the elimination of crime—all of this requires the preparation of means that assure the creation of a society in which the criminal element is faint. Here, we come to the role of academic institutions, the universities, and the specialized departments, to employ their capabilities and to benefit from their methods, practical studies of every type of crime, and determination of the factors, results, causes, and remedies of crime. I would like to indicate that a proper stance on the part of every police and security leader is crucial for detecting crime centers and employing capabilities to curb and eliminate them. This requires establishing a coherent security base attuned to political developments in the national arena and to the size of the challenges and dangers directed against the Arab nation. Regarding the drug problem, for example, historically Iraq has not suffered from this problem, which is, moreover, a condemned and abhorrent condition. Therefore, despite the existence of drug exporting or consuming states around us, we have no problems. Nonetheless, we are dealing with the problem through the Arab strategy drafted to combat drugs, and with the Arab office specialized in this regard."

Shaykh 'Abdallah Ibn-Khalifah Al Thani, Qatar's interior minister, stated the following to AL-HAWADITH, "Let me stress that Cairo's hosting of this conference was an important factor behind its success. Qatar has a special interest in the eighth session, especially in the light of the assistance that Egypt can offer, in addition to the importance of the subjects on the agenda of this session, which include new security concepts compatible with Qatar's needs and with the development phases through which it is passing. I would like to emphasize the importance of increasing cooperation between the Arab states to counter crimes cropping up in our Arab societies, especially organized crime, drug-related crime to be exact, because it destroys the citizen and society, depletes health, energy, and money, and squanders the potential of the Arab nation. Despite our Arab fatherland's efforts to confront this constant danger and its adoption of an Arab anti-drug strategy, Arab cooperation in combating the spread of drugs is unfortunately not at the level necessitated by this problem, even though it is described as a considerable danger. Our state cannot confront it singly however well organized control and counter-measures are at the local level. Therefore, a joint Arab security effort is needed to combat drugs and to exterminate this dangerous pest from Arab societies.

"Our concern on the Arab level with the drug problem does not dismiss the problem of terrorism, especially since we are in a part of a world that is especially affected by this problem, although some have become experts at accusing the Arabs of causing it! Nonetheless, a formula must be reached to confront this problem, because it concerns all states."

AL-HAWADITH has learned that Hayil 'Abd-al-Hamid (Abu-Hawl), the Palestinian interior minister, focused in his presentation during closed meetings on the need to solve the problems of Palestinians and their residence in Arab states. He told AL-HAWADITH that despite the efforts and decisions made regarding the freedom of Palestinians to work and travel, the problem continues to exist in numerous Arab states. Palestinians are bound by the internal laws of each state. They do not interfere in their internal affairs, and they defer to the security circumstances in each of them. Some of the states responded laudably to what was requested by the PLO-Arab League committee that conducted field visits to numerous states to examine the implementation of decisions made earlier to remedy the problems of Palestinians. However the matter requires the interior ministers to decide to remove several impediments blocking the implementation of these decisions in some Arab states. He added, "The termination of these problems will have a good return regarding support for the Palestinian people and its heroic intifadah [uprising], which is entering its third year. We hope to see an end to problems related to Palestinians' travel documents, residence, and movements."

Commenting on the eighth session held in Cairo, Dr. Akram Nash'at Ibrahim, the secretary-general of the Arab Interior Ministers Council, stated to AL-HAWADITH, "The Arab Interior Ministers Council achieved a brilliant success in its eighth session in Cairo, primarily because it was held in Cairo, the pulsing heart of the Arab nation, under the auspices of President Muhammad Husni Mubarak, in whom we take pride owing to his wise and courageous efforts in defense of Arab causes, and sincere attempt to strengthen Arab cooperation and solidarity to meet the challenges facing our Arab nation. The meeting between President Husni Mubarak and the Arab interior ministers had a clear effect, because the president desired to issue his valuable directives, in which the success of our conference lies."

The conference also succeeded because of the high-level, total participation of 20 interior ministers, the only absences being those of the Moroccan interior minister owing to the referendum in Morocco, and the Algerian interior minister owing to his participation in the proceedings of the Liberation Front conference. The ministers were also accompanied by delegations, which included police and security leaders and officials in numerous specialized sectors in their states. During their meetings, they discussed subjects distinguished by their importance, in an aim to provide the best means and methods to achieve maximum security and safety for the entire great Arab fatherland. The discussions were objective and to the point, and occurred with full realization and awareness of the importance of this session. The council issued its decisions by consensus in its meetings, which were pervaded by a friendly, fraternal atmosphere. The agenda of the proceedings of the eighth session included action to implement an Arab security plan, the phased plan for the Arab anti-drug strategy,

facilitation of the movement of Arab citizens and their residence and employment in the Arab countries, and the treatment of Palestinians with maximum care and concern. It also included an examination of the actions taken between the previous and eighth session by the council's secretariat general and the Arab Center for Training and Security Studies, which is subordinate to the council. The council also approved recommendations issuing from 11 conferences and meetings held by the secretariat general during the current year, and the secretariat's working program and budget for 1990.

Dr. Akram Nash'at Ibrahim added the following with respect to what was discussed by the Arab interior ministers, "The Arab security plan, to be implemented in five years, was discussed. It is a phased plan based on the Arab security strategy approved in the Arab Interior Ministers Council. It aims to achieve integration regarding Arab security. The internal security of every Arab state is linked to collective Arab security. A violation of security in any Arab state necessarily violates its political, social, and economic stability, and its military capability, which affects the situation of the Arab nation's autonomous power and its efforts to achieve development and confront the challenges. The Arab security strategy also aims to combat old and new crime in Arab society, purge Arab society of different behavioral deviations, preserve the security of the Arab nation, protect it from terrorist and sabotage attempts directed from within and without, preserve the security of the individual, and safeguard the individual's freedom, person, and property. The strategy includes components and programs defined and decided to improve society and values, the use of the scientific method in security work, the development of penal and reform institutions, support of civilian crime agencies, an increase in citizen input in the fight against crime, the establishment of Arab cooperation, and the strengthening of international anti-crime cooperation."

Regarding whether international terrorism was discussed, Dr. Akram Nash'at Ibrahim stated that the council devoted great attention to the terrorism problem. It previously entrusted its secretariat general with drafting an Arab strategy to combat terrorism in cooperation with the secretariat general of the Arab league. However, in a subsequent decision, the council recommended postponing the formulation of this strategy until the convocation of the international anti-terrorism conference requested by the Arab states from the secretary-general of the United Nations, in order to benefit from the conclusions of the UN conference in formulating an Arab anti-terrorism strategy. In preparation for this conference, an Arab terrorism concept was prepared for presentation at the conference. The actual draft of this concept was prepared by agreement between the Arab League and the secretariat general of the Arab Interior Ministers [Council], with the participation and consultation of the Arab states. Our efforts did not stop here.

Rather, numerous aspects were discussed in many specialized security conferences, and specific recommendations regarding them were adopted. These recommendations were in fact approved by the interior ministers and are being implemented.

Regarding measures pertaining to the Arab anti-drug strategy, Akram Nash'at stated, "A strategy was authorized in December 1986. It includes the determination of a national and local policy to combat this scourge in terms of protective and treatment means and Arab anti-drug cooperation means. Also authorized was a model Unified Arab Narcotics Law from which the Arab states will seek guidance when they draft new laws regulating the fight against drugs or amend this law in the event of the existence [text omitted from the original]. It includes punishments and anti-drug measures that must be taken. It specifies life imprisonment for a first-time drug smuggling or sale offense and execution in the event of a repeat offense. The law also stipulates the dropping of criminal charge against drug addicts who come forward for treatment on their own accord, provided that they are treated for one month, or three or more months if necessary. In their meetings, the interior ministers discussed the dimensions of the problem in the light of the application of the Arab strategy, and many of them expressed the hope of curbing the problem through the collective measures that were taken."

The attendance of Lebanese Interior Minister Ilyas al-Khazin was one of the surprises of the conference, because it was thought that security conditions in Lebanon and recent developments would preclude his participation. All the Arab interior ministers welcomed his participation and wished him success in his upcoming task. Al-Khazin told AL-HAWADITH that there are painstaking, intensive investigations underway to apprehend the assassins of former Lebanese President Rene Mu'awwad, and he indicated that these investigations were drawing to a close. He stressed the importance of the Arab interior ministers' eighth session in meeting the security challenges facing the Arab nation, whether regarding terrorism, drugs, or organized crime. He also expressed the hope that the stability which could soon prevail in Lebanon would be an incentive for his country to share in solving the Arab problems that have been raised. Cairo succeeded in its first experiment in hosting an Arab meeting at the level of the interior ministers, and it is anticipating further participation when Arab League Headquarters return to Cairo!

Iran Reportedly Sponsors Tunisian Destabilization Effort

45000070 London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 18 Dec 89 p 3

[Text] AL-DUSTUR has learned that the statement issued recently in Europe in the name of the Tunisian "Hizballah", which contained a violent attack against Tunisian Islamic personalities supportive of the changes which Tunisia is witnessing under [President] Ben 'Ali's

leadership, was prepared by one of Tehran's agents named Muhammad al-Tijani, in collaboration with 'Abd-al-Majid Torab Zamzami. The statement was printed in Iran, while Iranian embassies abroad took charge of distributing it among Tunisian emigrant communities.

Strengthening of Syrian Fortifications in Golan Reported

44000192 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] Chief Engineering Corps Officer Yisha'i Dotan said yesterday that Syrian fortifications on the Golan Heights have been strengthened during the past years. The main direction has been to continue building trenches against tanks, the expansion of mine fields, and the building of complex fortifications. These efforts are making the system more complicated from the IDF's [Israel Defense Forces] point of view. He added that these Syrian efforts are being continually monitored by the IDF and that the equipment and training exercises of the Engineering Corps give the IDF the ability to cope with the problem of breaking through such obstacles in times of war. Referring to the issue of chemical weapons, the chief Engineering Corps officer said that today the question is not whether they have the ability of operating chemical weapons in times of war. This ability exists and during the past years there has been an improvement in the launching equipment and the operation of the weapons, a factor that will have to be taken into account in any war in the future.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Palestinian Mood, Views on Intifadah Anniversary

44230064B Tel Aviv DAVAR (Supplement)
in Hebrew 8 Dec 89 pp 6,7

[Article by Y. Landers]

[Text] "If only he who kills you were killed! If there were a rifle in your hand, no one would dare slay you."

Jamil Hammad, a man from Bethlehem, a reporter for TIME MAGAZINE in Jerusalem, tells that this is how Palestinian women wailed over the grave of one of the "holy ones of the intifadah." Hammad heard one poem from a young boy, orphaned by his father, who was freed from administrative detention;

"Oh mother and sisters, don't worry about me. The Israeli put me into this darkness, and there I found my identity."

The intifadah has awakened a wave of oral and written creations that express the emotions of the residents of the territories: the sorrow, pride, hate, revenge. The authors are not always known. Sometimes, they are women who cannot read or write. They give spontaneous expression to their feelings, and their rhymes pass from mouth to ear, like a folk song. The intifadah experience,

which is expressed in prose and in poetry, has captured the Palestinians and strengthened the sense of their national identity. A sense of pride is heard in Hammad's words regarding the Palestinians' struggle for national liberation. "The intifadah has created tragedy and heroism. The Palestinians already do not view Israel as an undefeatable super-power and have stopped fearing Israelis. They are steeped today in a feeling of self-confidence and are convinced that the hands of the clock will not turn back and that time is working in their favor. The situation that prevailed before the intifadah will not return."

Hammad, who is 50 years old, speaks fluent English and occasionally accompanies his words with a sort of short laugh, a sort of gurgle-smile, that does not express joy, but, rather, anger and bitter sarcasm. He tells his history briefly and with restraint: born in the village of Refa't, west of Bet-Shemesh. In 1948, his family was moved to Bethlehem and from there the sons scattered to the United States. His father dreamed that he would become a lawyer, and he studied in Damascus and received his Bachelor's degree in law. To the disappointment of his father, law did not appeal to him, and he preferred journalism. In his work as a reporter, he visited Morocco and Kuwait, worked in the West Bank for the newspapers AL-FAJR and AL-BASHIR, and, since 1982, was appointed one of a team of TIME reporters in Jerusalem. Hammad is married and the father of three sons, two of whom are continuing in the journalist tradition. One is a reporter for the Associated Press news agency, and one is completing multimedia studies in a university in the United States. With the completion of two years of the intifadah, Hammad describes the opinions of the residents of the territories regarding the uprising and the changes in their lives and in Israeli policies. He often peeks at his notebook and quotes what the "man on the street" said to him, whose spontaneous responses reflect, in his opinion, the true state of mind, and not the prepared declarations by the well-known names.

The Mistakes of the Past

While talking, Hammad compares again and again the processes and modes of behavior of the Palestinians to events in the history of the Jewish people. These similarities sometimes grate on the ears of a Jew, as, for example, when he says that "the intifadah created a Palestinian holocaust." But the tendency to find parallels in Israel's history perhaps attests to the assessment of the success of the Jewish people in realizing its national desires and on the hope that the Palestinians, too, will succeed if they learn from the experience of the Jews.

In response to the comment that it appears that the vehicles of the intifadah are primarily youths, he replies: "This is true, but you should know that the youths comprise more than half of the Palestinian population." He further states that "not all of the Jews are Zionists." That is, we should not find fault with the fact that part of the Palestinian public does not take an active part in the uprising. This is also how it was with the national

struggle of the Jews. "And just as the Jewish tragedy consolidated the Jews, the Palestinians are also becoming consolidated as a result of deprivation and persecution."

The intifadah not only resulted in the consolidation of the Palestinians and strengthened their self-assurance, but also caused a change in their political positions. "The slogan about achieving the goal of the Palestinians by means of a military struggle was concealed, and most of the residents of the territories currently support the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip alongside the State of Israel. This is a decided change in comparison to the old demand for establishing a Palestinian state throughout all of the territory stretching from the sea to the Jordan. Whoever spoke, in the past, of a Palestinian state alongside of Israel was considered a traitor. That is not so today."

[DAVAR] What will be the regime in the independent state that the Palestinians want to establish?

[Hammad] The current view is that this must be a democratic state. They will not accept a one-man country like the neighboring countries. One man said to me: "If we establish a country of one ruler, Israel will feel that it must recapture the territories. And with a free, democratic state, it would be less open to Israeli attack."

[DAVAR] I thought that the preference for a democratic state would be based on the desire for equality and freedom and not on the fear of an Israeli attack.

[Hammad] It is clear that Palestinians prefer a democratic government because of its nature, but they say, with reason, that a democratic state would guarantee not only freedom within but it would also be better protected from the enemy from without.

[DAVAR] Do the Palestinians have the feeling that, in the past, they missed the chance to achieve their national goals?

[Hammad] Yes. They missed, for example, the chance to effect a split decision in the United Nations in 1947. On 29 November, I asked Palestinians what they felt on that day, and one of them answered: "I remember what my grandfather and father missed, and I want to blame them, but at the same time I know that this is of no use." And these words reflect the current view.

Hammad thinks that the Palestinians' support of a two-nation solution attests to the fact that they recognize the reality, have no delusions, and, in this way, they are also disconnecting themselves from the mistakes of the past.

[DAVAR] Currently, there are no more mass demonstrations, which characterized the intifadah in its inception.

[Hammad] There were developments in the intifadah, and although there are no mass demonstrations, protest is being expressed in more clever ways. I suggest that you not treat the intifadah as a symphony that begins with

the sound of the trumpets and finishes with silence. The symphony is not yet finished.

The Most Hated

Hammad says that the collective punishments that Israel inflicts on the residents unite them and create a sense of solidarity. So, for example, the harsh measures for the collection of taxes. The tax bills are meeting resistance because the residents are convinced that the bills are not correct. They take issue with the Israeli announcements, according to which the tax money is used to finance services in the territories. In their opinion, these funds should not be used to finance the salaries of the employees of the civil government. They say: Show us the roads and the hospitals that were purchased with these funds.

[DAVAR] What are the means of punishment that the residents suffer from the most?

[Hammad] It is difficult to say. Administrative detention is one of the worst, illegal means. Another difficult means is the blowing up of houses in addition to imprisonment, inflicted on one of the family members that was involved in intifadah activities. It is clear that killing people does the most harm. I know what the imminent danger is from throwing a stone at an automobile, but does this justify a bullet? Sometimes you feel that the Israeli Army treats the citizens in the territories like they are enemy soldiers. "Stop! Hands up, facing the wall." And this infuriates the Palestinians. To push an old woman, to beat a boy—this is something that goes against the principles of every culture, as well as the Jewish culture.

[DAVAR] But boys, too, are throwing stones and burning bottles.

[Hammad] How many Israelis have been killed in a Palestinian ambush? And, in contrast, how many Palestinians have been killed by Israeli rifles?

[DAVAR] How do the residents regard the IDF [Israel Defense Force] and the settlers?

[Hammad] Hatred of the IDF is increasing, as well as mistrust. And the residents believe that the Israeli Government encourages the settlers to take the law into their own hands.

[DAVAR] Are some IDF units hated more than others?

[Hammad] Usually, they are all equal, but the border guards are considered the most wild and brutal. More than once have they blasted vulgarities on loudspeakers at night or early in the morning, disturbing the residents and infuriating them. These are the provocative incidents that stimulate the residents to attack them.

[DAVAR] And how do the residents regard the masked men?

[Hammad] The feeling is that they are regarded with admiration, because they hate Israel and are fighting the enemy.

[DAVAR] And when they kill whoever they think are collaborators?

[Hammad] In the eyes of the residents, whoever collaborates with the authorities must bear the punishment, and I have not heard public criticism of it. Perhaps there are those who secretly express opposition, but they are not prepared to come out in the open against these acts. And it should be understood that the intifadah is like a revolution, in which there is no chance to weigh punishments on a pharmacist's scales, and there are probably also mistakes. For the Palestinians don't have a system of courts in which they can judge the collaborators.

[DAVAR] Why are the Palestinians turning to the High Court of Justice—do they believe that it judges fairly?

[Hammad] There are a number of reasons for this. They believe that the High Court does not operate according to the rules of the military court, which do not permit appeals and the performance of justice. Many Palestinians consider the High Court of Justice above politics and, in many cases, it has ruled against the government and the Army. And there are also those who turn to the High Court of Justice for publicity.

[DAVAR] What are the intifadah's achievements, from the residents' standpoint?

[Hammad] The intifadah has hollowed out a change in Israeli society. All Israelis are currently aware that a Palestinian problem exists, although there are two primary schools of thought regarding its solution. The United States was compelled to begin a dialogue with the PLO. Ties with Jordan were severed, and it is assumed that they will not be renewed. And, also, the world is more aware of the plight of the Palestinians.

Between Shamir and Peres

[DAVAR] What changes have occurred in the relations of the political forces in the territories as a result of the intifadah?

[Hammad] A social revolution has begun. A drastic decline in the influence of traditional families and elders has begun. Mayors are like puppets with no real power. In contrast the influence of the shabab [youth] in the village, refugee camps, and in the cities has grown. The primary political power is in the hands of Fatah and the Islamic movement. Approximately 60 percent of the residents on the West Bank support Fatah. In the Gaza Strip, perhaps less.

[DAVAR] Why do they still do so?

[Hammad] If the political process for a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip does not succeed, Fatah's influence will decrease, and the radical religious and secular groups will become stronger. They will claim

that the course of events proves that they were right when they said that Fatah's policies didn't stand a chance.

[DAVAR] What is 'Arafat's position; is he only accepted by PLO supporters?

[Hammad] I think that even the Islamic movement accepts his leadership and are not interested in going to war against him. They want a change in his policies, not his replacement.

[DAVAR] And what about Husayn?

[Hammad] Husayn, smart man, read the writing on the wall in the West Bank and Gaza better than Shim'on Peres, and therefore drew the conclusions. Peres is struggling everywhere for a Jordanian solution and an international conference, but he did not succeed within Israel.

[DAVAR] Is there a difference in the way the residents of the territories regard Peres and Shamir?

[Hammad] There are two approaches. The general approach of the man on the street is that Shamir and Peres are two sides of the same coin. Their opinions are the same, but they say it differently. The second approach of the more learned Palestinians is that it is better to negotiate with Shamir than with Peres, because Shamir says what is in his heart and mind, while Peres' mouth and heart are not the same.

[DAVAR] Why do the Palestinians oppose Israel's election initiative?

[Hammad] They have reservations about this initiative because, in their opinion, elections would be held only in order to rescue Israel from the intifadah and a political crisis, while the Palestinians want this plan to be part of a process for an inclusive solution to the problem. Many of them believe that the Government of Israel wants the elections so that the Palestinians will conduct part of their affairs while the conquest continues, and they don't agree to this.

[DAVAR] Do the residents of the territories regard the election plan differently from the PLO?

[Hammad] Even in the Zionist movement there were differences between the opinions of those who settled in Palestine and those who were outside of it. This is natural.

[DAVAR] And there are no signs of frustration from the results of the struggle until now?

[Hammad] The residents of the territories know that this is a lengthy struggle and not a 90-minute game, and this does not affect their morale. The intifadah is not a collection of isolated incidents of throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. It has become an institution for a way of life. For example, the opening of stores at 8 a.m., and their closing at 12 has already become routine. I don't

advise anyone to think that the Palestinians will stop the intifadah. They have the feeling that, if they do this, the Israelis will trample them, and nobody wants to be trampled.

[DAVAR] And what about the use of firearms?

[Hammad] The Palestinians recognize that firearms will hurt the struggle. But if the political effort does not bring any results, the question will arise where will the despair lead the Palestinians in the occupied territories. And this question is, in my opinion, a challenge for every Israeli.

PLO Position Two Years After Intifadah

44230064A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 8 Dec 89 p 3B

[Article by M. Klein]

[Text] Even though the PLO did not initiate the outbreak of the intifadah, and although its executive committee does not direct its events on a daily basis, the organization's leaders have clear knowledge regarding its primary directions and the achievements of the uprising.

George Habash's Popular Front judges the intifadah by one standard alone: its contribution to the struggle with Israel and to achieving all of the traditional goals of the PLO. In the opinion of this organization, the intifadah has changed the confrontation from its foundation, in that the center of gravity has shifted from the borders of Israel into well within them. The uprising teaches that, without a struggle, Israel will not retreat, and because of the essence of its strength, it understands only the language of strength. In accordance with its doctined outlook, the Popular Front believes that, first and foremost, a goal must be set, and in accordance with it, they must become organized and consolidate it through secondary goals. In the opinion of the organization, a realistic objective of this type, in the short term, is an "inclusive national rebellion," in which the population of the territories severs all of its ties with Israel, implements "popular institutions" as a substitute for the civil administration and military government, and fights with all its might and with all the means at its disposal, including massive, organized, and systematic demonstrations, armed operations, and firearms.

True to his radical approach, Habash claims that he will even draft Israel's Arabs to the struggle, because the national rebellion must be all-inclusive in its means, scope, and participants. Many varied opportunities for action are available to Israel's Arabs, and the "Arson War" is but one of them. Habash knows that, currently, it is impossible to crystallize his proposal, but, in his opinion, the source of this inability is the lack of a clear objective. The Popular Front estimates that the adoption of an objective will also result in their achieving secondary objectives, such as the undermining of the civil administration, achieving an economic autarchy, and bringing the masses out into the streets. This has been impossible until now, because of the vagueness and

blurring that commanded the PLO and distanced it from the principles that were agreed upon in the past.

This approach is received like a bucket of cold water by the Democratic Front of Na'if Hawatamah. He sees Habash as a prisoner in his enemies' chains, cut off from reality. In the opinion of the Democratic Front, it is not enough to wish for a general national rebellion. It should be possible for the wish to be fulfilled. A national rebellion is not the decision of the political leadership, but rather a reality that grows organically from within the nation, alongside of the development of revolutionary consciousness among the masses.

The uprising indeed in the beginning took the course in which Habash now wishes to direct it. The intifadah leadership called for the firing of all civil administration workers and members of the municipal and village councils, and for work stoppage in the settlements. But the response was limited. This teaches that the path is still long.

Along with the claim of the unrealistic approach of the Popular Front, the Democratic Front is trying to show that Habash's suggestions are superfluous and harmful. They are superfluous because there is already much advancement in the field toward a general rebellion; they are harmful because if the leadership of the uprising adopted them, they would not achieve their greater goals, at the top of which is recognition by the leaders of Israel that there is no military solution to the intifadah. The uprising is marching from soldier to soldier through a change in emphasis, means, and methods of operation. Its crystallization, its response to the needs of the field and the nation, and avoidance of doctrines are not creating a vagueness, but are attaining achievements; they are not placing in doubt the achievement of the goal, but, rather, bringing it closer.

Beit-Sahur as a Touchstone

Fatah's position in this subject for study is similar to the position of the Democratic Front. It, too, does not see the need to declare an objective that is impossible to realize. Decisions on the continuation of the intifadah's path must be cautious and considered, maintains Fatah, and in no way should the situation arise that would necessitate the cancellation of a decision that is impossible to fulfill. In contrast to the Popular Front, Fatah and the Democratic Front characterize civil rebellion as passive only, without the use of firearms, and they do not demand that Israel's Arabs take the same steps as the residents of the territories. In their opinion, the connection between the Arabs of the territories and Israel's Arabs must be political. The contribution of Israel's Arabs to the intifadah is found in their political and public activity within the political and legal system of the State of Israel, to crystallize the right of the Palestinians for self-determination and an independent state.

How penetrating and fundamental the debate is surrounding the civil rebellion and how far the PLO and the

Unified National Leadership of the Uprising are prepared to go can be learned from the Beit-Sahur episode, which served as a touchstone on this question. Nevertheless, these differences of opinion give evidence, more than anything, on the PLO, specifically on the shameful exchange in the Popular Front.

Through adherence to the PLO's stage plan from 1974, the Popular Front maintains that the political path is but one form of the struggle. Habash severely criticized 'Arafat, who deviated from the decisions of the Palestinian National Council in Algeria and sowed confusion and misunderstanding regarding the path of the PLO. The Popular Front's commentary on the Algiers decisions is forced and literal; however, only by its means can this organization point to 'Arafat as the one who has deviated from the whole, following the dictates of the United States; only in this way can it try to explain why the Popular Front is still a member of the PLO. The Popular Front sees the United States as a demonic image.

Despite the pragmatists who think that without the United States Israel will not retreat, Habash insolently states that the two are no more than two sides of an imperialistic coin. Habash recognizes the value of Moscow's policies and points out that he does agree with its position on bilateral, Israeli-Palestinian talks as a preparation for an international conference. In his opinion, no confidence should be given to Washington's promises that all it wants is to drive out the USSR from the political process and bring about direct Palestinian-Israeli talks. Also, the Popular Front agrees with Moscow that a change has begun in Israel's "expansions." The Popular Front suggests, therefore, opening a dialogue with Moscow and preparing a single front with them that will fight the United States and Israel.

The Only Friend

The approach of the Democratic Front is completely different. Unlike Habash, Hawatamah does not maintain that the positions of the United States are not subject to change and, therefore, there is no point in dialogue with them. The opposite—dialogue is one of the means that will bring about the longed-for change, alongside pressure from the USSR and the countries of West Europe and public pressure within the United States. A change in the position of the U.S. Government is, in the eyes of Hawatamah, the "point of Archimedes" in the struggle. The United States is the only friend of Israel, Israel exists by its hand, and if Washington changes its position, Israel will be forced to change its mind. The Democratic Front enthusiastically embraces Moscow's new policy, both regarding the communist doctrines and toward the United States and the political process. Moscow, in its eyes, is an ally, but at the same time also an essential tool for achievements in the realm that, in its opinion, the PLO must throw most of its weight, while the "armed struggle" and terrorism from the countries bordering Israel and the intifadah will only aid it.

If we shed the Marxist ideology from the Democratic Front's view, we will find that there is a great similarity between it and opposition factions in Fatah. The two of them think that discussions with the United States must focus on the agreement of the principal of Palestinian self-determination, and only later discussing the intermediate steps, i.e., elections and preparations for an international conference.

The position of most of the Fatah leaders and the heads of the pragmatic current in the PLO maintains that terrorism must cease in accordance with 'Arafat's declaration in Geneva last December, and that, through contacts with the United States, a way must be found to progress from the current situation to self-determination, while preserving some of the principles that will ensure its achievement; at the top, the direct involvement of the PLO in the political process, for example, as the one that will comprise the Palestinian delegation to the preparatory discussions for the international conference, and will even declare it publicly. Unlike the opposition groups, who think that the United States must behave as a super-power and head of the house, the pragmatic current thinks that the United States' grasp of itself as an intermediary is, in itself, an achievement for the PLO. The leaders of this current even take the trouble to remind their opposers that there is a price for cooperation with the USSR. The PLO must consolidate its policy, and if the Palestinian National Council had decided what it did in Algeria, Moscow's response would have been harsh.

To sum up, the range of difficulties teaches us how the PLO views the intifadah and its political results. The positions of the Democratic Front typify the direction in which this organization is going. The penetrating argument between the Democratic Front and the Popular Front in the questions that we presented above, as well as on matters such as the intifadah's influence on Israel, preserving the unity of the PLO, and the establishment of a temporary government, resulted in the consolidation of a larger and more varied pragmatic camp than in the past. The main debate in the PLO ranks, therefore, is being directed around the different levels of pragmatism within Fatah and the Democratic Front, while the bitter debate between the sharp and doctrined dogmatism and the pragmatic camp has been pushed to the back of the political stage in the PLO.

Fatah, Hamas Electoral Coalition Sought in East Jerusalem

44000180 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 4 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] Leading Fatah supporters in East Jerusalem are attempting to form a coalition with Hamas for the autonomy elections. In talks between Egypt and the PLO that took place in the U.S. it was agreed that without a single common electoral list there was a possibility that a blood bath might occur as a result of the expected bitter struggle between the various streams. One of the leaders of the 'Arafat camp in the territories said yesterday, that it was not certain that Faysal al-Husayni would win in

elections, due to the considerable power wielded by those in the city originally from Hebron. It was therefore decided to begin negotiations with them, promising Hamas supporters appropriate representation, despite the dissention between Hamas and the PLO. Since his release from administrative detention last year, al-Husayni has been working to form a common leadership of the various streams within the PLO, in order to prevent future violent opposition to the elections on the part of radical elements.

Abu-al-'Abbas Interviewed on PLF, Intifadah

90OL0186A Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 25 Dec 89 p 4

[Interview with Muhammad 'Abbas (Abu-al-Abbas), general secretary of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), by Marzaqah Na'it: "Arab Support Below Required Level"; place and date not given; first four paragraphs are AL-SHA'B introduction]

[Text] The concerns and worries of the Palestinian scene and the present state and future prospects of the intifadah [Palestinian uprising]—these are the questions that AL-SHA'B took to one of the most prominent leaders of Palestinian national activity, the militant Abu-al-'Abbas, member of the PLO Executive Committee, and general secretary of the Palestine Liberation Front [PLF]. Although he is a man who became famous for his military daring, he surprises and amazes you with his modesty and quiet conversation.

Muhammad 'Abbas (Abu-al-'Abbas) stands behind numerous militarily outstanding operations. He was the first to begin using gliders and balloons to reach military targets within occupied Palestine. These operations revealed the fragility of the theory of "Israeli security" in the face of the Palestinian fighter's will to fight and challenge. Among the heroic operations he planned were the heroic al-Khalisah operation, the Nahariya marine operation, the Haifa glider operation, and the operation that came to be known by the name of the ship Achille Lauro, which was heading toward Ashdod. The world still remembers the reactions to it.

America pursued him and put a reward of \$250,000 on his head.

But the important side of this military leader is that he is a man of open heart and mind. He answered our questions with complete geniality, confidence, and intelligence.

We Are Experiencing a Climate of Unity

[AL-SHA'B] What headway have you made on the road to restoring cohesion and unifying the PLF?

['ABBAS] Many attempts have been made to repair what was destroyed by the split that occurred in 1983. Important major steps have been achieved on this road. A series of meetings has been held. The effort toward unity has climaxed in a final agreement to form a single provisional leadership to lead national activity in the

PLF in order to establish a final, democratic solution. So I say that we are living in a climate of unity. Matters in the internal structures are developing to support unity, thus giving our front more strength on the mass and national levels. I can say that the meeting that was supposed to take place on 7 December 1989 in Tunis contributed to supporting unity of action. It also contributed positively to developing a joint vision of the tasks of the national struggle. There are steps that must be taken with the participation of the revolutionary base so that the final formula for the national course can take shape.

Development of the Intifadah Toward a Popular Revolution

[AL-SHA'B] What stages has the intifadah traversed, and what are the next stages in its development?

['ABBAS] The intifadah is basically a revolutionary action. The masses of our Palestinian people, with all their groups and all their orientations, are rising up to confront the Zionist enemy and liberate the Palestinian land. This intifadah, which has been continuing for two years, has accomplished many achievements. Daily interaction with it has pushed our masses into the framework of advanced, militant tasks that have begun on a number of levels—village, camp, and city. It now encompasses the entire land. It has been able to drive the Zionist administration within the occupied territory out of the zone of influence. Our people in the occupied territory are now strengthening themselves by themselves through various national institutions that lead our people within the country and supervise daily activity and the course of economic, political, and social life. Certainly, there are many problems that have confronted the intifadah, and these have taken various forms; but the ultimate desire remains to develop the intifadah so as to achieve the defeat of the occupation. For our part, we believe that developing the intifadah in the direction of a popular revolution able to defeat the occupation requires that our brothers' support for this intifadah continue. The intifadah must be protected and sponsored at the Arab level and at the level of friends throughout the world. The stages in this militant action interpenetrate. From strikes, demonstrations, and clashes with the enemy, to boycotting his establishments, partial disobedience, complete disobedience, and finally armed disobedience—these things may at some moment of the struggle be a revolution, but it is not possible for me to draw a dividing line between one stage and another and to say that one stage has ended and a new one has arrived. In the true sense of the word, the stages in revolutionary action interpenetrate in time and in the sequence of confrontations that take place with the enemy.

Arab Masses Have Remained Faithful to Their Commitments

[AL-SHA'B] What is your frank opinion about the level of official and popular Arab support for the intifadah?

['ABBAS] Let us begin by talking about official support, since, if there has been any inadequacy at the level of

popular support, we bear the responsibility for it. Official support should take many forms, including political, material, and moral support. As for moral support, I can almost say that this support does not measure up to the level of giving of the Palestinian people or to the level of giving of the intifadah. In many of the Arab countries, the measures of the intifadah are mentioned as a secondary news item. No official effort has been made to develop the Arab citizen's knowledge of the intifadah and its events. Conferences and exhibitions on the subject have been lacking. Indeed, we find that some Arab countries are completely blacking out the intifadah. At the political level, the Arab summits have given support, particularly the Algiers and Casablanca summits, and have committed themselves to giving political support to the intifadah. However, the manner of support by the Arab states for the intifadah has been varied. Some countries are trying to escape and default on their obligations, especially when the position conflicts with their alliances. For example, if a position requires opposing the American administration, we see some of these countries asking for American approval and not adhering to the Arab agreement. On the financial level, support has been limited: only three Arab states have made commitments, and even some of these states are defaulting and procrastinating. When it comes to supporting the intifadah, everyone pleads poverty; but there is no poverty for these states when it comes to pouring enormous sums into other things. In short, the level of financial support is much less than the needs of the intifadah.

On the popular level, as I said, if there is any inadequacy, we bear the responsibility for it, inasmuch as the masses of our Arab people, who have embraced the concerns of the Arab person in every place and have expressed the highest degrees of solidarity with the causes of the nation, are always ready to express this solidarity and are providing all the opportunities for this.

The Palestinian program to arouse the masses of our Arab people has not been up to the required level. Thus far, there have been no serious Palestinian initiatives to stir up the Arab situation at the grass roots or at the level of political parties and democratic forces. Nevertheless, mass moral support is very broad, and readiness is very high. On the level of material support, the regimes in some countries have allowed the Arab grass roots to move to offer direct support. If we compare the level of mass support to the level of official support, the truth is that the Arab masses are fulfilling their obligations and providing the support required of them, while official support is very weak.

Supporting the Political Process by Increased Military Action

[AL-SHA'B] Palestinian readings and opinions have varied in their evaluation of Palestinian diplomacy. Some see political flexibility in it; others see only gratuitous concessions to the enemy.

In your opinion, what is the dividing line between the political flexibility necessary for Palestinian national action and a policy of concessions detrimental to national action?

[ABBAS] This is really the question of the age. In other words, the main question being raised on the political scene has to do with precisely this point. From my point of view, I think the Palestinian political movement is indeed a battle equalled only by the military battle. This political battle holds opportunities for gain and opportunities for loss, as well as opportunities for victory and opportunities for defeat. When Palestinians decided on their political program, they decided to embark upon war by other means, without abandoning the traditional methods of struggle. To what extent will Palestinian diplomacy succeed in drawing closer to achieving the national rights of the Palestinian revolution? To what extent will Palestinian political flexibility be able to contribute to strengthening the victories of the PLO and the Palestinian people? While the battle rages, it is hard to judge the results, since the dust is still flying.

When the battle subsides, it will be possible for us to determine whether political flexibility has led to concessions or has achieved victories. In my opinion, the Palestinian political process has not offered concessions, especially since the political process goes hand in hand with a varied program of struggle. Our Palestinian people are engaging in political, military, and social struggle. They are engaging in their struggle through all Palestinian groups. So I see no concession. In fact, I think that concessions begin when the other means of struggle cease—in other words, when the political process prevails over the various other means of struggle. The results of the battle could be negative—naturally, we do not believe this will be the case—and they could be positive, visible in our relation to events on the international, Arab, and Palestinian levels and in relation to the balances of forces. Does current Palestinian performance serve the aspirations of the Palestinian people? Since we must judge each stage according to its given realities, we cannot judge the realities of 1990 by the same maxims that held in 1970. We therefore say that we cannot state unconditionally that this concession has been made or that that gain has taken place. The battle in all its forms carries possibilities of gain and possibilities of loss. For the gain to be serious, we think that the political process must be supported by increasing military action against the Zionist enemy, thus producing a balance in the methods of struggle. We shall thereby have insured a positive political and military battle and shall have minimized the negative possibilities.

Dialogue Will Not Move Us From Occupation to Independence

[AL-SHA'B] What are the prospects of the American-Palestinian dialogue?

[ABBAS] It is a fully recognized fact that Israel is a tool of imperialism in the region. It is one of America's direct interests in the world, very much like a major corporation such as General Motors—a corporation that tends American interests in the Middle East. Thus, we consider our main enemy to be the American administration, not merely Israel or the Zionist entity. The American administration is what supports the Zionist enemy. It gives it

billions of dollars a year and grants it all resources, support, and backing. On the other hand, it treats us with extreme hostility—so much so that it passed a resolution or a law forbidding contact with the PLO and worked in international gatherings and organizations to drive through its program of hostility to the struggle and aspirations of our people. Faced with this equation, and based on our perception of the American administration's position, the Palestinian effort is directed toward creating rifts in the enemy camp. The American administration could not ignore the new realities created by our people's glorious intifadah, especially after the resolutions issued by the 19th session of the Palestinian National Council; so it turned to a new policy or a new maneuver. We believe that its decision to open a dialogue with the PLO in the wake of the General Assembly session in Geneva was a result of Palestinian steadfastness. To what extent has this dialogue produced real results, and what are its prospects? The American administration is trying through this dialogue to advance the interests of the Zionist enemy. We, on the other hand, want to advance our right and whatever could inflict defeat upon Israel. As for the points that have been realized against the American administration and its hostile political position, the American administration has to date been dodging and maneuvering and trying to protract the dialogue. It is not trying to enter seriously into the depth of the question. Certainly, one should not say that this dialogue will move us from the stage of occupation to the stage of independence. This dialogue is an aspect of the political battle. It may contribute to further clarifying the picture of the Zionist position, and it will enable us to know the nature of the American position more exactly.

Factions Vying for Power in Tulkarm Refugee Camp

44000189 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 7 Feb 90 p 10

[Text] The confrontation between the different factions vying for positions and control over the direction of the intifadah in the Tulkarm refugee camp is growing worse. Lately there have been reports of violent incidents between youth who are members of Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] and members of the Unified National Leadership that support Fatah. The two camps have not been able to formulate a single policy during the uprising and lately the differences between them have erupted in violence.

ALGERIA

Minister Discusses Problems Within Health Sector

900A0255A Algiers EL MOUDJAHID
in French 22-23 Dec 89 pp 4-5

[Interview with Algerian minister of Health, Akli Kheddis, by N. Talaouanou, date and place not specified: "A Decentralized, Autonomous System"; first six paragraphs are editor's lead]

[Text] It is no secret that the health-care system—every link in the chain—is passing through an interminable critical period. Disastrous conditions in hospitals, abdication of responsibility, dehumanization of overloaded facilities, shortages and stock outages, excessive and bureaucratic centralization: all combine to create an entire system adrift with, subsequently, a deterioration in the quality of service and alienation of citizens and medical and paramedical personnel. At this point it is no exaggeration to liken some units to death wards. The paradox in this situation is that the state is investing ever higher sums at the same time that quality of care is following an upward (sic) curve.

As a consequence, only modern management methods involving rigorous profitability, efficiency and performance criteria can undo the poisonous effects of the situation. And the Ministry of Health's new plan of action comes just in time to redress, definitively we hope, a sector in very sorry shape.

Minister of Health Mr. Akli Kheddis, who was very willing to talk to us about the key elements of the program, does so without rhetorical frills and with all the conciseness and teaching flair that befits a professor and man of action.

The gist of the interview is that from now on a determined effort will be made to put into effect a coherent organizational whole, underpinned by hierarchical, interdependent, and autonomous facilities. Keeping in mind that their autonomy will not be allowed to hinder the public service mission of the health-care sector.

Another strong point: responsibilities are henceforth clearly defined and all facilities and all men, "including the minister," will be subjected to a scientific criterion of evaluation. The central administration, thus freed of bureaucratic topheaviness, will confine itself to the task it should never have forsaken: the conception and drafting of health policy. One is thus tempted to conclude that, though the patient is ill, recovery is possible.

When all is said and done, the aim is to set up dynamic management systems, through the definition of clear and operational objectives, in which everyone—personnel, doctors, executives—will take responsibility and be evaluated at his true worth. And to put an end to the pauperization of care that has prevailed until now.

[EL MOUDJAHID] From shortages to stock outages, the medications sector has more lows than highs, especially in the interior of the country.

What observation can you make, Mr. Minister, on this matter and what measures do you intend to take to remedy the poor functioning of this sector?

[Kheddis] The problem of medications is a strategic one for the country, and we looked into this problem as soon as we arrived. Our position is clear: the three companies in charge of medications (PHARM) are for the most part

autonomous, but the health-care system is still their only customer and so must be demanding.

When a medication is not available, the citizen holds the Ministry of Health responsible. To meet this responsibility, we are asking the three PHARMs to supply the population with adequate quantities of high-quality medications. If the three companies are unable to assume responsibility for purchase, stocking, and distribution, we will look at other solutions to ensure that the people find the medication desired at pharmacy counters throughout the land.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The catalog of medications approved in Algeria, 30,000 copies of which are published and distributed to all doctors, is, in fact, nothing but a list of medications by a common international name (CIN). Medications imported from different countries bear trade names, which raises problems in prescription...

[Kheddis] The importation of medications falls under the province of the autonomous companies, which certainly must take into account the prices of different producer companies, but the ministry, which is the guarantor of the people's health, monitors quality control. The problem of CINs (common international names) will be overcome by requiring pharmacists to be present in their pharmacy labs.

The information must exist between importers and prescribers. Since drug representatives disappeared, physicians are left to their own devices and are not informed of the availability of medications on the Algerian market. This void sometimes explains the prescription of a medication for which another could be substituted, but which the citizen perceives as a shortage, occasioning distress "caused" by a lack of information.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The pharmacists, not in their pharmacies, chase after their orders and the three companies in charge of medications are unable to organize a rational distribution. Don't you think, Mr. Minister, that it would be more profitable for everyone if a pharmaceutical office were created that confined itself solely to the importation of medications and authorized the establishment of pharmacist-wholesalers or cooperatives across the country?

[Kheddis] The distribution of medications must be decentralized as much as possible throughout the country to avoid wasting pharmacists' time and to allow them to be where they should be: behind their counter.

As for the future, that is, "the creation of an office" as you suggest, I will merely recount what I said to the general managers of the three PHARMs: "I cannot tolerate the existence of a monopoly that is suffocating the medications sector, the responsibility for which falls to the ministry. You have three functions: the purchase, the stocking, and the distribution of medications. If you are unable to carry out these tasks, we can consider

[creating] an organization responsible for grouping orders and purchasing them abroad."

The two other functions, stocking and distribution, can easily be handled at the national level.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Drug addictions involving medications are affecting part of our youth. Regulations concerning medication deliveries are rarely applied and drug addicts are disconcertingly successful in procuring the products, not to mention the fact that real "connections" exist in hospitals.

[Kheddis] We have recently signed two circulars to combat this plague:

- The first shores up regulations on delivery to distribution companies and hospitals of medications used by drug addicts.
- The second updates regulations on toxic and narcotic substances.

At the same time, we have revitalized the pharmacist-inspector corps, which must monitor the application of these circulars in warehouses, hospitals, and pharmacies. Finally, we will shortly set up a national narcotics commission in charge of strategy and prevention among the people.

[EL MOUDJAHID] It is no secret that our hospitals are in deplorable, even scandalous, condition. In your opinion, to what can this be ascribed?

[Kheddis] The critical state of our hospitals has a number of causes:

- poor working conditions of health-care personnel;
- -dead-ended careers without prospects for the future, which has led to a demobilization of medical and paramedical corps;
- a total lack of management: undefined tasks, diluted responsibilities, a bureaucratic top heaviness that results in all problems being dealt with at the ministerial level.

With a decentralized, autonomous health-care system that handled problems locally, we would get better results with the same financial resources.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Over two decades, one policy after another to improve medical services in emergency departments has been proposed, without any perceptible results. Are these policies doomed to remain dead letters in the medical sector?

[Kheddis] The problem of emergency rooms has always been a priority for different health-care officials and still haunts citizens.

Initially, it is necessary to distinguish between the triage center and the real emergency room. In the first, we must be capable of receiving patients that do not require very specialized care. Conversely, the emergency room must be staffed with high-level specialists who have adequate

means for immediately taking charge of patients whose condition is deemed "critical." The emergency room must not, however, be separated from the other hospital departments.

An emergency room, which has a limited holding capacity, works around the clock. To prevent it from quickly becoming filled to overflowing, it is essential that patients admitted the day before be rapidly evacuated to the other specialized floors of the hospital.

Generally speaking, the emergency room cannot perform well if the other floors are deficient. This shows that the problem is a global one, and an emergency room that functions well is a sign of a well-functioning hospital.

In the past, emergency departments were staffed with paramedical personnel sent from other floors as a disciplinary measure and whose attitude was "rejecting," which aggravated patients' distress.

It is essential that the best personnel be assigned to emergency, through the use of incentives, and that patients be received in a manner that relaxes them.

[EL MOUDJAHID] To pursue the previous question, do you think, Mr. Minister, that the fact that care is free of charge is one of the factors behind the inextricable problems facing hospitals?

[Kheddis] It must be stressed that care is not free, it is reimbursed by the CNASAT [expansion unknown], and it costs citizens dearly. The present situation, however, is explained by poor health-care management.

There is no hierarchy of care, no real responsibility for patients taken in different facilities. All patients are funneled to the large hospitals, and particularly to the university centers, who cannot meet the ever growing demand.

[EL MOUDJAHID] There are serious deficiencies in the maintenance of medical equipment, which not only costs the country a lot in foreign currency, but also increasingly contributes to further tarnishing the image of our medical facilities. Does the ministry have a new approach to this question?

[Kheddis] The maintenance of medical equipment is a priority for the proper functioning of our hospitals. There are three types of maintenance:

1) Preventive maintenance: this ensures that equipment is kept up and must be taken care of by hospitals. We have asked different facilities to recruit maintenance engineers and technicians to make sure the entire stock of equipment functions well.

2) Second-degree maintenance: this is primarily the problem of spare parts. This area currently falls under ENEMEDI [expansion unknown], with whom hospitals will contract. The contracts will stipulate that repair calls be made within 24 hours; repair must be done within a precise timeframe.

Failing this, the hospital will purchase the part on its AGI [expansion unknown] and will be reimbursed in foreign currency. These clauses will force ENEMEDI to perform.

3) Third-degree maintenance: this concerns heavy equipment and will be the responsibility of the supplier, who must respect the terms of the purchase contract.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Algeria is enormously proud of the fact that it has 30,000 practicing physicians today, a far from negligible number. Paradoxically, it is becoming more and more difficult to find doctors at their stations, especially in the afternoons, in most hospitals in the country. With the deontological rules being respected less and less, don't you think, Mr. Minister, that a persistence of the situation may seriously compromise all the government's efforts to rehabilitate the health-care sector and to improve services?

[Kheddis] The absence of doctors in hospitals is not the rule. Many physicians are at their stations and are carrying out their duties, often under difficult conditions. To reform the situation, it is essential to:

- a) make physicians more responsible for managing hospitals;
- b) improve working conditions;
- c) promote interest in productivity through incentives.

All these measures are planned as part of the [shift to] the autonomy of health-care facilities.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Apparently there is talk of adopting the system of "arranged full time" for the medical professions, at a time when the absentee rate for specialists in hospitals is already alarming. Won't this formula aggravate things still more? Particularly as certain countries, notably Tunisia, who experimented with it had to resign themselves to dropping it due to a backlash?

[Kheddis] The problem of moonlighting will be discussed very shortly with all of our colleagues. It will be a contract between the hospital and the physician. It will precisely define the doctor's obligations to the sector and the activities that can be pursued outside official working hours.

[EL MOUDJAHID] There was a huge outcry about private clinics when the APN [extension unknown] discussed the plan. What is their status today?

[Kheddis] An amendment to the 1985 law authorizes the opening of private clinics.

A decree and an order stipulate the regulatory conditions and the technical specifications for creating and running these facilities. The walis have currently been notified of 12 authorizations to open, eight of which were granted in the last 2 months.

[EL MOUDJAHID] In contrast to all other Third World countries, Algeria—to guard its independence or simply from an exaggerated sense of self-importance—disdains the use of gifts and subsidies from international organizations such as WHO, UNICEF, and the UNFPA [United Nations Fund for Population Activities], although it is regularly caught up on its dues. Your opinion, Mr. Minister?

[Kheddis] Our participation in international organizations has not been neglected and we have already contacted officials of different organizations. We participated in the demographics forum in Amsterdam. We proposed our plan and adjusted the budget allocated us.

Other UNICEF and WHO projects have been updated and are being implemented.

Relations with international organizations were not developed as they might have been. It is the ministry's duty to give a new impetus to this cooperation.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The elimination of zoning increasingly threatens the interior regions with a rollback in medical personnel. In your opinion, Mr. Minister, how can we prevent this measure from forcing the country, in the long run, from calling once again on foreign cooperants in areas where Algerian doctors are reluctant to set up practice?

[Kheddis] The elimination of zoning raises the problem of recruiting doctors in the interior. As part of the move toward decentralization and autonomy, this recruitment will be done locally.

To attract specialists to remote areas, local officials will have to offer contracts featuring optimum material benefits to attract young doctors.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The official fee schedule for medical services is not used by practitioners in the liberal sector, who consider it outmoded. Don't you think, Mr. Minister, that it has become urgent to update and rigorously apply it, so that patients do not bear the burden of a failure to apply regulatory laws?

[Kheddis] The fee schedule for medical services must not be frozen and must be periodically revised. Monitoring of an updated fee schedule will be done strictly, in collaboration with the CNASAT.

Finally, specialized services in the private sector will also be standardized, based on competence. This will allow doctors to boost their credibility.

[EL MOUDJAHID] At a time when AIDS represents a real danger to the people, blood testing is still confined to the large hospitals, and the lack of disposable syringes and condoms is deplored. The state has a responsibility here. What is your policy on the matter?

[Kheddis] AIDS and hepatitis are the responsibility of the ministry and testing must be done in transfusion

centers, since these two diseases are primarily transmitted through the blood. In the past, blood transfusion centers were created by local authorities without the approval of the ministry. Their location was not rational and the technical conditions (equipment) and qualified personnel were not cleared.

A blood-transfusion committee has been set up in the ministry and there are plans for:

- 1) A decree organizing blood transfusion in Algeria.

Location of centers will be more rational and general practitioners with supplemental training will take charge of centers at the wilaya level.

- 2) Another decree will deal with blood testing (AIDS, viral hepatitis and syphilis). The equipment essential for this testing will be available in different wilayas starting in June of 1990.

It should be pointed out that testing is now done in UHCs (university hospital centers).

It's true that the availability of disposable syringes and condoms is essential to fight AIDS. Import organizations are required to efficiently assume responsibility for this problem.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Hundreds of pharmaceutical agencies remain without pharmacists in 1989, placing the PHARMs in an illegal situation, while young pharmacists are unemployed. Why, Mr. Minister, don't your departments apply the regulations in effect?

[Kheddis] You must not forget that the PHARMs are autonomous, but are obligated to recruit the pharmacists who must assume responsibility for the functioning of agencies. To date, about 450 pharmacists have been recruited and efforts must be sustained to cover national needs.

[EL MOUDJAHID] At a time when decentralization is being pushed, the Ministry of Health maintains a monopoly on recruitment of doctors, thereby creating a real bureaucracy with no logic to it. Your point of view on this subject?

[Kheddis] The monopoly on recruiting physicians is a thing of the past. As soon as we arrived, we disseminated a circular stipulating that recruitment would be done in health districts and hospitals. This circular has already been applied at different levels.

It should be stressed that the ministry is incapable of managing health care throughout the land. As part of the move toward decentralization, and soon autonomy, all problems will be solved locally.

The ministry's mission can be boiled down to well-defined tasks:

- the initiation of health programs;
- negotiating for resources essential for attaining goals;
- evaluation and planning on a national scale.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The need for oral surgeons is crucial—yet those already trained do not have dental chairs with which to work and there are even cases where five to seven dentists are working with one chair. Why does this situation exist and what can be done to remedy it?

[Kheddis] The current situation in the department of "oral surgery" is the result of bad planning. If we are going to train specialists, we must plan to provide their working tools. If we don't, we find ourselves in a paradoxical situation:

- specialists not practicing their speciality and losing time needed to qualify in their fields;
- unmet needs.

To correct the situation, a dental-chair assembly plant is planned that will gradually reduce the shortage.

[EL MOUDJAHID] While the demographic peril is the subject of debate, we have no dynamic family-planning policy. What, Mr. Minister, is the government's policy on this matter?

[Kheddis] The birthrate problem is a topical one. No nation can develop without controlling demographic growth.

In 1983, the government adapted a national demographic-growth program. It involved several sectors and was coordinated by social security.

Since June of 1989, the program has been under the direct authority of the Ministry of Health. Its plans include:

- 1) the designation of a physician and midwife per wilaya (retrained to manage the program);
- 2) retraining of midwives in the use of new contraceptive methods at the health-district level.

INSP (National Public Health Institute?) and ANAF [expansion unknown] will be responsible for informing and educating the people.

This problem is everyone's business—all ministries should contribute in some way, notably in education. Finally, the Algerian family-planning association must participate effectively in the operations of this vast program.

A national study conducted in 1986 (done by the CENEAP [expansion unknown]) showed that 35 percent of women of childbearing age use a contraceptive method.

We are now seeing a drop in the rate of population growth, which is 2.7 percent.

Objectives for the year 2000 are:

- 36,000 inhabitants;
- a growth rate of 2.2 percent, which assumes that 61 percent of women will have used a contraceptive method.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Medical associations have been formed. How, Mr. Minister, do you plan to get them to participate in projects concerning the profession?

[Kheddis] We have invited the different groups that make up the medical corps, through their professional associations, to debate and to make proposals that will be used to draft a national deontological code.

[EL MOUDJAHID] You have reached the level of minister of health. What is our health situation and what measures, Mr. Minister, do you plan to take to improve health care?

[Kheddis] The country's health situation is denounced both by the people and by practitioners. A certain number of points are worth noting:

- There is a directorate for health facilities and a directorate for UHCs; well, health is not divisible and all facilities are complementary in the hierarchy of care.
- This duality was repeated out in the field, opposing health districts and university centers.

In the interests of the patient, relations between practitioners and administrators in different facilities should be close.

- The health districts, which deliver a large portion of medical care in the land, are under managed.

Evaluations were never done and no interest was taken in any district unless there was a huge problem to be solved, in response to a catastrophe. All solutions dealt only with one piece of the picture, and were most often dictated by the pressure of events.

- The UHCs have become real health centers that are collapsing under the weight of ever greater demands, for little responsibility is taken for patients in the interior.

Over the last few years, the ministry has never had a policy for training administrators, which explains the poor management of health care. The problems that cropped up in all facilities were the responsibility of the central administration. This centralized and inefficient bureaucratic management led to a demobilization of health personnel, faced with daily realities whose solution depended on a "decisionmaking center" that excluded caregivers.

To revitalize public health and to restore confidence, of both caregivers and patients, it is imperative that we propose another system of health care: autonomous health facilities. For that, we need managers.

Besides the competent administrators the country already has, a national public-health school that has been operating in Oran for a year and should supply 75 administrators annually.

Moreover, training abroad gave us 20 administrators in 1989.

During 1990, management will be decentralized in all facilities:

- Recruitment, as I already mentioned, is being done locally.
- Hospitals will be given an AGI for nondurable supplies and an AGI for equipment, starting in 1990.
- Health districts will have autonomous budgets with an AGI for nondurables.

These measures will enable facilities to function more effectively and to make decisions locally.

At the same time, autonomous status will be granted to a pilot UHC and a pilot health district.

In 1991 the entire health-care system will convert to autonomous status.

Renewed Official Commitment to Youth Development

90OA0255B Algiers EL MOUDJAHID
in French 22-23 Dec 89 p 3

[Text] At the close of the national seminar on socioprofessional integration and promotion of youth, Mr. Moudoud Hamrouche, prime minister, made a speech in the Palace of Nations Thursday afternoon. In it he touched on different national issues, in particular, certain practices that are a danger not only to public order but also to national institutions.

After reminding his listeners that Algeria was going through a new phase, concerned with quality, which requires that everyone understand its objectives and the changes and new necessities imposed by society, the head of government stressed the need to know the realities and the situation in order to avoid mistakes and to prevent young people from making them as well.

Evoking past steps, Mr. Hamrouche declared that "though we are grateful to those who preceded us and grateful for their efforts, we will not take a backward step," indicating, moreover, that "the present crisis is the result of a failure in the management and understanding of social relations. This failure is due to a lack of adjustment to new changes."

Reforms, a Stimulus for the Public Sector

On the subject of reforms, Mr Hamrouche asserted that those seeking to stir doubts about them—accusing them of being attempts to liquidate the public sector and to abandon the interests of workers, and maintaining that they constitute an open-door policy—are in reality the

very same people who desire the latter, along with the elimination of the public sector.

"These reforms," he added, "are a stimulus for the public sector, to make it more efficient and removed from pressures, and to ensure autonomous decisionmaking."

The first aim of the reforms, he said, is to enable citizens to meet challenges thanks to a strong economy and to give executives full power to exercise their prerogatives in a clear and open manner.

He reminded his listeners that "before, companies were 'economic' by law, but in reality their management was centrally governed in according to the desires of a group of people ignorant of realities."

"From that situation was born the idea of granting complete autonomy to companies to free them in managing their strategy," he went on to say.

Democracy Is Everyone's Business

In this context, the head of government talked about administrative reform and the elimination of bureaucracy.

Discussing the political reforms, Mr. Hamrouche said that society's vitality and development created a dynamic that outstripped measures. These circumstances prompted the October events, which the head of government considers the consequence of structural stagnation in different areas and of the marginalization of the majority of society, which was excluded from official institutions.

"The reforms today aim at ending marginalization, particularly the marginalization of young people," he added.

The head of government then brought up democracy and certain dangers that threaten it, such as violence. On that point he said: "As a government we accept certain excesses of expression, the exercise of freedom and the freedom to criticize, for we are at the beginning of a road that will enable society to find a formula for self-expression. But we will never accept violence and will react forcefully against all those who try to threaten the state and destabilize its institutions." He also emphasized that those institutions will be permanent and are the property of the people. Democracy functions only in a stable social situation that protects public safety.

"We will deploy the full potential of the state to preserve freedom and the freedom of the individual to express himself free of pressure. Democracy is everyone's business, especially young people's, for it is they who have the greatest stake, through the future," he added.

In the same context, Mr. Hamrouche appealed to young people to be vigilant toward politicians and demagogues, to be above superficial discussions, and to show more

interest in the educational and training system, particularly in the quality of training and its relations with the working world.

Islam, Above Politics

On the subject of youth associations, Mr. Hamrouche affirmed that young people were free to organize themselves in any manner. To avoid any sort of manipulation, they must, however, remain independent of all factions.

The top concerns of the country, he said, are to adapt itself to the ways of developed countries and to narrow the chasm separating us from the sciences and technology. He further stated that the danger lay not in technology but in isolation and a turning inward.

On the subject of Islam, Mr. Hamrouche indicated that the essence of attachment to spiritual values does not lie in the clothes one wears, but rather that the essential task is to arm the people with the spirit and values of Islam. The only threat against Islam, he said, is the attempt to use it for political ends. For our part, he remarked, we hold Islam above politics and the state.

With respect to the role and place of women in society, Mr. Hamrouche said that Islam makes no distinction between men and women. But each will be judged by his acts: at the last judgement, he said, there will not be one hell for men and another for women.

The battle under way is a battle for the destiny and place of Algeria in the world, added Mr. Hamrouche, before concluding that the future is in the hands of the young, who must meet the challenges. Likewise, he assured his listeners that the government will make a serious effort to deal with the problems of young people, using the methods and means most apt to bring it closer to them and to hear their voice.

Imam El-Ghazali Rejects 'Nationalist Ideologies'

90OA0259B Algiers *EL MOUDJAHID*
in French 7 Dec 89 p 24

[Article: "Imam El-Ghazali Tizi-Ouzou: 'The Koranic Message Recognizes as Its Own the Virtues of Science and Knowledge'"]

[Text] APS—Noted for his religious talks on Algerian television, Islamic scholar Imam El-Ghazali gave a lecture Tuesday afternoon at a House of Culture packed to the rafters (about 1,200 people) on the theme: "The Brotherhood of Faith, the Foundation of Islamic Society."

In his talk Imam El-Ghazali, the author of numerous theological works, expressed his vision of the world and the "Islamic Umma" in light of the Koranic message. The relationship between Islam and science, an imperative in the service of the faith and the faithful, and the necessary unity of the Muslims in this entity, which is the Umma, were developed at length by the former

chairman of the Scientific Council of the Islamic University of Constantine, who, in connection with this, voiced his firm opposition to "nationalist ideologies," asserting that only faith in God's truth as revealed by the Koran and the Sunna of the Prophet can constitute the ferment of Muslim unity.

Drawing a parallel with the efforts of other religions and tendencies hostile to Islam, Imam El-Ghazali called on Muslims to impregnate themselves with the Koranic message and to recognize as their own the virtues of science and knowledge for the purpose of further promoting the religion of peace and brotherhood.

Technical Language Committee Established

90OA0259A Algiers *EL MOUDJAHID*
in French 8-9 Dec 89 p 3

[Article: "Technical Committee on Science and Technology Instruction in Arabic Established"]

[Text] Deputy Minister of Universities Abdessalam Ali Rachedi established a technical committee on science and technology instruction in Arabic on Wednesday. This technical committee is composed of a multidisciplinary team of eminent university instructors who have lengthy experience in the fields of science, education, linguistics, various branches of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology.... Its mission is to define an appropriate methodology likely to enable instructors to master the teaching of sciences and technology in Arabic. This committee has also been assigned the mission of identifying the methods commensurate with quality instruction in these disciplines.

EGYPT

NDP Candidates Win Peoples' Assembly By-Elections

45000074 Cairo *AL-AKHBAR* in Arabic 1 Feb 90 p 6

[Report by Buthaynah Zakariyya]

[Text] Bani Suwayf—Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman Wafi, the National Democratic Party's [NDP]'s candidate, won in the Bani Suwayf District with 467,248 votes. He works as the NDP secretary general's treasurer. He won the seat left open by the death of 'Abbas Safi-al-Din.

NDP candidates Fathi Hashish and Muhammad al-'Azab also won the People's Assembly elections in the first and second districts of al-Daqahliyah Governorate. The elections were held following the deaths of Shafiq Hashish and 'Abd-al-Fattah Salih. Fathi Hashish received 46.65 percent of the votes and Muhammad al-'Azab received 63.84 percent.

Government's Public Sector Policy Rejected**Labor Union Position***90OA0261A Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 13 Dec 89 p 1*

[Text] Representatives of 13 labor unions in the Labor Federation have rejected the plan for [establishing] holding companies, reiterating their denunciation of the attempt to sell the public sector under any guise.

Labor representatives stated during discussions of the committee on developing the public sector set up by the federation that the public sector problems lie in the policies and trends aimed at striking at the public sector and liquidating it. They demanded granting the public sector the same facilities and exemptions granted to the private sector, banning the public sector from participating in new joint companies, reducing the number of controlling bodies, altering the profits distribution system by setting aside part of the profits for replacement and refurbishing purposes without encroaching on the workers' rights, collecting the government's debts owed to public sector companies, and merging companies.

On the other hand, a committee has been set up in Alexandria consisting of political forces, independent personalities, and labor unions in order to resist efforts aimed at liquidating the public sector.

Strict instructions were issued a few days ago by the political leadership to the NDP [National Democratic Party] and the committees on developing the public sector stressing the need to speed up completion [of the task] and finalizing the development proposals and the proposed new form before the end of the year so that the cabinet will be able to discuss it and submit it to the People's Assembly in order to obtain the necessary legislation. The [public sector] development committees have precluded heads of public sector companies and bodies from their discussions. The committee on industries headed by Fu'ad Abu-Zaghlah submitted proposals to abolish public sector bodies and establish holding companies.

It is worth noting that the proposed system involves changing the existing labor union committees system by abolishing the independent committees in every unit and providing one single labor union committee for every holding company; the committee is to be representative of the companies of which the holding company consists. The general assembly system is to be amended and its jurisdictions curtailed.

It is known that delegations from the World Bank and the IMF are scheduled to visit Egypt in January in order to discuss the government's earlier pledges to meet all the demands by the bank and the fund with regard to the public sector.

Editorial Sees Piecemeal Policy*90OA0261B Cairo AL-AHALI
in Arabic 13 Dec 89 pp 3, 6*

[Article by Mahmud al-Maraghi]

[Text] An upheaval seems to be awaiting the public sector, upheaval that will affect ownership, administration, wages and prices system, workers participation in management, and their right to labor organization.

The upheaval will apparently go beyond that; it will involve a redefinition of the role of the state, the government, and the ministry.

Despite the fact that details of the government plan have not yet been fully revealed, yet what we perceive of it is a "piecemeal" system that is certainly disturbing and, at least, deserves attention and discussion.

The government has raised the slogan of "holding companies" as a substitute for the bodies' controlling companies. Regardless of the fact that we have repeatedly complained of the frequent changes and their effect on production and relations within the public sector, it is expected, according to the proposed holding companies plan, that the following will take place:

1) The holding companies will merely be a financial portfolio. They will have nothing to do with control, follow up, or coordination, which is presently the jurisdiction of the [controlling] boards and was previously the jurisdiction of [public sector] institutions. The basic task of those bodies was to prevent conflict between similar or complementary companies, to make maximum use of available expertise, to help the central government organs to overcome obstacles, and even to enable providing correct foreign representation abroad (as has happened in the case of the cotton sector, for example).

The new system will abandon these functions but will continue to deal with part of the ownership affairs and matters resulting from it such as selection of management boards and reviewing their budgets.

2) In the light of this view, capital can be turned into shares exchanged in the stock market, some of which will transfer to the private sector.

3) Company merging will play a role here; certain management boards (both appointees and producers) will be abolished and so will the labor union committees. Management boards will be on the level of the holding company which might include 10 or 20 companies. In other words, we are consecrating the idea of the autocrat, the power-vested director, and are undermining any effect collective leadership or labor pressure may have.

4) We will return to the experiment of integrated institutions in its early stages when an industrial company would merge with a commercial company and with a financing bank. What a year ago we called a founder,

now we call a holding company, with the great difference that political support in the first instance meant great status and influence for the public sector in the society while in the new organization the trend is toward the government taking its hands off and maintaining only the flimsiest of links. Investments in the market will be subject to general economic rules, to making profit or loss, and to bankruptcy, yet they are not subject to any social commitments. In order for this to be achieved, the ministries' control should be abolished. While in the past we complained of centralization, the cabinet is creating a new centralization under the prime minister's leadership. This centralization means abolishing control over the public sector or just maintaining nominal control, leaving the economic [units] to fumble about each according to its own efforts. Some people even call for this effort to be free of any centralized planning. Correct planning, according to proponents of the school of thought whose voice is now heard loudest, is "indexed planning"; that is the state proposes and thinks and projects are decided upon.

This is happening in a country suffering from acute shortage of resources and where there is dire need to channel resources as best as can be. It is happening in a country in which 3 million young men are sitting at home unemployed. It is happening in a country in which prices are increasing at the rate of 40 percent annually and the state's prestige and control is waning. In the meantime a group of investment companies has been able to defraud more than 2 million citizens, with one of the companies being able to accumulate about 2 billion pounds, while the government is unable to build an efficient public sector.

We are not saying stop reform. Reform is desired and the economic function of the public sector units is essential. There are a thousand ways to separate ownership from management and to increase productivity, according to the principle "each according to his work." Nobody disagrees with these principles, but there is a difference between developing the private sector and inventing solutions for our problems, or accepting—willingly or unwillingly—the World Bank's request for development in a particular direction. We would submit and retreat because international organizations have the power to give or withhold. We are in debt and unable to pay the installments.

There is a difference between the two. Let the government provide us with the perfect project and let it be discussed. The "piecemeal" policy is insufficient to form a point of view. We are compelled to voice public opinion before we miss the bus and are surprised by the unpredictable.

Maritime Sovereignty, Antipollution Stance Stressed

90A0234C Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI
in Arabic 26 Dec 89 p 6

[Text] All nations of the world are becoming strict about protecting their rights of sovereignty over their territories, air space, and regional waters, because encroachment on these rights involves many notions of danger

posing a threat to national security, and because such encroachment means the violation by foreign elements of a nation's sovereign rights, which cannot be permitted, even if from afar.

Hence, the recent Egyptian measures to confront all forms and appearances of violation of its national laws are not an embellishment on Egypt's part. Nor do they reflect sensitivity on the part of executive agencies and investigation agencies, because the state's international reputation for safeguarding its rights and those of its people is an important element in reinforcing respect for the state and confidence in its government, and executive, judicial, and legislative agencies. The recent group of measures taken by the competent authorities to protect Egyptian sea coasts from pollution and to pursue those who act unlawfully against natural marine resources in the Red Sea area is a clear warning signal to anyone who lets himself be seduced into coming close to [violating] Egyptian rights of sovereignty, regardless of his nationality and character, because Egyptian laws do not distinguish between nationalities.

A tracking of the course of the investigation of the Filipino ship that struck an Egyptian oil platform underscores Egypt's concern for protecting its rights of sovereignty through proof and confirmed facts, to which it can always gain access through capable, competent, and knowledgeable agencies. This should be a warning to anyone who allows himself to be seduced into violating a right of sovereignty. Such violations will be detected regardless of how perfect or concealed they are, because whatever happens can be observed, analyzed, and tracked.

New Measures Restrict Israeli Maritime Activities 45000202 Cairo AL-HAQIAH in Arabic 16 Dec 89 p 1

[Report by Muhammad Hilmi]

[Text] Egyptian authorities have refused to permit Israeli boats to stop for snorkeling outside of the boundaries of Fir'awn Island and it is prohibited to sail to any neighboring area. It has also been decided not to permit fishing along the Egyptian coast in the Gulf of 'Aqaba.

The Foreign Ministry informed the Egyptian border authority in the region of the new measures concerning the regulation of maritime traffic in the Gulf of 'Aqaba.

It has been learned that the new measures include setting up an Egyptian consulate in Eilat to make boat owners sign pledges in writing requiring them to follow the maritime traffic instructions publicized by the consulate and written on the backs of permits and of warnings of violation.

Shaykh Tantawi on Israelis, Fatwa, Islamic Banking

90OA0222B London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 18 Dec 89 pp 25-27

[Interview with the Mufti of Egypt Shaykh Tantawi by Nadi al-Qassas; place and date not specified]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

[AL-DUSTUR] Your eminence's doctoral dissertation was entitled "The Israelites in the Koran and the *Sunna* [legally binding precedents of Islam]." What, specifically did you treat?

[Shaykh Tantawi] I dealt with the *Hadith* [prophetic tradition] regarding the Israelites, not in legal or political language, but in the language of religion. I cited Koranic verses and noble prophetic traditions, and I explained them scientifically and clearly. The main pivots of the dissertation revolved around the method of peace in the [prophet's missionary] call to Christians and Jews, the Jews' courses of action in fighting the Islamic call, the encounter of the sword between the Muslims and the Jews in the prophetic era, their invalid claims, and the Koran's response to them.

[AL-DUSTUR] What is Islam's judgement on the Israelites according to your eminence's study?

[Shaykh Tantawi] The Koran's judgement is contained in tens of verses. Good treatment was heralded to the Jews if they treated the Muslims well. However, they are assailing our brothers in Palestine, and they are fighting the uprising which arose to recover rights enjoined by God.

[AL-DUSTUR] What is the legal way for dealing with them so long as they are assailing Muslims?

[Shaykh Tantawi] If they attack us or our brothers, the correct path in responding to them is contained in the noble Koran: "Fight in the service of God whoever fights you and do not act aggressively; verily God does not love aggressors."

[AL-DUSTUR] On this basis, what is your eminence's opinion regarding the daring action of the Egypt's Revolution organization.

[Shaykh Tantawi] What do you mean by Egypt's Revolution?!

[Shaykh Tantawi] The organization that assassinated (Israeli) intelligence elements in Cairo.

[Shaykh Tantawi] These are political matters. We have not heard enough about the matter to be familiar with it. I know that the matter is currently being examined in court, and it would be incorrect to issue any judgments about it until the court has its say.

[AL-DUSTUR] I am not asking about your eminence's opinion of the group, but whether it is legally permissible to kill officers of the Mosad?

[Shaykh Tantawi] Killing them is permitted if there is a war between us, and they came to spy on us. However, if there is a treaty or armistice, and they came as visitors, and the state knows of their presence, killing them is prohibited. A judgement on the danger of the Mosad's presence in Egypt is the purview of the foreign minister, the military intelligence agency, or the Interior Ministry (!)

[AL-DUSTUR] Is one's knowledge confined to his position?

[AL-DUSTUR] Yes, certainly.

[Shaykh Tantawi] Does that mean that your eminence has no right to an independent opinion if you leave your position?

[Shaykh Tantawi] (After a brief moment of silence, he responded:) You are confusing matters, because expressing one's opinion is a right guaranteed to all. As for the issuance of judgments, it is the domain of the holder of the position, in other words, the person in charge.

[AL-DUSTUR] Is it legally permissible to negotiate with the Israelites when they are occupying Arab land, and tens of casualties are falling at their hands in Palestine?

[Shaykh Tantawi] These are organizational matters with which the ruler is familiar.

[AL-DUSTUR] I am speaking about the legal aspect...Is this permitted?

[Shaykh Tantawi] (Interrupting) Legally, it is permitted. If the Jews or others are attacking my people, it is permitted to defend them with every method. Negotiations are a legitimate defense method, and a way of stopping bloodshed, if I cannot repel the enemy and deter him with the sword. Therefore, every weapon is permitted as long as it regains a right.

[AL-DUSTUR] Including force?

[Shaykh Tantawi] Naturally, force is first. What compels us to negotiate is (the inability) to use force. There is currently no way to return a blow except negotiations until we regain our power, at which time, we will use force. [passage omitted]

The Office of Mufti: Between the Position and the Ulema

[AL-DUSTUR] Your eminence, who has the right to hold the office of the mufti?

[Shaykh Tantawi] A person possessing the aptitude for the office of mufti must have studied the *shari'ah* [Islamic law], sciences, and the Arab language, and memorized the Koran and the Sunna of God's prophet,

God bless him and grant him salvation. It is not a condition that he be completely conversant with the Islamic *shari'ah*.

[AL-DUSTUR] Some believe that nomination for religious posts must come through elections and not appointment. What is your eminence's opinion?

[Shaykh Tantawi] I welcome both methods. However, this matter is organizational, subject to the opinion of the ruler, who may believe in the fairness of elections, or may believe that elections would lead to discord or struggle between currents, and that it is preferable to refrain from them. These matters are subject to differing appraisals depending on circumstances and conditions.

[AL-DUSTUR] There are many *fatwas* [formal, religious, legal opinions] circulating on the Egyptian scene. Why have al-Azhar and the office of the mufti not dealt with them so far.

[Shaykh Tantawi] Neither al-Azhar nor the office of the mufti are in a position to muzzle the mouths of the people. All that we ask from one who issues a *fatwa* is adherence to faith and knowledge.

[AL-DUSTUR] And who shall oppose one who issues a *fatwa* without knowledge?

[Shaykh Tantawi] God, may he be praised and exalted, shall call him to account, and the state also has the right to call him to account.

Al-Sha'rawi Is Muhammad 'Abdu's Successor

[AL-DUSTUR] Why is the role of the ulema contracting compared to before, and why are the ulema no longer symbols of enlightenment movements in society or the political and social leadership?

[AL-DUSTUR] The role of the ulema is not contracting, but expanding compared to before, as indicated by their fulfillment of their legitimate functions pertaining to the office of the mufti and the teaching of the *shari'ah* and Arabic grammar, which is the foundation of their purview. Some of the ulema are members of the People's Assembly and the Consultative Assembly, and they participate in the different shades of political life. All fields are guaranteed to the ulema, subject to their personal choice.

[AL-DUSTUR] Do the ulema in the Arab nation have a role or function in the leadership of the enlightenment movement?

[Shaykh Tantawi] What then is the function of the ulema if they do not perform an enlightening role? What is my function? I am at the head of the enlightenment. The ulema do not have to engage in politics to be judged enlightening. We are in the age of specialization, and enlightenment, and in my personal view, each person is adhering to and mastering his purview. A manifestation of barrenness afflicting nations is the person who leaves

his specialty to shove his nose into the specialties of others without knowledge or understanding.

[AL-DUSTUR] Who currently plays the role of Shaykh Muhammad 'Abdu in your eminence's opinion?

[Shaykh Tantawi] Shaykh Muhammad 'Abdu was ahead of his time. However, we have those who surpasses him, including, for example, Shaykh Muhammad Mutawalli al-Sha'rawi. He has knowledge and culture which are benefiting millions.

Investment Companies [passage omitted]

[AL-DUSTUR] What is the judgement of Islamic law regarding companies or banks that describe themselves as Islamic, but do not apply Islam in their dealings?

[Shaykh Tantawi] Islamic banks have my esteem and support if they collect and disburse funds according to what is permissible, pay the state its due, help to create employment opportunities, and treat people well by paying them their full due. If they are as you say, they must be called to account for their deviation.

[AL-DUSTUR] I am not speaking about deviations, but about the extent to which they claim to adhere to Islam.

[Shaykh Tantawi] I cannot judge them economically. Nor can I know the difference between them and other types of companies. This is the purview of economists. I am a jurist. I have only a legal opinion.

[AL-DUSTUR] The dispute is not about economic transactions, but about the application of the *shari'ah*. Do they adhere to it as they claim?

[Shaykh Tantawi] I do not know. Those who investigate them should know.

[AL-DUSTUR] The investment companies have used Islam in commerce and in deceiving the people. Why does the office of the mufti not deal with this phenomenon?

[Shaykh Tantawi] Since the investment companies appeared, the office of the mufti has had a clear and conclusive position, since I said, in my capacity as the mufti, that the office of the mufti supports these companies and wishes them success as long as they proceed on the straight path by amassing their wealth according to legal methods, expending it in a permissible manner beneficial to society, and paying what is due God and the state.

As for the companies that smuggle funds abroad, lie to their clients, and hide behind Islam, we will fight them and fight them.

[AL-DUSTUR] What is your eminence's opinion on the use of Islam in commercial matters (regarding banks or companies)?

[Shaykh Tantawi] Nothing precludes that, provided that whoever describes himself as Islamic adheres to the *shari'ah* completely.

[AL-DUSTUR] Is your eminence of the opinion that a bank or company can engage in business according to the *shari'ah* with a bank or states which do not adhere to Islam?

[Shaykh Tantawi] In all cases, these Islamic companies or banks must conduct their foreign and domestic business pursuant to the requirements of the *shari'ah*. We would like for all Islamic and other institutions to adhere to fairness and honesty and to stay away from usury, greed, and exploitation, or from institutions that tarnish their dealings with exploitation and greed, do not adhere to the *shari'ah*, and for whom the self-description "Islamic" would be inappropriate.

Government Critic Calls Egypt Pluralistic, Not Democratic

45000203 Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 13 Dec 89 p 5

[Excerpt] Ahmad Baha'-al-Din has said, "Egypt does not live in a state of democracy, but rather a state of pluralism. Democracy means an opposition party being able to come to sit in the seats of power while the ruling party goes to the opposition benches. It has been made clear that this is most futile in the state's view but not in the minds of the opposition."

Ahmad Baha'-al-Din said, at the "Future of Egypt" conference at Cairo University's political studies center, that the ruling regime has discovered potential harsh feelings against the keys of real power remaining in the hands of those in charge of them.

"The president can go to Europe and say, 'Look, the opposition is vilifying me.' He says this despite the fact that all authority rests in his hands. He has consolidated the success of pluralism without democracy in Egypt for 10 years while Arab countries, 'like Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan' have begun reorganizing the Egyptian model, such as it is. But the next step for which the regime will pay the price is the inevitable push toward democracy, [whether] desired by those in charge or rejected by them." [passage omitted]

Firm Contracts for Perfume Exports to USSR

45000075 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 1 Feb 90 p 6

[Text] The Egyptian International Corporation for Producing and Exporting Perfumes has signed a contract worth 40 million pounds sterling to export its products to the USSR. This is within the framework of the trade protocol between the two countries. This was stated by Mahid Shitta, chairman of the board of the Egyptian Corporation, who bid farewell to the Soviet delegation headed by Mr. Viktor Romanov, deputy minister of the Soviet Chemical Industries, after its visit to Egypt. The delegation spent a week visiting perfume factories and producers in Egypt.

Editorial Urges Dialogue To Avert Dictatorship

900A0222A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 29 Dec 89 p 7

[Commentary by Dr. Milad Hanna]

[Text] Whether the car bomb was designed to attack the interior minister, or a short circuit in the car's wires caused it to catch fire coincident with the passing of the minister's car, the commentaries and reactions regarding this "solitary" incident, and the events in Asyut that accompanied it, clearly indicate that the climate is "charged" and nerves are "strained." Consequently, some fear that the security services will exploit this incident to wage a new campaign against those deemed by it to be symbols, leaders, and fuel for the fundamentalist current. Evidently, the sequence of "violence and counterviolence" did not stop in the previous period. The [ruling] National Democratic Party [NDP], and information, culture, and education agencies have all entered into a state of unconsciousness, sleep, and indifference, as if they were living in Sweden or Iceland, not realizing that ideas are only fought with ideas; that calm, objective debate is the way to convince people; and that the police and the security agencies are not responsible for shaping thought or forming public opinion on political, religious, or sectarian issues, even if we mix up the cards and "state security" did what it is not qualified to do. On the contrary, its function in Egypt, as well as everywhere in the world, is to track down crime, and anyone attempting to attack others' rights, violate national security by spying or planning to seize power by force, or violate others' freedom, as happened apparently in Asyut. There has been a need for all officials to join efforts to shape awareness and values in the country, from the education and information ministries to all the political parties and intellectuals.

Regarding this matter, all the state agencies have become satisfied with the activity of a number of religious personalities of rank and ability, including Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, the Mufti of Egypt, and Dr. Muhammad 'Ali Mahjub, the *awqaf* [religious endowments] minister, as if dialogue with the fundamentalist current was vouchsafed only to the imams of religion. I have observed that youths listen to all hues of religious interpretations, selecting those which for them are appropriate and convincing, or which they imagine are correct. Hence, the fundamentalist current has succeeded in luring the government into its territory to debate with it based on its own logic. It is therefore gaining a wider public, such that some analysts have predicted that the government will in time become an easily swallowed morsel in the hands of the fundamentalists. The government has neither engaged in a dialogue, nor has it allowed the "more capable" to fulfill their cultural and humanitarian role in this matter.

If the NDP is incapable, there are many intellectuals and creative personalities in Egypt who believe in the supremacy of reason and realize the dangers of this current if it grows and prevails. Since the start of the

century, Egypt has produced an enlightened, devout, lay current as an expression of its "renaissance age," including outstanding personalities, from Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid to Taha Husayn, Shaykh 'Ali 'Abdallah al-Raziq, Salamah Musa, Tawfiq al-Hakim, Louis 'Awd, Najib Mahfuz, Yusuf Idris, and many others.

Why do radio and television not open their doors to the participation of eminent figures in addition to enlightened men of religion. Such figures include Dr. Ahmad Kamal Abu-al-Majd, harmonizers of Islam and social justice, such as Shaykh Mustafa 'Asi, Professor Khalil 'Abd-al-Karim, and Zayn al-Sammak, or harmonizers of Islam and Arabism, such as Dr. Muhammad Ahmad Khalafallah and Amin Huwaydi, or those who have studied Islam and distinguished between religion and politics, such as Justice Sa'id 'Ashmawi and Faraj Fawdah, and many others.

Most importantly, dialogue must move into the arena of life itself. Dialogue, the shaping of public opinion through access to television and radio, and the revision of educational curricula, should be the purview of select rationalists and interpreters in the area of thought and support for democracy, who would legislate the personal limits at which religion stops and would distinguish the commonweal in a rational manner completely removed from [Koranic] quotations. There are a great number of such persons everywhere in Egypt, but their influence is limited to no more than a million persons, because they are not permitted to write in the newspapers. The solution lies in dialogue in all of its forms, and in the government in Egypt making a brave, democratic decision to apportion radio and television air time, which for years has been set aside for the discussion of religious issues, in order to widen the scope and introduce into the arena the new blood of interpreters and free-thinking intellectuals far from fanaticism.

The people of Egypt are devout, not fanatical. Throughout its history, they have shaped many formulations and influential interpretations in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. However, it has also raised a hue and cry over the rule of men of religion in all eras, from the priests of the god Amon until now. This is because it is unreasonable to build a modern state entering the 21st century and embracing the achievements of scientific advances and the conquest of space, and then accept a regime that can be nothing but a dictatorship. It suffices to look around us to see what has happened in Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan.

ISRAEL

Finance Ministry Official Says Taxation at Maximum Level

44000181 Tel Aviv MABAT in Hebrew 4 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] Senior Finance Ministry official Yoram Gaba'i said that the Israeli economy is now at the maximum possible level of taxation, and that any additional taxes

would cause damage. Additional taxes would actively reach the treasury, but they would contribute nothing to the economy's resources. Gaba'i also said that taxation can no longer serve to reduce inequality in gross wages.

Police Minister Bar-Lev Profiled

44230062F Tel Aviv DAVAR (Weekend Supplement)
in Hebrew 1 Dec 89 pp 15-16

[Article by Yisra'el Linders]

[Text] Hayim Bar-Lev enjoyed more success in the ranks of the Army than he has in the political arena. During his army service, he proved to be a cool commander who instilled confidence during a crisis. For example, both during the period of waiting before the Six-Day War and during the Yom Kippur War, he was called back to his major general's uniform to serve as commander of the southern front to block the Egyptian breakthrough and to impose authority over the hawkish generals. At the beginning of the 1970's, the leaders of MAPAI [Israeli Workers Party] held his talents in higher regard than Rabin's. Pinhas Sapir, who asked Bar-Lev to join him as minister of commerce and industry, explained to his colleagues: Why should I have a wrinkled commander in chief (Rabin) when I have a well-pressed one (Bar-Lev)? Bar-Lev once was even seen as a possible candidate for Prime Minister, although he himself has consistently rejected the idea and said that he does not see himself as the best man for the office.

There is no consensus regarding his performance as minister of commerce and industry and as police minister. In the IDF [Israel Defense Force], he acquired considerable administrative and operational experience, and he received a B.A. in business administration from Columbia University in New York. He conducts the affairs of his office in a proper way while maintaining strict order, and his critics do not claim that, in general, he is a bad minister. They do say, however, that he is a gray public servant, performing his duties routinely, without imagination or brilliance. In contrast, his supporters note his fundamentally sound attitude, his honesty, his ability to perform successfully under pressure and his loyalty to his subordinates. The Chairman of the Knesset Committee for State Comptrollership, David Liba'i, says that since the severance of police affairs from the Ministry of the Interior and the establishment of an independent office for police affairs, the police and the prison service have had someone to look after them. Bar-Lev's outstanding qualities, a practical approach and moral integrity, serve as an inspiration for the senior command in the police.

Others point out that he is serving as police minister during one of the most difficult periods of internal security since the founding of the state. In their opinion, it would be wrong to deny him and Police Inspector General David Kraus credit for the fact that, despite unquestionable difficulties, the police have, to a large degree, met the heavy demands placed upon them in

these days of the intifadah. Likewise, they argue that Bar-Lev serves as a target for criticism primarily because of unrealistically high expectations of what he could do. He was expected to turn the police around, reorder its priorities, and stand out as a minister head and shoulders above the others. That did not happen. As a result, even those who are not his political foes speak in a minor key of his achievements.

In an interview with HA'ARETZ last year, Bar-Lev expressed his opinion that one of the reasons for this state of affairs is his weakness in public relations. There is a lot to be said for that view. On the eve of Yom Kippur this year, Ari'el Sharon published in YEDI'OT AHARONOT an excerpt from his autobiography in which he adopted an insulting tone towards Bar-Lev because of the way Bar-Lev treated him after the crossing of the Suez Canal. Bar-Lev did not take the trouble to reply to Sharon's remarks until he was asked about them last week in an interview in DAVAR HASHAVUA. Another public figure concerned about his image certainly would have reacted immediately.

In September, Bar-Lev started his sixth year as police minister. When he offers to state what is, in his opinion, his main accomplishment, he points first of all to the stability in personal relations in the police department. Five years ago, there were internal struggles that affected its work. Today, people are working, he notes, essentially double duty, because 800 police officers were moved from staff and administrative positions to assignments in the field.

According to Bar-Lev, there has been a marked improvement also in relations between officers and citizens and suspects. In his words, the days when "they took a suspect to the beach and beat him until he confessed" have passed. "That standard of conduct no longer exists." Still, the first year of the intifadah saw a rise in the number of incidents of violence by members of the police and the Border Patrol inside Israel and in the territories, but Bar-Lev says that this increase has been halted.

Bar-Lev takes police violence seriously and, on his own initiative, made inquiries into such claims transferred from police disciplinary boards to civilian criminal courts. Complaints against police officers are investigated not by their comrades in the unit or the district but by officials under the authority of the chief of the unit responsible for public complaints. These reforms do not satisfy many of the critics, who contend that the police still investigates themselves. In their view, it would have been worthwhile to establish a unit of investigators under the authority of the Attorney General and not the police command. Bar-Lev, however, disagrees. Despite the sometimes unfavorable publicity about violence by police officers, Bar-Lev says that, all things considered, "We do not have a violent police department compared to the police in enlightened countries. We uncover irregularities and we deal with them ourselves, seriously and aggressively." Bar-Lev also rejects the claim that

police investigators are inclined to base their charges on confessions obtained by means of coercion instead of concentrating on gathering evidence in the field and through laboratory tests. "First of all, we look for evidence," he says, "and do not focus on obtaining confessions as the easiest and simplest route." Of the improvement in the police situation, he offers as additional evidence the relatively large number of suitable candidates for the position of Inspector General. "Five years ago, there was a dearth of candidates and many people argued that we needed to appoint someone to the post from outside the police. Today, there are lots of good candidates." Bar-Lev says that the Inspector General needs to be "a leader, a man of authority, a policeman who knows what a police department is and someone acceptable not only to me but also to the police officers with whom he will work." Bar-Lev will choose the Inspector General from within the police and appoint him next April.

The main factor affecting police work, in Bar-Lev's opinion, is the lack of officers. The number of officers today stands at 17,000, the same as 13 years ago although the level of crime has risen in the interim and many more tasks have been assigned to police officers. Great efforts have been made to make up for the lack of transferring officers from command positions to the field and by mobilizing volunteers from the civil patrol for police work. These efficiency and manpower measures are the equivalent of an additional 1,600 officers, but they have not been sufficient and the police department still needs hundreds of new officers to fulfill its obligations.

To illustrate the effect of the manpower shortage on the functioning of the police, Bar-Lev says that the backlog in executing court orders has already reached 90,000 and will continue to grow.

Bar-Lev also attaches importance to solving the problem of overcrowding in jails and prisons. He wants to improve the situation in three ways. First, through a more selective policy in detention of suspects; that is, he has authorized the police to forego, wherever possible, detentions that are not necessary. Second, by adding buildings for holding prisoners. Third, through a legislative proposal to shorten the period of imprisonment to reduce the overcrowding in the prisons. The combination of these three measures can alleviate crowding and improve living conditions for the inmates.

Despite the rise in the number of terrorist acts by Israeli Arabs, Police Minister Bar-Lev believes that the intifadah has not penetrated the State of Israel itself. Even the discovery of a terrorist network in Devoriyah, whose members are suspected of throwing Molotov cocktails and committing arson in the forests out of nationalist motives, has not changed his opinion. Speaking in his usual calm voice and measured delivery, the minister explains that it would be possible to say that the intifadah had crossed the Green Line if the Arabs of Israel were to rise up against the government as the residents of the territories have. But the Arabs of Israel are not taking

that course. They are expressing their identification with the Palestinian struggle through legal means, by expressing their opinion, declaring strikes, and holding demonstrations approved in advance. Only a small minority, almost infinitesimally small, are choosing terror and sabotage. Of course, if the current situation should continue, without progress towards a settlement, acts of sabotage will multiply. In another year, Bar-Lev estimates, there will be outbreaks of violence and expressions of nationalism that we do not see today, just as this year we saw phenomena such as intifadah summer camps that had not previously occurred. For now, however, these are marginal events that do not reflect the positions of the decisive majority of Arabs in the country.

Recognizing that the current situation will intensify the suffering of the parties to the dispute, Bar-Lev supports the government's peace initiative. It will be possible to carry it out "if the Arab side and the Israeli side find the necessary degree of understanding and flexibility." In his opinion, however, Israeli flexibility need not take the form of direct negotiations with the PLO. "That does not figure in the equation because it is possible to negotiate with the PLO only about the establishment of a Palestinian state and the right of return with all that implies. A Palestinian state will not solve the problem of the Palestinian people who will be divided between it and Jordan; for us, that split is a tried-and-true recipe for discontent, acts of sabotage and, in the end, even for war. Even if a Palestinian state were to agree from the beginning that all its land be demilitarized, it might change its policy as time went by. Deployment of tanks and missiles in Nabulus will compel the IDF to return there. If we leave today and return tomorrow, that is no solution. A full solution is possible only with Jordan. Since Jordan just now is cut off from the process, we must seek a settlement with the residents of the territories."

Bar-Lev assumes that every Palestinian from the territories who wants to offer himself as a candidate in the elections will seek approval from the PLO. Israel has no need to oppose that, nor could it. He also is not frightened by the possibility that such a representative will declare at the start of negotiations that he represents the PLO. "We will say to him, you can represent whomever you wish. You are a resident of the territories, you were elected or appointed to negotiate the preparations for elections and the transfer of administration of daily life to the residents. We are not speaking with you about the right of return or a Palestinian state, even if you support that. By contrast, were we to agree to speak directly to the PLO, it would introduce the establishment of a Palestinian state into the discussions."

Bar-Lev is prepared to show a degree of flexibility concerning the participation of Arabs from east Jerusalem in the elections. "If the Arabs insist on that, I do not think that we must scrap everything because of that, so long as they vote in ballots in Ramallah or Bethlehem and their institutions not be established in Jerusalem."

These words, and Bar-Lev's participation in the recent meeting of members of the mainstream of the Labor Party, do not mesh with his image as a dove. Some of those in Labor holding dovish views believe that he has changed his spots. They find it difficult to understand how Bar-Lev can feel comfortable in the mainstream, which is considered hawkish, on the side of Shalma Halal, Shoshana Arbeli-Almozlino and Michael Bar-Zohar. They recall that, five years ago, he agreed to sign a petition presented to the Supreme Court in which he wrote that settlement of Alon-Moreh would not contribute to the security of the State. He said in the Knesset that if Jews did not settle in Beit-Hadasa and Hebron, they would not get murdered. At that time, he supported the right of members of "Peace Now" to advocate their position even outside the country. It has become clear, however, that what appeared to be signs of Bar-Lev's dovish views in reality were expressions of an unsophisticated bluntness, which is not at all common among politicians. He really did think that Alon-Moreh does not contribute to security and that the residents of Beit-Hadasa took upon themselves the risks when they moved their apartments there. And so, he said what he thought. But one cannot conclude as a result that he adopted the typical dove's views of talks with the PLO and establishment of a Palestinian state. Amos Karmel, from the mainstream, says that Bar-Lev in recent years has taken part in meetings of that circle, which nominally has always counted him one of its adherents. If Bar-Lev himself were asked, he would certainly say that he is loyal to the Labor Party platform, which is neither dovish nor hawkish. His view of a desirable settlement with the Palestinians is based primarily on strategic considerations. That is not surprising for a defense man who was mustered into the Palmah [Strike Force of the Hagana] in 1942 and devoted the best part of his years to the IDF until he finished his service as chief of staff after 30 years.

It is no secret that Bar-Lev hoped at one time to serve as defense minister and not as police minister. At the start of 1981, it appeared that the position he coveted was within his reach. He even formed teams of experts to prepare proposals and evaluations for him on national defense matters. In the end, he did not receive the post.

Did it seem to him that he had exhausted his talents and ability in his political career?

"All in all, I cannot complain," says Bar-Lev. "It is true that I wanted to be defense minister and that is an area in which I believe that I could have contributed more, but that could not be helped and did not leave me frustrated."

[DAVAR] Do you think that Peres made a mistake when he offered the post to Rabin?

[Bar-Lev] No. He did not make a mistake. It was Mina Tzemah who made a mistake. One night, she came to my house all excited and said, "Listen, I have a survey showing that if you are the Labor Alignment's candidate

for defense minister, the balance of strength between Alignment and Likud will be even. But if Rabin is the candidate, Alignment will enjoy an advantage of six seats in the Knesset." So I said, "What, shall I take such a defeat upon myself?" And I gave in without any problem. In the end, we did not gain an advantage although Rabin was the candidate for defense minister and Alignment did not join the government.

Since then, Bar-Lev has not attached excessive importance to survey results. But given that Alignment at that time believed in Rabin's popularity enough to offer him as its candidate for defense minister, I asked Bar-Lev if the Labor Party had to present Rabin at the top of its list in the next elections if it became clear that he was the most popular candidate. Bar-Lev explained why surveys are unreliable and essentially said that "this is not a relevant question today and there is no need to deal with it. Shim'on Peres was picked unanimously for the current term of office."

[DAVAR] Is he the best man to lead Alignment in the next term of office as well?

[Bar-Lev] I think so. I do not know what the situation will be when the time comes to determine who will be the candidates, but now he is the one we have chosen. In my opinion, he is the best man and I hope that we will gain strength in the next term of office.

Bar-Lev has long been loyal to Peres. Even when Peres and Yig'al Alon were rivals, Bar-Lev supported Peres and not his own commander in the Palmah. Those who know Bar-Lev say that he acted as he did because he recognized that Peres was better suited for the job. In the political jungle, Peres can turn his back on Bar-Lev without fear of getting knifed. Peres paid Bar-Lev back for his loyalty when he decided to include Bar-Lev in the current government and the cabinet even though Bar-Lev did not win any of the main positions in the party's internal elections.

Bar-Lev, 65 years old, is Peres' junior by one year. Will he continue to serve as minister in the next government if Alignment joins in it?

"It is one story if the current term of office continues another 3 years, but if it goes on just another year, that is a different story. I still do not know what the situation will be."

IDF Allegedly Shoots To Kill Suspects

44230062D Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 28 Nov 89 p 7

[Article by Maya Rosenfeld]

[Text] About two months ago, high-ranking commanders in the IDF [Israel Defense Force], including the chief of staff, announced that the security forces have set themselves the goal of capturing some 700 "wanted" persons

now operating in the territories. Anyone who heard these announcements on radio and television could only be amazed.

After all, since the beginning of the intifadah, no less than 50,000 Palestinians have been imprisoned, and we hear day in and day out about mass detentions ("pre-emptive actions"), that sweep up hundreds of people from the age of 14 to 70, in every town, city, and refugee camp. Is it possible that the number of those wanted facing imprisonment has suddenly dropped and is now estimated at only about 700? How strange that, from the time of the announcement until today, no drop in the number of prisoners has been recorded.

A follow-up to the events of recent months is necessary to solve the mystery. More than ever, we hear now of incidents in which IDF soldiers, according to Arab residents, fire at close range straight at the heads and chests of young Arabs of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, discharges that almost always end in deaths.

Afterwards, an announcement is released by the IDF spokesman about a "masked" or "wanted" youth shot in the execution of "procedures for detaining a suspect" ("procedures for detaining a suspect" in practice become the killing of the suspect). Eyewitnesses report that the shooting was at close range aimed straight at the wanted persons by IDF soldiers. According to these claims, there are also shooters disguised in civilian dress who use vehicles with local license plates.

Last month, for example, during the period between Rosh HaShana and the holiday of Sukkot, the security forces killed 20 youths in the territories. Regarding the circumstances of the killing of 11 of them, the authorities reported that the dead were wanted persons. It is enough to follow the media reports of those days to be convinced that in each of these incidents, the soldiers shot the "wanted" or "masked" youths intending to kill them.

Here are a number of examples: On 1 October, a youth from the 'A'ida refugee camp, Khalil Mahmud Al'ag, was killed. The Voice of Israel reported the circumstances of his death, noting that the youth was "wanted." On 4 October, soldiers opened fire on a group of masked people in al-Buraj, wounding Maher al-Mugdima in the head. His body later was seized by soldiers (AL-ITTIHAD). On 10 October, soldiers fatally wounded Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Shami from Kfar Batir in the back. Al-Shami died the next day in the al-Maqasad hospital. The justification the authorities reported for killing al-Shami: the youth was wanted for previously taking part in attempts to sabotage railway lines (Voice of Israel). On 12 October, soldiers shot and killed Yasin Mahmud al-Misri, 25, from the 'Asqar refugee camp. The authorities reported that a "chase occurred" and that "the youth had been imprisoned in the past for security offenses." (HA'ARETZ). The same day, soldiers shot to death 'Amad Zaki al-Qadumi, 18, of Nabulus. The authorities reported that he was "masked" and that "procedures for detaining a suspect" had been carried

out (HA'ARETZ and Voice of Israel). On 13 October, soldiers chased 'Azmi Fathi abu-Diyab, 18, from Qalqilyah, wounded him in the chest and killed him. The official announcement reported that the youth had been "masked." That same day, soldiers chased Salah Jamal Jwarish, 24, a resident of the 'A'ida refugee camp, and fatally wounded him. He died at the Beit Ja'ala hospital. The official announcement reported that the youth had been "masked."

At first, the authorities made an effort to dress up the policy of deliberately shooting to kill with various pretexts, sometimes the pretext of the absence of an alternative ("the soldiers were compelled to open fire"), but also the pretext of battle conditions.

A prime example is the killing of two on the wanted list, Jamus and Kalbuna, in Nabulus about two months ago. The IDF spokesman knew enough to speak about armed terrorists who had forfeited themselves in a villa, and added that Jamus and Kalbuna had struck fear in the residents of their own town of Nabulus. The authorities made a supreme effort when they took the bodies and buried them in what is called the "terrorists' cemetery" in Jericho.

But it quickly became clear that Jamus and Kalbuna had been shot at close range in their heads when surprised in their hideout. It was also claimed that the "armed terrorists" had neither rifles nor hand guns. Above all, it was proved that the city of Nabulus had loved the two who had "put them in fear" and saluted them. Indeed, the entire town underwent a curfew and heavy punishment for days, and even sacrificed additional dead, when it united behind the demand for return of the two bodies.

Therefore, the "wanted" and the "masked" are those whom the authorities are interested in capturing and putting in prison. The data point to someone whose blood can be spilled, someone who the Army, the Border Patrol and the General Security Service may eliminate anywhere at any time without needing to provide a report about it either in a legal proceeding or to the public. The use of such terms by the authorities, with the clear assistance of the governmental media, thus has become a stamp of approval for murder.

Discipline Problems Reported in IDF

44230062C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 27 Nov 89 p 33

[Article by Danny Sade]

[Text] More than 20 officers were dismissed or transferred this past year from their command posts in the IDF [Israel Defense Force] for disobeying orders, undermining discipline, filing false reports, lying in reports and lowering the operational readiness of their units. In three instances, five officers were dismissed following the deaths of soldiers.

That was the reason for the dismissal last week of Captain Amir Goren, a company commander in the Giv'ati Brigade, after the suicide of Sergeant Eli Shazar. Two weeks ago, a commander of one of the Golani Brigade patrols was dismissed; the reason given for that was the death of Corporal Aviram Arnoladas. Three commanders, among them a lieutenant colonel, were dismissed because of the death of Second Lieutenant Tzur Golan at Training Base No 1.

These dismissals, and the comments and reprimands other officers have received, demonstrate that the IDF comes down with a heavy hand on every instance of disobeying orders and breaches of discipline. It is not clear, however, if the IDF is also working to prevent the problem which, in the last year, has swollen to worrisome dimensions. Someone in the IDF must start to think about what is not right in the junior officer ranks and, possibly, a little above that.

When officers do not obey orders, or when soldiers in the field commit offenses, it seems that someone higher up simply did not send down his orders in the right way. Soldiers inducted just a year or two before do not understand subtleties. When they receive orders, they carry them out to the letter.

One hears in the IDF that there is no problem with orders. "Orders in the IDF pertaining to conducting operations, safety of weapons, and safety in training are perfectly clear," says a senior officer in the IDF. "The problem is whether the person transmitting the orders to the soldiers is not leaving room for interpretation; then everyone gives his interpretation of an order instead of asking questions that seem to him unnecessary.

"When a company commander sends soldiers to give a 'motivational talk' to a soldier, he violates army instructions. In each instance, he needs to be certain that the soldiers understand exactly that he what intends is a motivational talk and is not giving them authority for interpretations of their own," explains the senior officer. "But whenever shots are fired in a given unit, wounding soldiers or even causing their deaths, there is a problem in orders and instructions. This virus must be wiped out as quickly as possible, before it becomes an epidemic."

To illustrate his point, the senior officer points to a number of prominent investigations over the past year that revealed defective reports, disobeying orders, and negligence.

"This did not start with the manifestly unlawful orders of Colonel Yehuda Me'ir or those who accepted soldiers in the Giv'ati Brigade. It also did not happen because of the intifadah. During the IDF's operation at Na'ima, it was already possible to recognize that something was not working properly in every cog of the report. Afterwards, this continued in an incident in one of the units in the north when the commander took a wristwatch from a terrorist contrary to orders forbidding touching terrorists' equipment, primarily from fear that the equipment is booby-trapped.

"And that is not all. After that, there was an incident involving Lieutenant Colonel Hagai Klinger, deputy commander of the Shomron district, who was suspended from his post after the military police opened an investigation against him. That began after military police stopped the officer's driver for speeding and the senior officer contended that he was on his way to the scene of a terrorist attack.

"Later, there was the incident of Lieutenant Colonel G., who used a helicopter to pursue Arabs who had fled into the mountains near Bene Na'im; the incident of a lieutenant colonel in the armored corps who took military documents and used them to complete his studies at a university; an incident in which the chief of staff had to transfer two lieutenant colonels from their posts because of a dispute between them; and finally, a lieutenant colonel and a colonel in the Air Force received comments and reprimands following a Syrian MIG-23's penetration of Israel's air space."

There have been still other incidents, in which commanders were summoned to the chief of staff because they had not carried out orders regarding provision of hitch-hiking stations for soldiers, and in which commanders filed reports on the operational readiness of their units, which turned out to be incorrect. There is the incident of the deputy Golani Brigade commander who was dismissed by the commander of the Northern Command because of a false report about a certain field operation.

When the chief of staff, Dan Shomron, assumed his position, he promised to shake up the IDF. Later, he emphasized that a shakeup is not something done with one blow but is a slow process the entire Army will undergo according to needs and circumstances.

"A shakeup is not a matter of a one-time action," adds the senior officer, "but it seems to me that what has been happening recently in the IDF concerning obeying orders and instructions requires a major shakeup, and the sooner the better."

Poverty, Social Problems Plague Country

44230062B Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 26 Nov 89 p 19

[Article by Niri Livneh]

[Text] On the "Morning Diary" program yesterday, one man at the poverty level shouted, "Why do they tell us not to have large families? Let us have children, my children are valuable, they are important for the Army; just give them an education." On the same program, the head of the Ma'alot Tarshikha council explained why he does not want Ethiopians, only good immigrants: "Russians, Romanians, Poles, and Anglo-Saxons," he specified.

Of Moroccan descent, Bukhavot, the head of the council, believes that Ashkenazi and Moroccan Jews are good

blood and Ethiopians are bad blood. In contrast to the man at the poverty level, Bukhavot does not believe in education. An Ethiopian remains an Ethiopian, just as (it's very unpleasant to say this) a Moroccan remains a Moroccan. Bukhavot even threatened that if Ethiopians are sent to him, he won't take them in. It is as if the Ethiopians are Arabs. And so, in the same week in which the law on basic human rights was rejected for racist reasons, it became clear that there are lights and shadows even in racism. Bukhavot at least does not hold racist views against Arabs. His racism against the Ethiopians has raised his estimation of the Arabs.

Let us return for a moment to the representatives of the poverty level. Unlike Bukhavot, he believes in education; that excellent Israeli education, from which every concerned father and every mother with eyes in her head will protect their children, will eventually produce an Israeli. That Israeli, when he survives, will make the effort to go to the Spinoza Institute, where he will pass three long days of his life finding out who and what, alas, brought him this far on condition that he is not, of course, a representative of the poverty level or Ethiopian. Experience, Marx taught us, determines perception, and the Ethiopians or the poor are too burdened with survival to be able to make themselves a part of the symposium. Besides, no one even thought of inviting them. What is more surprising is the fact that not a single Army man in active service was invited to the symposium.

Here, a question cries out for an answer: What is more Israeli than the Army, the absolute melting pot into which you introduce an 18-year-old graduate of the education system and from which an Israeli man or woman emerges (ever so slowly)? Indeed, this week, the same week of the symposium, was the very best time to consider the fascinating subject, "The Army—lights and shadows." We, who are repulsed by the besmirching inflicted on the name of the Giv'ati Brigade and the mud slinging of the patrol of the Golani Brigade prevalent in the hostile media, are engaging here in "lights." The Army is the most massive educational tool of the fourth largest power. And here, only Ethiopians or those from the poverty level want to produce children and especially IDF [Israel Defense Force] soldiers.

For two weeks now, my best friends and I have been looking for a magic wand to stretch out the 10 years that remain for our elder sons before they are mustered into the IDF for at least the next 120 years. Who, after all, wants his son to go into the Army? It is not only that taking part in war is not like working in an insurance company. The Army, we learned this week, invites wholly unexpected trouble. They humiliate people there, kill them there; there are even those who kill themselves there. But we have promised to speak here of "lights." What clearly appears from the abuse scandal in the Giv'ati Brigade, and also from the shooting in the Golani patrol, and from other events that will be taken up later, is the fact that the Army, as an army, is an antiracist institution. From this day on, it has been proved that it

is impossible to educate a soldier in the IDF to be barbaric, hard of heart, violent, a beast of prey on the prowl, and to think that when he returns to his tent, he will carry on friendly relations and exchange mutual support with his comrades in arms. It is no longer possible to believe that someone who will be a perfect cowboy when he goes out to face enemy lines will return to his tent a pacifist who hates weapons. In fact, it is impossible any more to think that he who will be an Israeli soldier as he leaves will be a good man in his tent.

As for the Giv'ati soldiers as well as those in the Golani patrol, the difference between Arabs and Jews is becoming blurred and if you want, there is a good example for us here of the Army as an instrument in the war against racism. It is not only the difference between the peoples that the Army blurs but also the difference between the sexes. If the role of women in the IDF was once thought to consist of waiting breathlessly for their men to return from the ambush in the valley, today the women soldiers do everything the men do. Two weeks ago, MA'ARIV reported that three women soldiers in the civilian administration had ordered an Arab woman, who had come across the Damiya Bridge, to undress and dance naked before them for some minutes. Why? Just because.

The Army is making the question of "Who is an Israeli" entirely superfluous. The Army is stamping us into a uniform mold. What will the product be? It will be possible to understand that only in another century or two.

Destructive Gaps Perceived in Society

44230067C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 5 Dec 89 p 15

[Article by Emmanuel Zisman, Knesset member for Alignment]

[Text] The gaps in Israeli society have been widening in recent years. The comfortable strata are becoming richer. The weak strata are becoming poorer. The salaries in the highest stratum of Israeli wage earners are rising. The salaries in the lowest are declining.

Israeli society is becoming an unequal society. The gaps are widening constantly. According to data in the Central Bureau of Statistics, in the State Revenue Administration, and the Bank of Israel, it appears that a minority of about 10 percent of those in the state whose income comes from work earn about 40 percent of all income. A few weeks ago, the Knesset discussed this issue, and the debate showed that the polarization in Israeli society is growing and deepening, and the wages of top-level individuals are pouring oil on this fire.

Very high salaries are a foreign phenomenon that was adopted. But, as usual, they're trying to be more Catholic than the Pope.

Over the last few years, external trappings of the affluent society were adopted, without the Israeli economy exhibiting the same vigor and strength as other Western economies.

In many cases, the Israeli pupil surpasses his master, and in the sphere of wage differentials, we are trying to imitate the American model, without any justification and without any logical and economic basis. Of course, we are talking about mere imitation of external trappings and not about essence. This is only Levantine imitation, without any justification in the economic sphere or in the influence that it has on the rest of the workers, and on organizational-economic behavior in general. For who are the standard-bearers of these gigantic salaries? Those who fill top-level positions in the economy.

Israeli society derives no benefit from the widening of this wage differential. It does not encourage saving. To the contrary, the rate of savings declined precipitously in the past four years, from 22 percent to 4 percent of disposable income.

The assertions that the high level of salaries in the top centile encourages savings are empty phrases. Those who save, when they have the means, are precisely the middle and the lower deciles. If we deprive them of the ability to save, savings in the economy will decline and the entire economy will be hurt.

The reports to the stock exchange, and from there to the media, about the salaries of those at the top, provide us amusement in abundance. One company paid its three top employees more than its profits. In 1988, they received IS [Israeli shekel] 525,000, while the company earned "only" IS 400,000.

Only IS 381, the National Insurance payment, is "awarded" to 130,000 persons in the state. On the other hand, one-tenth that number, 13,000 salaried individuals who constitute the upper centile, earn no less than IS 23,855 per month—twice the salary of a judge.

About 40 percent of the retired persons in the country, 180,000 pensioners, receive only an old-age payment equal to 10 percent of the average income. Forty percent of the workers in Israel don't earn enough from their labor to be worthy of the attention of income tax officials. They don't even come up to the yearned-for minimum taxable income.

While this process is proceeding full force, the prices of many essential items are rising. Housing prices are rising rapidly. I would note that the Construction Price Index rose by nearly 40 percent in the past twelve months, in contrast to an increase of about 15.8 percent in the Consumer Price Index.

In September alone, the Housing Prices Index rose 4.5 percent—about three times as much as the Consumer Price Index, which rose 1.6 percent.

This and other processes are creating new patterns in Israeli society, a society that is eroding the basic values upon which it was founded. A high salary is becoming an aspiration, a social cause.

Those who are especially hurt by this race are the young. This deep change in norms, one of whose expressions is the high salaries, is indirectly causing the justification for emigration. The youth are looking at themselves and at their chances to obtain here, in the next 20 years, similar results, and they think that if they go abroad to work and return, they will be able to improve their economic situation here.

The demand to curtail the rise in the standard of living, due to the negative influence that it has on economic development and the rate of inflation, has been around as long as the state. This demand, which was voiced loudly by the leaders of the economy, was always directed at the wage earners, who were called upon to refrain from wage demands and to be satisfied with their present salaries. Why should it not be addressed to all salary earners at every level? Why should it be addressed only to wage earners on the lower levels?

And, in truth, at the same time that the loud demands for belt-tightening are heard, the top-level employees, even in companies where public capital plays a central role, have allowed themselves the freedom and the privilege to grant themselves very high salaries, which are completely inconsistent with their preaching to the other wage earners to be satisfied with the minimum. In many cases, we are talking about companies that are firing wage earners or are suffering heavy losses.

It seems to me that in more than a few cases, the practice of "eat, drink, and be merry" has spread, and the fate of society is secondary to the envy-arousing race to obtain the highest possible standard of living.

If the public previously expected that this stratum of managers would provide an example worthy of imitation at least as regards its preaching, the recent revelations showed that managers who are responsible also for the profitability of the company in their hands, brought about by the piling-up of exaggerated expenses for their personal requirements in amounts that constitute a heavy burden on the company, financial difficulties, losses, and even lay-offs of workers in that company.

The bill that I recently submitted to the Knesset recognizes the need for wage differentials in order to encourage entrepreneurship in the economy. But it requires that these differentials be established within a reasonable framework of multiples of the average wage (according to the principle that guided the legislature regarding the salaries of judges and other salaried employees at the top of the leadership of the state and the economy).

We recognize the fact that managers in a company whose turnover is over IS 100 million deserve high salaries. But

in this sphere, as well, the salaries that these managers take for themselves are 30 percent and even 50 percent above what we propose.

This bill takes into account the annual revenues of a company and its economic situation.

The atmosphere that has been created in the state around the salaries of the top-level personnel obligates the legislature to take the initiative and restrain this development. If this stratum of managers is not reined in (and they are not in every case so talented and able as to justify these salaries), this subject will become social dynamite, because it deepens and emphasizes the widening gaps in Israeli society, and expresses the bankruptcy of those who preach settling for less.

Vilner on RAKAH Changes

44230062A Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 26 Nov 89 p 19

[Interview with RAKAH Knesset Member Me'ir Vilner by Tzvi Gilat; date, place not given; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] And so, Glasnost has finally come to Israel's RAKAH [New Communist List]. Me'ir Vilner, Tawfiq Tubi, and Tawfiq Ziyad, who have been around forever, are expected to turn over their positions within the next two days to the party's young guard. According to Vilner, the whole matter is a reply at long last to his personal request for ideological activity, and ideological problems, as everyone knows, are not lacking today. Whatever the reason, Vilner is looking back with satisfaction on more than 40 years of parliamentary service. If we look at the map correctly, he says, it becomes clear that only they, the Communists, are living in the modern era while the fossilized Likud and the Alignment remain far behind. And if anyone represents the national interest in the Knesset, it is the Communists and no one else.

[HADASHOT] So why are all of you retiring?

[Vilner] The central committee of the party decided a week ago to carry out a decision made some time ago to effect a change in the composition of the party in the Knesset. In practical terms, that meant that Knesset members Vilner, Tubi, and Ziyad would resign....

[HADASHOT] Young members will take their places.

[Vilner] Wait. Their places will be taken by candidates who were next on the party list. That was what was decided.

[HADASHOT] I already knew that.

[Vilner] The party's Knesset members asked for their freedom from Knesset work a long time ago so they can devote themselves to ideological and organizational work in preparation for the 21st party congress.

[HADASHOT] You yourself really asked to step down from the Knesset?

[Vilner] I am about to finish and then you can ask. The ideological work and the preparations for the congress are most important now. The three of us wanted the change also to bring up new people.

[HADASHOT] Why is it now of all times that you want to leave the Knesset?

[Vilner] Because of the debates in the Communist and socialist world and also among ourselves.

[HADASHOT] Glasnost is having an effect. You must put forward new faces.

[Vilner] You are asking me how to succeed in politics, not about policies. All of us are proud of the success of our policies.

[HADASHOT] Your policies have succeeded?

[Vilner] Definitely. Our political program, the peace program. Look, we have said this for years, and we were alone in this, that the problem can be solved only on the basis of two states for two peoples. We have also said that the second side to the dispute is the PLO. Now everyone sees that our proposal was correct. If I read today in HA'ARETZ an article by Uzi BarAm on the subject, that says it all.

[HADASHOT] Still, to say that you have succeeded....

[Vilner] Just a moment. Recognition of the PLO was also our idea. Therefore, we are proud of our line. We were entirely isolated in the Knesset and today there are 30 members who support that line.

[HADASHOT] You are satisfied.

[Vilner] We feel that we have contributed something to the state.

[HADASHOT] If so, what is the internal debate about?

[Vilner] For example, we are working according to the principle of democratic centralism.

[HADASHOT] As the democratic governments work throughout the world.

[Vilner] But the substance of the debate is where is democracy going? What is the scope of centralism?

[HADASHOT] How is it actually with you?

[Vilner] There always has been more democracy than what was accepted in the Soviet Union. For example, in contrast to the socialist countries, we always have voted by ballots. Until a few years ago, they always voted by a show of hands.

[HADASHOT] The revolution has begun for us.

[Vilner] It started long ago. And I will give you another example. They have a custom by which there is only one

candidate for each position. You can vote against him, but there is only one. We have always had more.

[HADASHOT] You have always had candidates against you?

[Vilner] No. But the possibility was there.

[HADASHOT] To make this clear, what ideological problem are you leaving the Knesset?

[Vilner] There is a demand for more democracy.

[HADASHOT] The idea to leave was yours?

[Vilner] For a long time now, we have wanted to engage in other work. There are people who can do our work in the Knesset.

[HADASHOT] This period has seen the Communist regimes in Europe swept away.

[Vilner] It is still not proved that the people are against the government. There certainly is a sector that is for a capitalist government, but what is not clear is whether they want better socialism there or no socialism at all.

[HADASHOT] What is your feeling?

[Vilner] In my opinion, the people want more socialism, more democracy, more concern for social problems and more importance accorded public opinion. They do not want millionaires who will exploit the workers. Socialism really has succeeded in many times. Without its success, the Soviet Union would not, after the revolution, have attained a position of equality with the United States.

[HADASHOT] It is difficult today to speak of equality.

[Vilner] That is true. I admit that. But they lost strength not because of the system but because of their leaders.

[HADASHOT] You know the leadership. Were you able to predict that this was what would happen to them?

[Vilner] There was no loss of contact there, but as in East Germany, for example, they were not really in touch with the people. That is what led them to prohibit travel abroad; there was no need for that there. But where is there a place without problems?

[HADASHOT] Is the process in Eastern Europe helping communism or undermining it?

[Vilner] That depends. All the perestroika, which we support, was justified. But the goal, as Gorbachev has defined it, is more socialism.

[HADASHOT] If so, then you in RAKAH continue to be a rubber stamp of the Soviet Union.

[Vilner] I want to tell you that we have always been independent in our affairs and have made important, serious decisions. For example, we decided after World

War II that the land of Israel was binational and not, as was decided there, an Arab land with a Jewish minority.

[HADASHOT] And the lesson you draw from what is happening in the world?

[Vilner] We are more critical today towards what is happening there, I admit. Even now, we do not agree with everything that is happening. For example, for two years now, we have found unacceptable the anti-Semitic organizations such as Pamyatz that are operating in the Soviet Union. It is true that we are ideologues, we believed everything they said, but we have learned our lesson.

[HADASHOT] What were the most important moments for you in the Knesset?

[Vilner] Our stand against the wars in 1956, 1967, and in Lebanon. We were the only ones who spoke out against them. Indeed, Begin said that all the wars, except for the War of Independence, were wars of choice. In other words, we were correct even in that.

[HADASHOT] But in Ben-Gurion's aphorism "without Herut and the Israel Communist Party," there is still a consensus that the Communists are outside.

[Vilner] True, that is a dogmatism they have kept right up until today. They have become fossils. They do not see reality. The national interest is to avoid war and make progress towards peace. I feel that I represent the national interest of the people of Israel. In Europe, they understand that there is a danger in destroying the humanity in us and they are developing new thinking. Here, people live as if nothing has happened. They do not understand that if there were another war, we would suffer, not the Americans.

Effects of Arab Boycott Examined

44230067A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 28 Nov 89 p 11

[Article by Eliyahu Salpeter: "The Arab Boycott Is Alive and Kicking"]

[Text] London—The government ministries have decided several times to conduct a vigorous campaign against the Arab boycott, but in reality the ministries have never recognized the real significance of Arab economic warfare. Aside from a brief period after the Yom Kippur War, the government regarded the power of petrodollars as a marginal factor in the Arab struggle against Israel.

During the deliberations of the congress of Jewish organizations that are fighting the Arab boycott in the Western world, which was held in London in mid-November, it was again made clear that the damage to Israel's economy is much greater than can be seen from the figures alone.

The government representatives who participated in the congress, including Re'uven Merhav, director general of the Foreign Ministry, stressed their awareness of the subject and the recommendations of the congress. The establishment of a data bank, economic warfare, and the convening of a global steering committee for coordinating the activities of the Jewish organizations on this subject were recommended. It was also decided to continue to devote maximum attention to Japan and Korea, who head the list of non-Muslim countries that submit to the demands of the boycott. The demand was made that Israel do more, and it was especially recommended to bring to the attention of the Israeli consumer the products that arrive in the Israeli market indirectly, in order not to arouse Arab anger.

According to the figures that were reported at the congress, countries may be divided into four groups according to the degree to which they surrender to the Arab boycott.

The first group includes the United States, where there are explicit laws against cooperating with the boycott. These laws impose fines on and withhold export benefits from companies that violate the law. American companies are even required to report to the government every approach made by the Arab boycott bureaus. About 25,000 such reports are received every year by the Commerce Department in Washington, and the fines imposed each year come to millions of dollars.

The second group includes several Western European countries, specifically France and Holland, which passed legislation against submitting to the boycott. But these laws are not especially effective. Most countries are in the third group—they have no legal prohibition against the boycott, and each manufacturer does what it deems proper. Among the worst countries in this group is Britain, which explains its refusal to aid in the struggle against the boycott by the liberal principle that every businessman may decide with whom he will trade.

The fourth group consists of those countries that not only submit to the boycott, but also refrain from business that it permits, in order to curry favor with the Arabs. Japan and Korea are the leading countries in this group. There has recently been a certain improvement in the position of Japan, which is the third-ranking country in Israel's foreign trade. But many Japanese firms still do not export to Israel directly, going instead through a third country or through a shell corporation.

A change in Korea's attitude and a further improvement in Japan's attitude are the main goals in the war on the Arab boycott. Israel hopes to be assisted in this struggle mainly by the United States, both because of the strength of the American-Jewish importers and consumers and because the U.S. Government has reason to defend American exporters from unfair competition from foreign exporters, who cooperate with the boycott. However, the American representatives pointed out that the

Arabs accept a situation in which there are laws against the boycott, and American exports to the Arab countries have even increased.

But the most urgent goal in the coming years is to ensure that the Common Market will not surrender to the boycott after 1992. Today there is legislation against the boycott in three member nations, and a prohibition against any kind of discrimination appears also in the agreements that the Maghrib and Mashriq countries signed with the Common Market. But the Arabs (except for Egypt) are not fulfilling these undertakings, and the European Commission is not being strict about their behavior. Consequently, there are two goals in the struggle against the boycott in Europe: to bring the Arab countries to fulfill their written undertakings to the Common Market and, mainly, to ensure that in the unification of statutes and trade rules for 1992, the prohibitions of a few countries will apply also in other countries, either in the framework of harmonization, the uniform interpretation of the clauses against discrimination in the Treaty of Rome, or in explicit, uniform legislation (or statutes).

The speakers at the congress in London noted that even companies and countries that refused, as it were, to surrender to the boycott have surrendered de facto, through "counter imports" and technological imports. As an example, it was noted that the Japanese company that openly exports cars to Israel and undertook to purchase spares from Israel does this in the required amount only for the vehicles that it sells to Israel. Another example is the export of computer components. The American company IBM now buys these components from Israel to the tune of \$200 million, because it is worthwhile from the viewpoint of price and quality. But European computer firms do not purchase components made in Israel, for fear of the boycott.

If American firms annually receive approximately 25,000 approaches and demands from the boycott bureaus, despite the stringent laws against the boycott, it may be assumed that Western European companies receive at least the same number of approaches. And as in most of the countries in Europe there is no legislation against the boycott, it is reasonable to assume that most of the Arab approaches receive a positive response.

The danger of the influences of the Arab boycott on Israeli exports increases as economics and trade become multinational. When international trade was mainly bilateral and trilateral, it was known which products were reaching the Arab markets. Today, when products contain components from different countries and are thrown into the stream of international trade, the probability has increased that the product—or the company connected with it—will come in contact with an Arab importer or bank. Therefore, many manufacturers prefer not to use any Israeli-made components, in order not to clash with the Arab boycott.

Treasury Intervention on Behalf of Koor Examined
44000179 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 12 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by Allen E. Shapiro]

[Text] Whatever may happen with Koor, the Histadrut industrial combine, it seems certain that Israel's political economy will never be quite the same again. When the stakes are really high, the rules of the game change. In a sense, it is a different game altogether from any of the previous bail-outs that have drained Israel's resources ever since the ill-fated decision to pick up the tab when the bottom fell out of the rigged market for bank shares.

Who owns Koor? The easy answer, perhaps the one most lacking in significance, is Hevrat Ha'ovdim, the workers' economy of the Histadrut. Like all the other major combines, without regard to ownership, Koor is a client of the Treasury, which has control of the concern's access to the capital market. As Prof Daniel Shimshoni pointed out in his classic *Israeli Democracy*: "The formation and growth of conglomerates and holding companies has been encouraged far beyond the needs of economies of scale, partly through awe of size and partly to make it easier for the administration, so it was hoped, to direct the economy and to raise capital."

As a result of its size and standing, Koor was able to raise capital in the world money market, both from bank loans and from the sale of debentures abroad. The Treasury, which has firmly refused to give guarantees on loans to beleaguered economic entities, should be entitled to chalk this up to its credit. However, when the going gets tough, it is the Treasury which, with no direct legal responsibility, has to mount the rescue operation.

This would be true even if the ownership were foreign. Suppose one of the overseas combines reputedly interested in buying control of Koor were today the owner. What would happen if a foreign-owned Koor was on the brink of bankruptcy? It might have easier access to additional capital than does Hevrat Ha'ovdim, Koor's present stockholder. However, in a pinch, Koor's importance to the economy of Israel as a whole would mandate Treasury intervention, irrespective of the ownership. In fact, the one reported detailed bid for control of Koor by a foreign concern contains a demand for what might be characterized as a pre-packaged bail-out.

Leaving out the possibility of sale of the concern to a foreign investor, the political implications of Koor's ownership by the Labor-dominated Histadrut is not a decisive element. The basic decision to bail out Koor, after the threat to throw the firm into bankruptcy, was taken by the Likud treasury minister in the previous government, Moshe Nissim, and backed by Prime Minister Shamir. Presumably they were not motivated by any emotional ties to the socialist ideals of the workers' economy.

The final address for any major financial failure is, in any case, the government. If this is so, why should the Treasury be so chary about extending government guarantees in the first place? The question arose during the debate over the kibbutz bail-out, when Sarol Ben-Ya'akov of Kibbutz Degania Alef proposed a government guarantee for debentures that the kibbutz movement would float domestically, thus saving the Treasury money in a direct injection of funds, while at the same time freeing the kibbutzim from dependence on the commercial banks. The Treasury refused to discuss the proposal.

In the Koor debacle, the demand for a government guarantee is usually called a "Chrysler solution," after the bail-out of the American automobile manufacturer by a U.S. administration dedicated to non-intervention in the economy. There is a real problem in opting for a Chrysler solution in Israel. So much of the economy, whatever means of locomotion it may be using today, is a potential Chrysler. Once the Treasury goes down that road, where does it stop? Would an Israeli Chrysler have brakes?

On the other hand, there is no magic either in sale to a foreign investor. Foreign ownership, on a firm-to-firm basis, may open marketing opportunities or facilitate the transfer of new technologies. The recent sale of a former Koor affiliate, The Jerusalem Post, to the Canada-based Hollinger newspaper chain may realize these benefits, although the particular characteristics of the commodity involved—a daily newspaper—create special problems. However, it is difficult to see these advantages of foreign ownership accruing on a conglomerate-to-conglomerate basis.

One conclusion from Israel's successive financial debacles is how little formal ownership matters. There are firms that the government controls, although it does not own them, just as there are government corporations that it owns but does not control. There are major economic entities which it neither owns nor controls, despite the regulatory authority that the law provides. More to the point, for present purposes, government responsibility does not necessarily follow lines either of ownership or control.

Another conclusion is that the Treasury's clients—the banks, the agricultural sector, the major conglomerates—control the Treasury as much as, if not more than, the Treasury controls them. Until there is a fundamental reform of the economy, the Treasury is in a no-win situation when the signs of impending disaster to one of these so-called clients appear. And a fundamental reform of the economy is not in the cards—without a fundamental change in the political system that has spawned it and in which it operates.

Trade With Eastern Europe Increases 30 Percent

44000190 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 7 Feb 90 p 5

[Text] During the past year there has been a 30 percent increase in trade between Israel and countries of Eastern Europe. The trade turnover reached nearly a quarter of a billion dollars. Today Israel trades with seven East European countries [passage omitted].

Increase of 12.5 Percent in Electronics Exports Reported

44000191 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 7 Feb 90 p 5

[Text] [excerpts] Last year Israel's electronics exports reached nearly \$2 billion. This sum represents a 12.5 percent nominal increase compared with 1988. [passage omitted] Director of the metal, electric, and electronics industries department, Mordekhay Avi'or, revealed yesterday that investments made in the civilian sector in research and development and in the expansion of existing factories are now showing returns and that the high growth trend of exports confirms this.

Scientists' Emigration Becoming Serious

*44230062E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 30 Nov 89 p 4*

[Article by Gid'on Alon]

[Text] A study conducted by Professor Gid'on Shafski reveals that the scope of research projects Israelis are carrying out abroad has grown considerably in recent years. This situation creates a serious risk of significant growth in the scale of emigration of young scientists (aged 30-45) from Israel and potentially could result in grave consequences for the future of science in Israel.

In an article Professor Shafski published in the annual report of the Center for Political Studies in Israel, which was based on the study he conducted, he stresses that a number of possible causes are motivating Israeli scientists to trek to scientific centers abroad to carry out their research. The main causes are research conditions and possibilities for employment, economic conditions, political factors, and the quality of life.

Concerning the political factors, Professor Shafski notes that "of late, it seems that one of the causes of temporary emigration from Israeli and permanent residence abroad derives from dissatisfaction with the political situation and the quality of life in Israel. It may be that service in Lebanon and the territories has brought many scientists to try to evade these military obligations by every legal means."

Professor Shafski goes on to say that "there are advantages, disadvantages and dangers in this wandering of scientists abroad. The advantages for Israeli scientists in conducting research abroad are progress in using more advanced and expensive equipment, which permits more sophisticated projects; fruitful collaboration and

mutual stimulation between them and scientists in the scientific centers of the world, which encourages fresh ideas, absorption of new concepts, and new ways of thinking; improvement in their quality and efficiency of their research; and charging their batteries with materials and an atmosphere that helps scientists to a better life here in Israel." This age group, however, usually includes scientists at the peak of their scientific activities, for whom the enticements of better salaries and research conditions abroad may encourage emigration.

Professor Shafski calls on science policymakers in Israel to pay attention to this phenomenon and the dangers inherent in it. He also spells out a long list of recommendations designed to promote research by Israeli scientists at home as a means of reducing emigration by senior Israeli researchers.

This HA'ARETZ reporter points out that, on paper, the Ministry of Absorption is responsible for taking measures to prevent emigration, but that since Yitzhaq Peretz became minister, his department has nearly ceased its efforts to stem emigration and bring home those who have left, except for limited administrative and financial help given to emigrants who return on their own.

Position of Rabbi Swisa, CRM Profiled

90OL0163A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV
in Hebrew 8 Dec 89 pp 6-8, 10

[Article by Ya'el Paz-Melamed]

[Text] The honorable Rabbi Swisa, 29 and single, walks the streets of Bet Shemesh like a groom on his wedding day. He shakes hands with this one, taps the shoulder of that one, converses lightly with another. People cross the street just to speak with him. "What's new," "hi there," "I have something very important to talk to you about." If not for the modest dimensions of his body, the old Subaru he drives and the shy, pleasant smile on his boyish face, you might think we were talking about the local lord. And he, his big black eyes gleam with pleasure. He walks as if in a dream through the clean and well-kept commercial center. From time to time he lifts his eyes and looks with pride at the huge placard that still remains from the Histadrut election campaign. The poster calls for the residents of Bet Shemesh to vote for Moshe Swisa, the candidate from CRM [Citizens' Rights Movement].

The passing visitor to the development town would find it difficult to understand the excitement. Just another sign, left over from a quiet and unimportant election. What is so special about the people who gave their warm blessing to a young, charming rabbi. But Rabbi Swisa knows that this placard and the friendly taps on his shoulder are proof that what was does not have to last forever; proof that it is possible, given the persistence of one who believes in the righteousness of his ways, to change the face of an entire town, to combat demagoguery and incitement, with a smile and long, quiet

conversations into the night. Sometimes that same persistence can change the face of valleys, rise above 1,000 loudspeakers, change the order of the world.

It was only at the end of last summer that Rabbi Swisa was forced to leave his home and his town, to hide from the anger of the Bet Shemesh masses. For days he had to act like a hero pursued in a television suspense series. He moved from one hiding place to another, so as not to be found, switching cars in mid-route, so as not to be followed. For months he was subject to threats against his life. On the door of his modest apartment in one of the town's railroad districts there are black stains. It is not dirt. The police were here, spreading lamp black on the door to check for finger prints, to discover who had broken into the rabbi's home.

All this because Swisa dared to travel to Toledo to gather the Jewish intellectuals there, who met with Palestinians, among them members of the PLO, to discuss the possibility of an Israeli-Arab peace.

On the Saturday following that meeting, the rabbis from all 39 synagogues in Bet Shemesh addressed the issue in their sermons. They told their audiences that it was forbidden henceforth to listen to Rabbi Swisa, forbidden to be in his class, because he had crossed all the red lines, violated all the borders. It was a kind of ostracism, although not in the religious sense of removing him from the community and stoning him to death. Social ostracism. And Swisa said, mainly to himself: "This, too, shall pass." He continued to go out into the streets, to knock on the doors of townspeople asking that they allow him to come in and listen to what he had to say. Just as he had done over the course of 3 years since he joined the Citizens' Rights Movement.

So it was, too, when fliers denouncing him were distributed, when demonstrations were organized across from his home, when they waited for him with sticks, tore his clothes, cursed, spit, and overturned booths that he had set up.

Rabbi Moshe Swisa had indeed crossed the lines. He abandoned the narrow orthodox world in favor of intensive activity in the Citizens' Rights Movement, which among other things waves the flag of war against religious coercion. The honorable rabbi is secretary of the CRM faction in the Histadrut in Bet Shemesh and head of its social field services. Together with Knesset member Ron Cohen, he circulates throughout Israel, meeting with labour committees, visiting work places, trying to reduce somewhat the huge gap between employer and employee. The two were among the initiators pressing for the establishment of an Israeli "solidarity" movement, which much to their chagrin did not enjoy the success of its sister in Poland.

The link between the two men was created 4 years ago. Swisa started working as a parliamentary aide to Knesset member Ron Cohen. In town they said: It is not so terrible, he has to make a living. When they understood that in fact this was a mission—the problems began.

Kahana's Kakh movement had in those days its strongest and most violent branch in Bet Shemesh, whose actions were well publicized. Kahana's people gave Swisa "a hard time," and they are experts at it. But it was not just them. For a decisive majority of townspeople, words like CRM and Peace Now, not to mention names like Yosi Sarid and Shulamit Aloni, are identified with deep sentiments of "anger and humiliation," as quoted by Amos 'Oz in the fall of 1982. Sentences like, "Peres and Yosi Sarid, who right from the start tell the Arabs to come on in, will take everything away from us, you know. An end of the season sale, only free....In what other country in the world would Yosi Sarid be allowed to roam free in time of war and make statements every day in favor of the enemy? ...You, you do not have pride in your country. You are just proud of yourselves, of the kibbutzim, of Peace Now. They are running all over the world saying, it is not us, it is them, Begin's dirty politics...." ("Here and There in the Land of Israel.")

So how is it possible that one of theirs, their own flesh and blood, would join these people, and a rabbi no less! Since when has a boy who studied under the renowned Rabbi Lita'i in Bene Beraq and was certified for the rabbinate by the honorable Rabbi 'Ovadya Yosef himself, been known to bring such garbage to his neighbors' doors.

And that is why they spit on him when he walked through the streets, why good friends rudely threw him out of their homes. Going out into the street became a dangerous enterprise requiring courage. When Rabbi Swisa wanted to open a branch of CRM in this town, it was difficult to find someone willing to rent him an apartment for that purpose. When he found such a hero, the man started receiving threats on his life and the lives of his children, and he quickly cancelled the lease.

The summer passed, followed by fall. Today Moshe Swisa is one of the most popular people in Bet Shemesh. His presence is requested on happy occasions, they visit him at his home, they seek out his company. It is as if a miracle has occurred. Today a branch of CRM sits proudly in a place where only a few months ago a branch of Kakh was situated. It has since closed due to lack of interest and participants. And that is the whole story. In a town that was a bastion of Kahanaism, with one of the strongest branches in the country, the Kakh movement disappeared off the map, and in its stead, CRM is flourishing. If Bet Shemesh was once considered a national political barometer, perhaps this movement is more than just a local phenomenon.

One must be careful not to get caught up in exaggerations. The revolution expresses itself in small ways. Bet Shemesh, Swisa emphasizes, is still a Likud stronghold; the town has not become left-wing "to the last man." But things are happening: Die-hard Likudniks have become CRM activists; young people from Bet Shemesh who were previously wide-eyed fans of Kahana's hysterical screaming and arm-waving have gone on buses with Rabbi Swisa to Taybah where they met and spoke with

Arab youths. Yosi Sarid and Shulamit Aloni came to Bet Shemesh, spoke in the amphitheater and left without incident. A year ago, it would have been impossible to even dream that such an appearance could take place, without the protection of a large police force.

Swisa: "We are not talking about a political revolution, at least not yet. The revolution is psychological. What happened is that today there is tolerance and a willingness to listen to other opinions, which was not the case at all a few months ago. People are prepared to listen, to accept the possibility that even those who believe that we should talk with the Palestinians are lovers of Israel, not her enemies. That is a tremendous achievement. I believe that if Bet Shemesh was able to come this far, it is an indication of what is happening in all the development towns."

If it was not a revolution, the elections for the workers council certainly indicated a turnaround in Bet Shemesh. For the first time, CRM won a mandate; 285 people voted for Rabbi Swisa. Among them were a few who worked night and day for a movement that engraved its banner with the call for direct talks with the PLO, the return of territories in exchange for peace, and the fight against religious coercion. The activists went into homes, talked with people and fielded their complaints. Wherever they went, the story goes in Bet Shemesh they were received with joy, with benevolence, and a willingness to listen.

Revolutions do not happen in a day. The path is still a hard one. But the first kilometer of the long march has been finished and Rabbi Swisa knows that this first kilometer was the hardest of all. Now, they need to build stamina, to continue slowly but surely, not to become discouraged, to rejoice in every new member that joins. There are no shortcuts, no revolutions of the masses. Swisa climbed the barricades. For him, the very fact that he was not toppled is an achievement.

Moshe Swisa immigrated with his parents and his eight brothers and sisters from Morocco when he was 7 years old. At the airport, the clerk insisted on writing on the parents' identity card that the child's name was Moses. It was only at the age of 18 that the youth officially went back to using his Hebrew name. The family arrived in Bet Shemesh and was given a modest 2-room apartment; they knew poverty and destitution. Their home was orthodox-religious. The father worked as an agricultural laborer and dreamed that they would not stay where he was. The children grew up with a strong political awareness, the essence of which was a strong hatred for MAPAI [Israeli Workers Party] and everything it represented.

Swisa was an excellent student. His teachers recommended sending him to the No'am school, elite among the religious yeshivas, where they combine Bible study with general studies. Swisa, who was stubborn even as a child, found a wonderful world in the Gemara. On his own, he decided to forego secular studies and devote

himself completely to the study of the Talmud. He stopped watching television, reading newspapers, playing with his friends. He switched from the knit skull cap of the No'am school to a black one, gave up his jeans in favor of black pants, from which the fringes of his prayer shawl peeked out. Before arriving at the yeshiva, he dreamed of being a politician. He used to stand in front of the mirror and deliver speeches to the masses. Shortly after arriving at the Zionist yeshiva, the dream changed. He wanted only one thing: to be a great Torah scholar.

At the age of 15, despite protests from his parents and teachers, he packed his bags and went to the Porat Yosef yeshiva, headed by Rabbi 'Ovadya Yosef. They refused to accept him. But he insisted. They threw him out the door, but he came back in through the window. They gave in and accepted him. His ability stood out immediately, but after a year he left, again, without consulting anyone—a restless youth, looking for answers, new paths, not finding his own peace.

Again with his suitcase in his hand, he arrived at the Neve Eretz yeshiva in Be'er Ya'aqov. All night he sat and studied, until he made himself known. They spoke about him as of a great luminary, someone who would have a great future. But he was busy wrestling with his soul, seeking his own truth, waiting to see the light. He was also thinking about Rabbi 'Ovadya Yosef. In the yeshiva he learned Ashkenazi and read books by the rabbi from Porat Yosef.

Rabbi Yosef, like Zionism, was not accepted at this yeshiva. Swisa acquired the reputation of a renegade. He began protesting and fighting the battles of this important Sephardic rabbi. Slowly but surely, other boys joined him. One might even speak of an "underground" at the yeshiva. For those who grew up in secular schools, where someone who challenged the teacher was king of the class, it is difficult to understand the significance of his actions. Going against the rabbi of your yeshiva is almost like denying the existence of God. There is nothing more terrible.

Young Swisa was only 16 years old when he decided to revolt against the wars of the rabbis and the complex world and the incitement he found in the yeshivas. He returned to Bet Shemesh, weakened and depressed. He studied for his high school diploma, which he passed with honors. He went back to wearing his knit skull cap again. The wearers of black skull caps from his old world mourned his "death."

In the Army, he served in the armored corps. Later, he went to the university where he studied philosophy and Kaballah, taught at Kolel, and served as the kashrut supervisor for a hotel in Acre. He was very strict on the issue of kashrut, but gave them permission to open the discotheque and swimming pool on Saturday. The rabbi of Acre fired him from his job. Swisa wrote a letter of complaint to Ron Cohen from CRM. That was the

beginning of a relationship that changed his life, and will, he believes, change the face of CRM when the time is ripe.

Swisa had meanwhile left the university and returned once again to the world of yeshivas. Five years ago he was certified as a rabbi. When the crisis erupted at Bet Shemesh Motors, Ron Cohen came to town to be with the workers. Swisa went up to him and said: "I am with you." Since then, they have been working together.

Ron Cohen: "After the initial, superficial encounter with Swisa, he suddenly came to see me at the Knesset one day and asked to work as my parliamentary assistant. I explained to him that I already had a parliamentary assistant, and that I was very sorry, but the Knesset only appointed one assistant to each Knesset member. And he said: 'I will work without pay. It is not important to me.' And so it was. He worked for months on a voluntary basis, became an expert mainly on issues I was dealing with—aid for workers at large, development towns. I was sure he had a rich father, or other sources of support that allowed him to survive. From time to time, he would disappear for a week or two. He would never leave notice and it was impossible to reach him, as if the earth had swallowed him up. Once, he phoned after 2 weeks, and from that telephone conversation I understood that the man was simply hungry for bread, and during his absences he earned money. He gave lessons, would go to Kolel for a period of time. When the office of secretary and Histadrut spokesman for CRM opened up, it was only natural that he should get it.

"Moshe was a man who works on principles and personal characteristics that were so sharp and so clear that others followed him. He is a stubborn man, a strong believer, never ambivalent in things he adopts as his own positions and he succeeds at inspiring others."

When Swisa began to speak out against religious coercion and for the separation of religion and state, those close to 'Ovadya Yosef tried to convince the rabbi to take away Swisa's certification. The rabbi refused. Then the curses began, the spitting, the banishment, and the ostracism. Three years ago, the local Jerusalem publication ALL ABOUT TOWN published a profile of the rabbi from CRM. On the day the article was published, the great and respected rabbi from Bet Shemesh stood in a central location, surrounded by his students, waving the article and inciting his followers against Swisa. A few days later, Swisa visited the home of a young yeshiva student, a good friend who had become religious and who had been a student of his for years. The young man threw him shamefaced out of his house. The street became an enemy. Rabbi Swisa made a decision not to retreat. He continued walking around town, talking with anyone he could, sitting down next to people in the public park, knocking on doors, organizing [text illegible] in social activities, slowly but surely scratching at the thin layer of hatred.

Today, CRM is a legitimate movement in Bet Shemesh, like the Likud, like Tehiya, like Alignment.

"If today I can speak about a revolution, it is because my greatest support in the Histadrut elections came precisely from people who were formerly right-wing. The most dedicated activists in CRM today are those people who used to be in the Likud, not Alignment. If people from Alignment were to support me, I would not see that as a significant change. CRM activists visited almost every home in the settlement. This Histadrut campaign fell on me like manna from heaven. It gave me the opportunity to go to people and talk; it gave an added push to the process of changing the relationship."

On 1 May 3 years ago, Swisa decided to organize a central convention of CRM in Bet Shemesh. The residents said: over our dead bodies. Swisa said: Shulamit Aloni, Yosi Sarid (whom he particularly admires and with whom he consults about everything), Ron Cohen and Dadi Tzucker, were coming to Bet Shemesh with hundreds of CRM activists. It was a short time after Peres had been in Bet Shemesh and they had thrown a beer bottle on his head. Imagine what they might have done to Yosi Sarid. Residents organized a small demonstration near his home, and they warned Swisa that "nothing would help." Yosi Sarid would not be able to come in. The Kahana branch went into action. They published fliers denouncing him and threatening his life.

Swisa decided to enter the lion's den. He went to the homes of the Kahana activists, asked them "to continue the wonderful tradition of the Oriental Jews, according to which every man is accepted with respect." He went again and again, and it started to sink in. Shulamit Aloni spoke at the amphitheater, followed by Yosi Sarid. Hundreds of CRM activists arrived from throughout Israel, and no one prevented the events from transpiring according to plan. It was a rare victory. Sarid, who always knew how to find the right words, ended his speech with a variation on a quote from one of the psalms, saying: "If I forget you, Bet Shemesh, let my left hand wither," and he was applauded hysterically.

There were tears in Swisa's eyes. He said: We have done it.

The next step was an attempt to establish a youth group. He gathered dozens of children from his neighborhood, one of the toughest and most problematic in Bet Shemesh. They came, one by one at first. Slowly but surely a group formed. Rabbi Swisa had a suggestion: to go visit an Arab village, to organize talks with local youth. The response he received was: "The Arabs should be slaughtered; we should not be visiting their homes."

The rabbi organized a soccer game between youths from Bet Shemesh and a youth group from the village of Taybah. He hired a bus, set a time, did not sleep at night for fear of what might happen. One wrong word might ignite a conflagration. The youngsters did not tell their parents that they were going to an Arab village. They were afraid.

The story of this visit is long and exciting. Not everything went smoothly; occasionally things reached the edge of mass conflict. The bottom line showed that once again a miracle had occurred, once again the kind of small breakthrough had been made on which, Rabbi Swisa believes, the world and all its fullness are built. The youths from both camps became friendly; they sat and they talked together. They parted friends.

Are you also willing to host Arab youths from Taybah here? I asked a 17-year-old boy from the Gefen district who participated in this unusual event. "Why not. Let them come. I know Arabs. I have already been working with them for many years. I have nothing against them."

One has to remember what existed here a few years ago to understand how great the victory is.

Swisa: I wanted to host youths from Taybah in Bet Shemesh, but they would not allow that. I believe that today we can even start to talk about that.

Later, there was Rabbi Swisa's famous trip to Toledo, to meet with Jewish, Sephardic intellectuals from around the world. PLO members were also present at the meeting, and the affair was exposed in the papers because of the desire of the Sephardic chief rabbi to take the rabbinic authority from Rabbi Mordekhay Malka, who travelled with Swisa to Morocco. When he returned, Swisa was forced to hide for 2 weeks outside of town. It was clear that this time his life was really in danger.

He returned with the brazen resolve that he would never hide again, never run away from anything again. He went home, went out in the street, held his head high and explained to the few who were willing to listen that he was really a patriot and a lover of the land.

When it came time for the Histadrut elections, it turned out that this effort had paid off. It was the biggest victory of all. CRM was on the map in Bet Shemesh. Kahana's gorillas disappeared completely, the defamatory pamphlets and the incitement stopped, once again there are no bans, no spitting or tearing of clothes.

How do your parents feel about your participation in CRM?

"That is the hardest issue of all. I do not want to expound at length. For 3 years there was no contact at all, they refused to see me. A short while ago, the tie was reestablished. I want to preserve that. I do not want to hurt them anymore."

Every revolution has its price.

[Box, p 8] Like a Man Jumping From the Shalom Tower

Avraham Ben-Muha, Zefat, "die-hard Likudnik." Until 2 months ago. Never missed a single Likud meeting.

"Me? If they had ever told me that one day I would meet with Ron Cohen or Yosi Sarid, I would have been

appalled. I was sure that these people were highly dangerous to the State of Israel, that they wanted to give everything away to the Arabs. I was like a man who had been injected with a certain substance, and I needed it more and more. Today I believe in the principles of CRM. I am sure that if all my friends in Bet Shemesh really know Sarid or Shulamit Aloni, they would also think the way I do."

Ben-Muha was among the most active, dedicated, industrious, and loyal supporters of CRM in the Histadrut elections. A new face in the Israeli left, calloused hands, a new language, a new way of debating.

Would you also vote for CRM in the Knesset elections? Accept their platform of talks with the PLO, territories in exchange for peace?

I am with them all the way. And I am not alone here, in Bet Shemesh. There has been progress. They received a mandate. You do not understand what that means. Do you know what it means to hang a CRM sign on my house without them burning it. A few months ago, someone switching from the Likud to CRM was like a man jumping from the Shalom Tower. Notwithstanding, I know several people like myself. Not a lot, but that is not important. The fact that they did not turn over our tables during the campaign, that is important.

Do you think that Peres would also be well received today in Bet Shemesh?

Peres is another story. He has become the symbol of all the hatred on the part of the Oriental Jews toward Alignment. For many of the residents here, it would be like waving a red cape in front of their eyes.

Rachel 'Omer was a member of the Labor Party until she switched to CRM. A Jerusalemite who married a resident of Bet Shemesh and followed him there, she is the nurse for nine settlements in the "Adulam" group. "CRM frightened me at the beginning, until I got to know them and learned what they were talking about. Bet Shemesh was known as the stronghold of Kahanaism. Today, you will not find Kahana people here. People are prepared to listen to what we have to say because they know us. It is not CRM, not talks with the PLO. It is me, Rachel, whom they know."

Yosi Bayton was for years a council member from the Likud. Today, he is using everything he learned as a Likud activist to advance the position of CRM. "The left has a problem, which is that they say things the way they are. They do not know how to explain things for the little man, the simple man. That is the most important. Likud knows how to do that. Begin was the best at it. It was enough for him to raise his hand, and everyone understood what he wanted."

JORDAN

Representative Discusses Party's Role in New Parliament

90OL0159A Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH
in Arabic 3 Dec 89 pp 21- 22

[Interview with Bassam Haddadayn, nominee of the Jordanian Democratic People's Party: "We Have Succeeded in Forming a Democratic Parliamentary Group;" first paragraph is AL-HURRIYAH introduction; date and place not given]

[Text] The following is the text of an interview conducted by AL-HURRIYAH with the Jordanian Democratic Parliamentary representative, Bassam Haddadayn, nominee of the Jordanian Democratic People's Party.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Let's begin by evaluating the recent elections in Jordan.

[Haddadayn] Let us first express our satisfaction that the executive authority chose to comply with the people's will and hold elections for the Jordanian Parliament, and that they suspended the election law's Article 18, paragraph h, which stipulates that a candidate not be a member of an "illegal" party. It is well known that political parties in Jordan are "illegal," with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the elections were conducted on the basis of an undemocratic election law, which divides the country and the provinces into unequal electoral districts. For example, the Capital Province was divided into seven districts, and the city of Amman into three districts. The purpose of this division was to fragment the votes, and create electoral districts from which it would be easy to elect traditional delegates. In addition to that, the election law does not fairly distribute the seats of the electoral districts. Al-Zarqa' Province, which has more than 600,000 residents, is only allocated six seats, while five seats are allotted to Amman's third district, whose residents are part of the bourgeois class. Please note that this district's population is no more than 240,000. This applies to several other provinces, such as al-Karak, Ma'an, etc. This means that the election law interferes with the democracy of the electoral process before the process even begins.

Moreover, the elections were conducted under unfair conditions. The national and democratic forces throughout the preceding period were prosecuted and hounded, while the Muslim Brotherhood was openly and freely pursuing its activities.

In addition to this, the administrative complexities that the election law contains precluded any widespread participation of the citizenry in the electoral process. Al-Zarqa' Province has more than 600,000 residents; the number of those who exercised their right to vote did not exceed 57,000. These administrative complexities were the reason for that. The citizen must first go to register himself on the electoral rolls during a specific period of

time. He then had to go back again to get his voting card. He cannot make up for the time that he wasted and the complications that ensue, and all this takes place within the context of an absence of an awareness of the importance of elections, since the citizen was deprived of them for a quarter of a century. The direct result of this was that a large number of citizens were apathetic about going to register and obtain their voting card. Consequently, their right to vote was lost. The majority of this group of people are from the masses, which form the principal rank and file of the national and democratic forces, while the Muslim Brotherhood Party—for reasons that we mentioned before—was successful in rounding up all its forces among the people and, consequently, assured for them the right to vote. Therefore, one must say that the groups of citizens who participated in the electoral process do not accurately represent the leanings of the Jordanian man in the street.

Another problem that I want to mention in this regard is that the person who voted for the Muslim Brotherhood actually voted for religion, by virtue of the fact that he was against corruption, bribery and polluted hands. Moreover, a suitable opportunity was not made available for the voter to judge the political forces on the basis of their positions with regard to religious issues and problems surrounding him.

Despite all this, the national and democratic forces achieved about 20 percent of the seats. If the national and democratic forces had united in solidarity, that percentage could have been even higher.

[AL-HURRIYAH] What do you think of the work to be done in parliament during the coming period?

[Haddadayn] I think that there is an open horizon before the representatives of national and democratic forces and the nationalist independents, to coordinate their movements and construct joint positions with regard to the principal local issues that must be solved. On this basis, I called early on for the formation of a democratic parliamentary bloc, and we have succeeded in forming a "democratic grouping." Some 14 deputies attended the formation session; three who have declared their willingness to take part in the group were absent. In my opinion, this grouping will be able to recruit more deputies and, through that, we will find more points in common with religious and liberal elements with regard to the many issues. We in the Jordanian Democratic People's Party reject doing business according to the principle of "say the word and I'll march," because we want this parliament to achieve practical results. If we structure this parliament carefully, with good balance, we shall find that this matter is possible. Moreover, we have priorities for which we want to muster a parliamentary majority, so that we can achieve them; the "democratic grouping" must act in a spirit of realism and high responsibility in that regard.

[AL-HURRIYAH] What are the priorities that you will concentrate on?

[Haddadayn] I can define those priorities as follows:

1) Call on the government to issue a general amnesty for political prisoners, by opening a new page in politics;

2) Call for the lifting of martial law, out of consideration that that is the gateway to creating a healthy climate in which to begin the journey of reconsideration and change;

3) Call for the application of general freedoms, led by freedom of the press, labor and political organization, on the basis of practise, as was in fact done in the parliamentary elections, and grant press rostrums to political forces; and,

4) Put the economic portfolio at parliament's disposal, especially the foreign debt dossier, and the kingdom's agreement with the IMF. The purpose behind this is so that we can formulate our viewpoint on the basis of these documents, as was suggested as a way out of the present crisis. The IMF is not sacred and, with regard to foreign debts, there are precedents for countries to be able to impose their conditions in a way that suits their national interests. This could be an example to follow. With regard to economic programs, our direct inclination would be in the interest of fairer distribution, in order to lessen the effects of the crisis on the working classes. In this regard, we shall demand the application of the escalator clause system, which links wages to the cost of living index. It is well known that every advanced country has adopted this system for basic salaries and allowances. This addition is precisely linked with the index of price increases.

Agreement on these priorities, and other details connected with them, is not impossible. That will be a test of everyone's intentions before the masses.

[AL-HURRIYAH] Are you optimistic with regard to the future of the voluntary change process?

[Haddadayn] Yes, I am optimistic. This optimism is not out of line, and is based on the firm supports for profound change that has in fact already occurred in society, and from which a new April uprising has resulted. I think that there is only one direction for those who make decisions to go. It is the way of democracy; no other path is open. It goes without saying that the other way that was tried and that failed has led to this huge and heavy collection of problems that have shaken the country.

The present challenges are greater than any that were being confronted in isolation from the people's participation. It was not by chance that our election campaign slogan was "Participation and Change," that is, popular participation and democratic change. Here we are, going along that road!

Naturally, the size of the participation and the depth of change are both a question of the balance of power. They depend on the pressure of the escalating mass movement and, therefore, I think that the work inside parliament

will not be in isolation from the work going on outside. The divisions within parliament are not set in concrete. Rather, parliament will generally affect the direction of the demands of the mass movement. There is much that must be done. The important thing is for the wheels to begin to turn. We are ready to escort this progress as vanguard forces should do.

[AL-HURRIYAH] What about your personal battle in the al-Zarqa' Province district?

[Haddadayn] We succeeded in organizing a mass election campaign, an organization formed from all parts of the province of various groupings and classes. Our campaign met with an unequaled response from the masses, which was made manifest by the number of votes, some 14,698 votes in fact. This was the highest vote tally of any candidate, outside of religious candidates, in all electoral districts of the kingdom. It is not at all odd that the programs that we proposed garnered this support in an electoral district such as al-Zarqa', where the vast majority of residents are workers and lower class, living on limited incomes. We succeeded in creating an excellent situation with the masses, which was manifested in numerous election rallies.

The people of al-Zarqa' remembered my name, and I shall not forsake them. I will be faithful and courageous in defending the programs that are in compliance with their interests and which defend their rights. I have faced a campaign of organized distortion, but the masses spoke clearly and unmistakably. The result was the reverse of what the organizers of that distortion campaign had hoped for.

LEBANON

Writer Analyzes American Relations With Ja'ja'

90OL0187A Kuwait AL-QABAS
in Arabic 21 Dec 89 pp 29, 30

[Article by The Arab Observer]

[Text] After the U.S. Ambassador in Beirut, John McCarthy, submitted his credentials to the late President, Rene Mu'awwad, the silence of the Lebanese Forces—which Washington persisted in considering illegal following the election of the president—in the face of Michel 'Awn's position was deemed strange (and provoked astonishment). It was clear that McCarthy wanted to say: Attack the General, we are behind you...

But Ja'ja' can only cleave to precise calculations, because he greatly fears "American perfidy" owing to his belief that the United States, unlike the Soviet Union (before perestroika of course), does not employ a certain consistency in its foreign policy. Moreover, he takes into account that the Americans would not hesitate to behave as those who take back what they give in formulating this policy. If Ja'ja' is well aware of 'Awn's experience with Washington, which lent its support to General 'Awn's

candidacy in presidential elections but then withdrew it without cause, his personal experience with the American administration is not devoid of deep gaps. Who will guarantee that this administration would not decide, after 'Awn's removal, to remove Ja'ja' in the special context of "removing the militias from existence," especially since the administration has attempted to lift his cover more than once?

There is another calculation. Dr. Ja'ja' stated to us that he is stronger militarily and has more popular support than General 'Awn. In other words, he is able to decide the battle in the field. However, 'Awn's personality, which has become increasingly suicidal, might make it difficult to achieve such a decision, inasmuch as it could lead to endless bloodshed.

Also, Ja'ja' sees himself as an "ideological hero" who cannot become involved in tactical operations entailing the loss of "precious Christian blood" or the collapse of the "grand Christian strategy," because the region is approaching sensitive transformations, regardless of whether the diplomatic probe to settle the Palestinian problems reaches an impasse, or "loopholes are found in the Torah," as one Palestinian leader told us.

Ja'ja' cannot forget that Henry Kissinger's shadow blankets the U.S. State Department. This means that fighting inside the eastern areas might be needed now to liquidate "Christian society" completely, so that—as the Kissinger plan envisages—a Palestinian state can be established inside or beside Lebanon, moral scruples notwithstanding. Ja'ja' believes that bloody partition means the end. On this basis, he justifies his political and informational (and even military) tolerance of Gen. 'Awn last February, when 'Awn ordered the repulsion of the Lebanese Forces to the rear, and even [would have ordered] their termination had not the confrontation on the Antilyas-Jall al-Dib axis revealed the impossibility of full military control over the eastern areas.

When the Ta'if agreement was concluded, Ja'ja' was confident that it was the best that could be obtained in these circumstances, in which the "golden locks" are disappearing from the heads of expert strategists, inasmuch as the Americans and Soviets are exchanging warm kisses, and there is no room for play. Thus, Ja'ja' considered the agreement, despite its weakness and incompatibility with his ideological convictions, able to constitute a basic framework for a breathing spell while waiting for the international and regional picture to become clear.

Ja'ja' does not differ in theory with Gen. 'Awn. However, he regards 'Awn as proceeding on the basis of a personal inclination, his major goal being the presidency, and if Syria were on his side, he would not hesitate to request the establishment of a confederation, at least, with it. This is confirmed by secret envoys who went to Damascus and had the door shut in their faces, because the Syrians understand, fully and with the utmost precision, the different psychological aspects of the general's

personality. They find him to be not only seized by a tendency to overthrow, but also to prevail, so that failing to attain the presidency, he would not hesitate to declare war on Syria.

Ja'ja' believes that there is a great difference between himself, namely "the hero" who was raised up by roughened hands, and 'Awn, the "functionary" who was promoted by stipulations and circumstances. Ja'ja' believes that wisdom might be more advantageous than might in the face of a historical turning point, but...

The general was enjoined to retain the American helmet, even if he was accusing the Americans of oscillating and accommodating the Syrians, either for the sake of the hostages—whose lives, it was ascertained, were no longer in danger in the light of assurances which Damascus received from Teheran and Hizballah leaders—or for the sake of not provoking a confrontation with Syria, regardless of its type, in these sensitive circumstances in which the American settlement [of the Palestinian problem] is being marketed.

Ja'ja's conviction—leaked by his confidants—that "we can only accept the Americans as they are" reveals for the first time that his threats were what prevented supporters of Gen. 'Awn from detaining the American ambassador in Beirut, John McCarthy, and all the members of the diplomatic mission, before Washington ordered them to leave Beirut immediately.

However, 'Awn was, and still is, betting on an American turnabout imposed by the regional reality currently taking shape on the ground. This change will not occur in the foreseeable future, and may never occur. Ja'ja' knows this well. Therefore, he has begun to pay close attention to the Americans.

The Americans told Ja'ja' that 'Awn is ripe for extinction, but that this would not happen in a military operation undertaken by Syrian forces, because Damascus had been informed that this option was absolutely forbidden. The downfall was to be at the hands of "other agents" currently being prepared, and the Lebanese Forces must unite forces with the Phalange Party to assure the fall from within. Someone was also saying that an American official told an envoy of Dr. Ja'ja': "If you reject 'Awn's removal by the Syrians, you must remove him; this is your opportunity."

Perhaps the second card which the Americans are attempting to play is their statement that they will not permit Gen. 'Awn to direct any military strike against the Lebanese Forces. Moreover, a reliable source familiar with East Beirut provided AL-QABAS with information that the Americans assured the arrival of certain types of weapons to the Lebanese Forces to strengthen their effectiveness in the eastern areas in confronting 'Awn, who is rumored to have discovered a plan that a number of armored corps officers were intending to carry out. As is well known, the Americans have been able to attract a number of such officers for

training on tanks purchased from the United States since the first months of President Amin Jumayyil's tenure.

The same source stressed that more than one "coup attempt" has been made against Gen. 'Awn in recent weeks. However, all of them failed, and it is rumored that about 30 officers belonging to different units were dismissed.

But the interesting thing said by the Americans to Ja'ja' is that the provisions of the Ta'if agreement are no more than sleeping pills intended to give the crisis a brief respite, so that it will not adversely affect the diplomatic process being conducted by the United States. In other words, U.S. cover for the agreement is no more than a tactical measure to cover the waiting period until the first formula of a settlement of the Palestinian problem takes shape.

Some Americans are saying that the Ta'if agreement is a solution agreement. Others say that the agreement means Lebanon's linkage with Syria, and that it will fall like all other agreements witnessed by the Lebanese crisis to establish a new formula defined in the light of the form to be assumed by a settlement of the Middle East crisis.

The formula which the Americans are discussing is a federative formula. Perhaps it would have been a confederative formula if circumstances had so decreed. In any case, it conforms ideologically to Ja'ja's orientations, inasmuch as he states that a solution lies only in political plurality, which implies not returning to a formula calling for a confederation.

Naturally, Washington is not relying, in its present course, on the resilient wall of hatred between the factions, but on specific arrangements to which recourse must be had to conclude sensitive and complicated deals.

In other words, the United States, which has stopped covering 'Awn politically (and perhaps militarily), is supplying ideological cover to Ja'ja', and may supply him with military cover if he wants it. However, the ever cautious Ja'ja', who has witnessed the destruction of all the men of his day one after the other, fears that there is a plan aimed at destroying him together with 'Awn. He therefore prefers caution to unrestrained slipping, because possible action by Army officers to eliminate the general would establish the strongest man in the eastern areas without him being responsible for any possible bloodshed and without him having to wade into an adventure whose outcome is unknown.

Washington is doubtlessly pressuring Tel Aviv, which, despite its wariness of direct involvement in the Lebanese crisis, cannot abandon certain strings which it can use effectively at some time. American pressure is soothing to Dr. Ja'ja', who has not forgotten that the Israelis at one time asked him to move with his elements to the border strip, desiring him to be no more than an energetic guard of Israel's northern borders, while he, a native of the northern region, believes that his true role

is that of "guardian of Christian society," and he assumes that he will always continue in this role.

The Americans currently state that they are the masters of the Middle East. As for the Israeli role, it is a patron role. If the Maronites were discussing "new waves" in the region, which might impose on them a certain reality, the United States alone states that it is prepared to protect the Maronites "if they decide to be reasonable."

This remark was conveyed to Ja'ja', who became determined to actually move. Attracting great attention, he decided to sponsor "Resistance Day" on 9 December 1989, jointly with the Phalange Party to be exact, with the understanding that he would define his position on developments in a speech to be delivered at a mass rally. The necessary preparations were made to move the rally to the courtyard of the headquarters of the Lebanese Forces command in al-Karantina. Many expected that the announcement [by Ja'ja'] of a "separate political position" differing from that of Gen. 'Awn would lead to a military confrontation between them. Intensive contacts occurred to handle the situation carefully, and the onset of rain provided an excuse to cancel the rally. However, this did not prevent the congestion from developing into a clash in the Nahr al-Mawt area after army elements seized the AL-MASIRAH magazine, which is the mouthpiece of the Lebanese Forces. It should be recalled that any explosion in the eastern areas frequently begins after the seizure of this magazine, which is usually tasked with conveying Ja'ja's personal view. The Lebanese Forces also own a very sophisticated television station (The Lebanese Broadcast Organization), possibly the best in the Middle East, and a radio station (the Voice of Free Lebanon), which covers Lebanon and parts of neighboring countries. However, the written word remains the most potent medium for expressing subtle positions.

The Americans assured Lebanese Forces officials, with whom they met recently, that the Syrians would withdraw in the course of two months from mountain positions overlooking the eastern areas and from the neighboring northern al-Batrun area, on up to other northern areas in which a Maronite majority lives. Moreover, the Americans promised a "precious gift" to Ja'ja', namely a Syrian withdrawal from his hometown, Bushra.

This would of course happen after 'Awn's "withdrawal" from the Ba'abda [Presidential] Palace: You must attack...

According to information conveyed to AL-QABAS, among the alternatives broached by the Americans is the establishment of coordination between the Lebanese Forces and Army brigades subordinate to Major Amil Lahhud to attack the presidential palace, without the participation of non-Lebanese elements in the fighting. In this case, the pincers would be applied to the general, whose worst fear is an internal move against him, and whose biggest bet is on everyone standing behind him,

even if by the force of tanks, because what would happen if he became threatened from the rear, when he is already threatened from the front?

The contacts are still continuing: Ja'ja' is betting on greater American offers, despite being convinced of the importance of what has been offered him so far. 'Awn is betting on American tiredness. This was in the days of the cold war. For now, the Soviets are receiving "instructions" from Washington, and the Middle East is again falling in...North America! [as published]

MOROCCO

Royal Air Maroc Cargo Services Expanded

900A0239C Casablanca MAROC SOIR
in French 25 Dec 89 pp 1, 3

[Text] Casablanca (MAP)—In implementation of the measures provided in the communique of the prime minister and announced on Wednesday 13 December 1989, Royal Air Maroc (RAM) informs its customers of the steps taken to expand its cargo service, to add a cargo flight, and to set up a cargo line.

A communique from the RAM announces that those measures concern the following:

1. Expansion of cargo service to Europe:
 - a) France: four basic flights to Paris, Marseilles, and Nice, plus five additional flights to Paris in the spring to be operated in cooperation with Air France.
 - b) Other European countries:
 - 1) Cargo service by B737 (13 metric tons of cargo) to seven destinations: London, Amsterdam, Brussels, Rome, Milan, Geneva, and Zurich.
 - 2) Cargo service by B707 (36 metric tons of cargo) to Frankfurt and Rome.
2. Restoration of regular cargo service between Casablanca and Montreal (36 metric tons of cargo): departure every Tuesday at 1100 hours; rate: nine dirhams per kilogram for fruit, vegetables, and cut flowers; first flight: Tuesday, 9 January 1990.
3. Startup of a weekly cargo flight to Scandinavia serving the airports in Stockholm and Oslo (36 metric tons of cargo): departure every Thursday at 1400 hours; first flight: Thursday 11 January 1990; rate: eight dirhams per kilogram for fruit, vegetables, and cut flowers.
4. Establishment of a cargo line to Jeddah (36 metric tons of cargo) in May 1990 to operate during the fruit and vegetable season; rate: eight dirhams per kilogram.

In addition, and for the purpose of improving its African service, Royal Air Maroc announces the establishment of a regularly scheduled line to serve the west coast of Africa. A 36-metric-ton cargo plane will serve the airports at Nouakchott, Conakry, and Abidjan as follows:

1. Departure every Sunday at 1515 hours.
2. First flight: Sunday 7 January 1990.
3. Rates can be obtained from the RAM's commercial freight department.

Women's Association Holds Regional Conference

90OA0239B Casablanca MAROC SOIR
in French 25 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by Moustapha Ouadrassi]

[Text] Meeting under the slogan "Hand in hand for equality and dignity," the Democratic Women's Association of Morocco (ADFM) held its first national congress in Rabat on Saturday and Sunday, 23 and 24 November.

In attendance were a great many women from the cities where the association has branches: Rabat, Casablanca, Agadir, Meknes, Tadla, and Taza.

And in the report by the National Committee that she presented, the association's chairwoman, Amina Mrini, said: "There will soon be eight more branches in eight more cities."

Definition: "The ADFM was established in 1985 at the initiative of members of the Party of Progress and Socialism," said Mrini, "and it was supported by women not affiliated with any political party. Its purpose is to be an independent association with the following objectives, among others:

1. To defend the economic, social, and political rights of women.
2. To work to promote laws that will better ensure the dignity of women and allow them to assume the important place and role that are theirs in society.

Laws to better ensure the dignity of women?

Here is the speaker's response:

"We recognize that thanks to undeniable gains in this area, women in Morocco are not starting from scratch in their struggle."

Explanation: "Moroccan women are airline captains and deans of schools, they win gold medals at the Olympic Games, and they are professors of medicine, judges, and lawyers."

Footnote: "A great many tourists are agreeably impressed by the presence of Moroccan women in the various activities of daily life!"

Comment: "That is the new face of the Moroccan woman, and it has come about thanks to the positive changes that have occurred in Morocco in recent decades and more especially over the past 10 years or so. There is no possible comparison between today's generation and the generation that preceded it."

Assertion: "Those are achievements that must be preserved at all costs."

Does this mean that everything is the way women want it?

Answer: "No," says Mrini. "Otherwise our association would have no reason to exist."

So there are dark spots in the picture!

What are they?

"For example, there is rampant illiteracy among women in the rural areas," says Mrini. "There is the fact that a woman, even if she is a university professor or a judge, cannot obtain a passport unless a man, be it father or husband, approves. There is the fact that she is kept out of positions of responsibility in Parliament, where there are no women, in the government, where there are also no women, and in the top bodies of the political parties and unions."

So what should be done?

The chairwoman of the ADFM answers: "We must consolidate our gains and work to revise legal texts that view women as eternal minors. In other words, what we as women want is to live as we want—certainly different from men but equal to them—rather than living as men want us to."

In a word, as Karima Khaldi put it in her speech opening the congress, the Moroccan woman wants to work for and does work for, and we quote, "a society in which men and women will live far removed from exploitation and protected from discrimination."

Along the same lines, Noura Borsali, who came to greet the congress on behalf of the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD), said: "The rights of woman are part and parcel of the rights of man."

She added: "Any violation of women's rights in Algeria, Morocco, or elsewhere directly affects Tunisian women."

In her speech, Nacira Merrah of the (Algerian) Association for the Equality of Men and Women Before the Law said: "The Greater Maghreb will be built with women or it will not be built at all!"

Mrini said: "We affirm that the Maghreb of which our peoples dreamed and that has become a reality thanks to the UMA [Arab Maghreb Union] cannot make progress without the women, just as it will not succeed in meeting the challenges of the century if it keeps half its population on the sidelines."

Other women delivering speeches in which they gave their support to the ADFM Congress were the following:

1. From the Soviet Union, Natalia Nicolaeva of the Committee of Soviet Women.

2. From Romania, Victoria Iliescu of the National Council of Romanian Women.

3. From Syria, Mrs. Balancou of the General Union of Syrian Women.

4. From the State of Palestine, Ikhlasse Jamil of the General Union of Palestinian Women.

5. Zahia Safa of the International Union of Democratic Women.

Seated on the platform with Amina Mrini, the association's chairwoman, at this congress were Rabia Nacira, a university professor; Karima Khaldi of Rabat; Nouzha Skalli, Fatima Ihri, Zahra Dliaa, and Latifa Ouadi of Casablanca; Hayat Khaba of Agadir; Naima Ouahbi of Marrakech; Habiba Harrar of Meknes; Rahmouna Anzagh of Taza; Rgad Halima of Oujda; Saadi Idrissia of Fes; Zahroui Fatima of Tadla; Hamimi Maimouna of Khenifra; Ahiche Salma of La'youn; and Ghalia Bijou of Nador.

It should be noted that Victoria Iliescu, a member of the National Council of Romanian Women and responsible secretary of the Romanian press agency AGERPRESS, took the opportunity provided by this congress to say: "From the rostrum of this congress, I am going to say that I am in favor of all the democratic reforms now taking place in my country. Those reforms are opening the door to democracy, freedom, and socialism with a human face."

Fes Housing Construction Permits Awarded

*90OA0243A Casablanca MAROC SOIR
in French 26 Dec 89 p 5*

[Text] The Fes Municipal Planning Office issued 47 building permits in October 1989 for the construction of 97 dwellings and a factory. Total value of the construction is estimated at 12,899,602 dirhams.

The "new city" section was awarded 44 permits to build 87 dwellings of 334 inhabitable rooms and a factory in the industrial quarter of Sidi Brahim. The value of these buildings, whose constructed area is 3,976 square meters and a floor area of 12,197 square meters, is estimated at 12,197,000 dirhams.

The medina was only awarded three permits to build seven dwellings of 24 inhabitable rooms on a constructed area of 280 square meters. Total cost is estimated at 702,602 dirhams.

Private Organization Hosts Debate on Privatization

*90OA0243B Casablanca MAROC SOIR
in French 21 Dec 89 p 9*

[Article by Jamal Eddine Herradi: "What Kind of Privatization?"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] As is its custom, the "Ajial" Association sponsored a dinner debate at the Casablanca Sheraton yesterday, on the theme of "privatization."

In his introductory remarks Mr. Manjour, president of the "Ajial" Association, first reminded his listeners of the association's purpose, in particular, intellectual stimulation through the hosting of debates and conferences on topical questions. Mr. Manjour, who noted the keen interest of the Moroccan intelligentsia in privatization, also stressed that only dialogue could spare us all mistakes [as published] and keep us from falling prey to demagogery.

Consequently, in their talks speakers emphasized the different aspects of privatization, the complaints about this type of economy, its positive aspects and its contribution, which apparently would be considerable and would help to make the Moroccan economy more dynamic.

In this vein, the synergy between the private and public sectors, the subject of Mr. Gharnaout's speech, can [Mr. Gharnaout said] bring about fresh cooperation between the two sectors to the greater gain of the national economy. Mr. Gharnaout, who felt it important to point out that the two sectors share a "homogenous view" of Morocco's economic problems, reminded his audience that the state creates and make arrangements for the "private" sector also. Citing the privatization experiences of other countries, Mr. Gharnaout underscored the fact that family businesses must be separated from business in general.

As for Mr. Brittel, he attempted in his talk to show the close links between social equality and economic efficiency. Although he dealt with various legal aspects of the question, the very fact that his speech raised pertinent questions such as who will benefit from privatizations, what legal form will they take, etc., made it of interest to the audience.

The debates, which lasted well into the evening, served as a sort of overview into a fascinating subject. We will come back to the question in more detail in upcoming editions.

Water Reserve Statistics Reported

*90OA0243C Rabat L'OPINION
in French 13 Dec 89 p 5*

[Text] Dam water supplies have risen to 5,300 million cubic meters since the beginning of the agricultural season (1 November to 8 December) compared to 1,410 million for the same period last year.

These increases were reported during November and the first week of December and concern the following dams:

Dams	Million Cubic Meters
Hassan Dakhil	173
Oued Makhazine	318
Mansour Eddahbi	410
Mohammed V	196
Massira	366
Lalla Takarkoust	152
Bine El Ouidane	129
Mohammed Benabdellah	99
Ibn Bettouta	23
Moulay Youssef	87

The report of the Water Research and Planning Directorate (Hydraulics Directorate), which is part of the Ministry of Public Works and Professional and Managerial Training, states that dam water reserves reached 5,315 million cubic meters, or 56.4 percent of holding capacity. This compares with 50.9 percent recorded for the same day last year.

The report specifies that the Ibn Bettouta and Hassan Dakhil Dams were the greatest gainers from these water supplies, jumping from 20 to 65 percent and 17 to 59.5 percent, respectively.

The report also indicates that drinking water and irrigation needs were met with 1,680 million cubic meters.

These reserves, the report says, also make it possible to satisfy drinking water and irrigation needs in the peripheral regions of Tafilalet, Ziz and Draa under better conditions.

Inadequate Irrigation Levels Reduce Cotton Production

900A0243D Rabat L'OPINION in French 6 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by M. Aakarmi: "Cotton's Surge"]

[Text] The Gharb's immensity makes it one of the most important agricultural regions in our kingdom. This year, producers and COMAPRA (Moroccan Agricultural Product Company) are taking great interest in the cultivation of cotton. Our stopover this time will be an agricultural one, as we decided it would be useful to visit some producers from the group of cooperatives in one of the receiving centers where cotton picking is at its height.

Judging from COMAPRA's arrangements, it appears the company is aware of the former difficulties of producers and that it has let down its administrative "guard." Mr Salli Ahmed, president of a cooperative, and two other producers caught on the run gave us their impressions of cotton farming, its potential problems, the roles played by COMAPRA and receiving centers, and their advantages: "This year things have shifted enormously in our

favor, compared to previous years. First, to combat foreign bodies that harm cotton, COMAPRA has given us several resources: we get sacks to gather the cotton, a 50-meter square of black plastic to cover it, cleaning and drying, in addition to pieces of string to tie that kind of sack. Those are undeniable advantages and we are pleased about them."

Aware of the costly and difficult trips made by producers and to spare them long waits at the main factory where the cotton is processed, COMAPRA created six other receiving centers. Of them Mr. Salli says: "It is a good initiative on the part of COMAPRA, who finally understood and put an end to the calvary we were going through. In contrast to past years, this year our daily harvest was received in centers and that has two positive aspects. First, travel is no longer a problem, nor is waiting. Second, we are sure of getting our money. We no longer fear bad weather, since after delivery, it's the company that is solely responsible. It is one of the greatest advantages that we're so happy about, because before we were always afraid of rains at the time of harvest and delivery, during the endless wait at the main factory."

However, production and sometimes even quality still fall short, and to know more about why, we must ask the producers already identified to sum up the situation: "Though we have no complaints about resources and aid, there is still the problem of irrigation, which stands in the way of raising cotton properly, and especially in the way of [earning] income from it. For it (irrigation) often comes late, especially when there is no rain. This delay in irrigation often leaves producers uncertain and indecisive about crops to plant. We dug wells, but it turned out the water was harmful to cotton and even sunflowers, because it was salty. Thus, it would be better if the irrigation department managed to distribute water better, and that's why we're waiting impatiently for construction of the El Mjaara dam, which will surely solve these problems, to be finished."

Despite COMAPRA's arrangements and the willingness of producers, cotton production is still inadequate for a strip that is the largest, if not the best, in the kingdom. Indeed, given its resources, COMAPRA, which handles two provinces, Sidi Kacem and Kenitra, could develop over five thousand (5,000) hectares. COMAPRA has already played a dual beneficial role, socially and economically, for the 1,500 hectares already planted. First, the company makes it possible to process harvests of the 1,500 hectares in its own factories, and second, it hires considerable manpower that increases yearly according to the statistics provided. In fact, the 2,000 (sic) workers hired in 1987 jumped to 350 in 1988-89, or 75 percent, and the factory is even contemplating taking on between 400 and 450 workers in 1989-90.

In accordance with royal directives to preserve self-sufficiency and to improve quality and quantity, COMAPRA has made the following recommendations:

- 1) The creation of a vast and important program [to increase] area cultivation.
- 2) An increase in cotton prices from 6.40 dirhams to 6.90 dirhams.

3) An acceleration of mutual aid between agricultural cadres and producers to improve production.

4) Above all, an improvement in quality and preventive measures against the introduction of foreign bodies into cotton crops.

The cultivation of cotton, which has become an integrated operation, could soar in this agricultural region where it is preferred to other agricultural crops. This seems especially true if one looks at the decision of COMAPRA's last board of directors' meeting, dated 2 June 1988, and which decided to offer a guaranteed, firm purchase price to cotton producers starting with the 1989-90 season, according to the following schedule:

Common Cotton

Extra-fine quality: 6.90 dirhams/kilo

First-rate quality: 6.70 dirhams/kilo

Second-rate quality: 6.20 dirhams/kilo

Third-rate quality: 6.10 dirhams/kilo

Multiplier Cotton

Extra-fine quality: 7.20 dirhams/kilo

First-rate quality: 7.00 dirhams/kilo

Second-rate quality: 6.50 dirhams/kilo

Third-rate quality: 6.40 dirhams/kilo

QATAR

Information Minister Discusses Censorship, Telecommunications

90OL0199B Doha AL-RAYAH
in Arabic 2 Dec 89 pp 8, 9

[Article: "Interview with Shaykh Hamad Bin-Suhaym Al Thani, minister of information and culture by Ahmad 'Ali and Muhammad al-Fawwal in Doha; first four paragraphs are AL-RAYAH introduction; date not given"]

[Excerpts] An interview with His Excellency Shaykh Hamad Bin-Suhaym, minister of information and culture, could go on for hours.

The young minister is an eloquent conversationalist who is cultured, openminded, and a good listener. Despite his responsibilities and the demands on his time, his excellency the minister of information and culture carefully monitors the domestic press, radio, and television. He makes his observations ever so casually so they would not be mistaken for guidelines or even for criticism.

He welcomed the meeting with AL-RAYAH and its readers in this, his first press interview since the 18 July cabinet reshuffle. [passage omitted]

Absolute Confidence in Editors-in-Chief

We began the interview with a hot issue of concern to all engaged in the domestic press.

[AL-RAYAH] Journalistic circles, very optimistic now that you have assumed the Ministry of Information, have expectations of great strides in developing and evolving the national press, including the lifting of censorship off Qatari newspapers and magazines.

[Bin-Suhaym] You are completely aware of the conditions and circumstances that necessitated the imposition of censorship on the national press at that time. The Ministry of Information and Culture has absolute confidence in the editors-in-chief because it knows fully well that they, as enlightened citizens, are keen on safeguarding the interests of the country and citizens and that they are performing a major function in the development of our society. Censorship, therefore, is now closer to being a means for coordination and exchange of views in the public interest between the ministry and press organizations. So-called censorship, as it now exists, does not at all mean that the papers avoid tackling any subject, be it political, economic, social, cultural, or sports-oriented, as long the motive is to enlighten citizens in the interest of society and as long as they [the papers] comply with the Publications Law. Of course, censorship will be lifted when the reasons for it no longer exist.

Press Concerns Are of Interest to Us

[AL-RAYAH] Why doesn't the minister of information and culture meet monthly, or at regular intervals, with information and press leaders in order to discuss and solve their problems and explain the state's plan for development of information?

Shaykh Hamad Bin-Suhaym responded in his quiet manner, "The Qatari press is a bulwark of Qatari information and is to be proud of its accomplishments over the past few years, compared with older foreign counterparts. The concerns and interests of the press are also of concern and interest to the Ministry of Culture and Information. The ministry has spared no effort in the past to support and encourage the press by all means. Certainly, interaction between the ministry and our journalistic organizations is necessary, important, and desirable if the press is to be kept always informed and abreast of the general direction of the state's information policy. Furthermore, meetings are necessary to identify whatever obstacles or impediments prevent the local press from performing its role in the best possible fashion. The issue of regular meetings is therefore currently under serious consideration and study. We are also evaluating all aspects of information activity.

Measures To Boost Effectiveness of Information

[AL-RAYAH] Are there any new measures planned in the near future to propel Qatar towards its goals?

Shaykh Hamad Bin-Suhaym quickly responded, "There is no doubt that we of the Ministry of Culture and Information aspire to elevate the standard and content of the informational message in order to evoke the desired reaction. This is one of our priorities in information and it covers all information media—print, radio, and television.

I can say that we are studying various measures to boost the effectiveness and impact of Qatari information by, for example, adding to information bureaus abroad, prolonging radio and television transmission hours, expanding the overseas broadcast network of the Qatar news agency and the network of correspondents, and seeking to boost cooperation in information between Qatar and sister and friendly nations. [passage omitted]

Arab and Foreign Journalists

[AL-RAYAH] The Ministry of Information and Culture hosts a number of Arab and foreign journalists whose visits do not seem to bring about positive results. Are there plans to restructure such visits for better results by inviting Arab and foreign opinion-makers?

[Bin-Suhaym] The ministry, by inviting Arab and foreign journalists, has in mind their value and importance as widely-read and influential journalists and information people. It prepares for them itineraries that familiarize them with major aspects of Qatari society and its most important accomplishments. The ministry is also careful to study and evaluate the informational feedback from such visits in order to avoid negatives and to implement positives and boost them in the future. [passage omitted]

Coordination Among GCC States

[AL-RAYAH] Since the GCC [Gulf Corporation Council] states have very analogous political, social, and economic conditions, do they coordinate among themselves in the field of information? Are there efforts to create a coordinated Gulf information system that would contribute to the implementation of development plans in GCC member states?

[Bin-Suhaym] Coordination in information has existed among GCC states for a long time. Information officials meet constantly. Positions towards events are coordinated. I believe the efforts expended since the GCC was formed in 1981 constitute the basis of broad guidelines to GCC information systems. Those guidelines form a general framework within which various systems can move freely while maintaining their individuality as well as initiative, innovation, and enterprise.

A Qatari Plan for an Information Agency

[AL-RAYAH] There is no doubt that Zionist information plays an important role in distorting the Arab image in the West and other parts of the world. What are the flaws in Arab information and how can they be corrected

in order to challenge Zionist information, uncover the face of Zionists, and advance the Arab cause?

Shaykh Hamad Bin-Suhaym said, with a hint of reproach, after a moment of silence, "Arab information has vast material and human resources which could effectively challenge Zionist information if properly utilized and consecrated to the goals and causes of our Arab and Islamic nation; if there were definite and distinct agreement on the priorities of those goals; and if the methodology of implementation were precisely defined. Arab information could be propelled then from a clear base and on a deliberate course in the international arena and would be able to effectively challenge Zionist information which, as we are all fully aware, controls more than 80 percent of Western information media.

"I must point out that the State of Qatar is cognizant of that issue. The ministry of information and culture had proposed the creation of an independent information agency with worldwide operations and has submitted a comprehensive feasibility study; but the project, unfortunately, was not accorded the attention it deserved and ended up as an official document of the Arab League!" [passage omitted]

Arabsat Is an Arab Accomplishment

[AL-RAYAH] The utilization of the Arab satellite Arabsat has so far been limited in relation to its costs. What future role can it play to serve countries of the Arab nation? Why can't it play this role at present? How can it be better utilized?

[Bin-Suhaym] The Arab satellite Arabsat is a major accomplishment, an advanced technological step, and a scientific breakthrough. It must therefore be utilized to the utmost and employed in the best possible manner in order to link all parts of the Arab nation and bring them closer together by exchanging the news of major issues and events and by transmitting major cultural, technical, social, and sports events live to all reaches of the Arab nation.

Arab information ministers, at their recent 24th session in Tunis, paid special heed to the maximum utilization of the Arab satellite for information purposes. [passage omitted]

Reinforcing Islamic and Arab Identities

[AL-RAYAH] What is the impact on Qatari society of the telecommunications assault and the technological revolution in such means?

[Bin-Suhaym] The world we live in is now linked with ties of a new kind forged by modern means of technology which progress greatly almost every hour on the hour, removing barriers between peoples and nations. This has increasingly augmented the elements of influence and impact interacting between advanced and developing societies. You are aware that many social and telecommunications scientists are concerned with the uneven

flow of information from more advanced countries to developing ones. This issue was also discussed by UNESCO at length.

We believe that our Arab and Islamic identity can only be safeguarded by reinforcing it in citizens' minds in an acceptable incessant fashion and by supplying information, news reports, and commentary with truthful objectivity that addresses mind and emotion. [passage omitted]

I Watch Television

[AL-RAYAH] Does your excellency watch television? What programs do you like? What do you dislike and wish would disappear from the screen?

[Bin-Suhaym] I try of course to keep up with as many television programs as possible, first as a viewer and second as an official. There many programs that I like for the effort expended in producing and presenting them. One such series is "To Whom It May Concern," and especially the segment where editors-in-chief discussed local press concerns. They were extremely frank and expressed their viewpoints with clarity.

I would like to point out, however, that the state has done a great deal for the local press and has always been careful to solve its problems. There is no denying that fact. At the same time, it must be clear that the press has its own role and responsibilities as does the state. This is why there must be parameters and limits. It would be senseless to pretend that the state can grant all press demands and expectations. It becomes a delicate equation, then. There is always a difference between what is wanted and what is possible.

As for [television] programs, I dislike those that lack innovation and disregard viewer tastes. But then I might dislike a program that others enjoy since television addresses disparate tastes and addresses different personalities and educational levels. That is why it must present a diversified fare where everyone could find something to like...and dislike. [passage omitted]

Plans for Media Expansion

44000151D Doha GULF TIMES
in English 3 Dec 89 pp 1, 16

[Excerpts] Measures to expand and upgrade Qatar's information output are currently being studied by the Ministry of Information and Culture, the Minister, HE Shaykh Hamad Bin-Suhaym al Thani, has said.

In an interview published yesterday in the GULF TIMES' sister newspaper AL-RAYAH, HE Shaykh Hamad said the measures included opening more information offices abroad, increasing radio and television transmission time, expanding the international news transmission of Qatar News Agency, and enlarging the scope of information cooperation with friendly states.

Noting that all top positions and two-thirds of medium and technical posts in the Ministry are run by bi-Qatari nationals, HE Shaykh Hamad Bin-Suhaym said the Ministry was going ahead with its policy of qualifying and training national staff through in-career training and courses abroad.

The Minister said Qatar's aim in the dissemination of information was to provide an appropriate intellectual climate for the citizen to contribute to the development and growth of his society, and, at the international level, to project a true image of the progress achieved by this young country. [passage omitted]

"The existence of what is called censorship does in no way mean that the Press should refrain from tackling any political, economic, social or cultural topic, as long as the aim is to benefit society and enlighten the citizen," HE Shaykh Hamad said.

The Minister noted that censorship would be lifted once the circumstances that necessitated it had ended. [passage omitted]

Study Surveys Aspects of Industrial Economy

90OL0199A Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 6 Dec 89 p 7

[Article: "Aspects of Industrial Economy in Qatar: The Industrial Sector Develops Into a Definite Substitute for the Oil Sector"]

[Text] The Gulf Organization for Industrial Consultations is about to publish in book form a study of the Qatari industrial economy as part of its series of studies dealing with industrial economies in Gulf countries. The studies deal with major economic indicators in general and industrial sectors in particular. They are meant to help those concerned with industrial development gain insights into the status of industrial sectors and into ways of supporting and developing them.

This study is composed of five chapters, a summary, and statistical appendices. It is prepared by Mamduh Hubrah and published in the latest edition of ECONOMIC COOPERATION, the organization's quarterly publication.

Chapter 1 analyzes major economic indicators in Qatar and highlights the characteristics of this economy which is essentially oil-based. That fact prompted state efforts, since the early 1970s, to diversify sources of national income, expand the productive base in Qatar, and invest oil surpluses in capital projects. The state has implemented several projects for such basic industries as fertilizers, iron and steel, petrochemicals, cement, and oil refining. It has also supported small and medium-size industrial projects and provided them with incentives.

Figures included in this chapter indicate that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew considerably in the period 1975-1980. It rose from 9,877 million riyals to about 28,663 million riyals in 1982, when it began its

decline to 18,580 million riyals in 1987. This is attributed to oil prices which kept rising till 1980, then began softening. The figures indicate that the oil sector dominates the overall economic activity of the country even though that sector's share of the GDP declined from 68 percent in 1975 to 66 percent in 1980 to 30 percent in 1987. The figures also indicate that the contribution to the GDP of the capital industries sector increased from four percent in 1980 to 10 percent in 1987. This positive phenomenon reflects developments in that sector and indicates that it is taking a course independent of oil that recommends it as a good substitute for the oil sector in the future.

Chapter 1 also analyzes foreign trade figures and the composition of imports and exports. It points out that the trade surplus has begun diminishing in 1981 as exports declined at a higher rate than imports. The surplus dropped from about 15,748 million riyals in 1981 to about 3000 million riyals in 1987.

The labor force, according to the study, is composed of some 103,000 workers of whom 23 percent were Qataris in 1985. The government employs 37 percent of all workers. The construction sector ranks second as an employer and the commercial sector ranks third.

Chapter 2 and 3 include a comprehensive analysis of the industrial sector and its two components: extraction industries and basic industries.

Chapter 2 surveys natural resources for such extraction industries as petroleum and natural gas, historical milestones, and major developments related to reserves, production, and utilization.

The chapter also analyzes the structure of basic industries and their most important developments.

The analysis concludes that chemicals, petrochemicals, petroleum, and plastics are the most important basic industries in the country, accounting for about 85 percent of the sector's contribution to the GDP. Ranked second in importance are nonmetal extracted raw materials such as cement and construction material. Electricity, gas, and water ranked third in importance followed by the iron and steel industry.

Chapter 3 reviews the country's major industrial projects such as oil refining, chemical fertilizers, liquefied natural gas, petrochemicals, iron and steel, cement, and grain grinding. The study discusses the development of those industries and their annual output, sales, and various organizational and technical structures.

Chapter 4 reviews the factors of industrialization in Qatar, such as raw materials, especially petroleum and natural gas; nonmetallic raw materials; and farm, animal, and fish resources. It discusses market capacity, changing demand, and individual income. It also reviews elements of the infrastructure, or economic structures, such as roads, ports, water, electricity, health and educational services, and vocational training and

the quality and composition of the labor force. It also examines the availability of liquidity, capital, and foreign exchange and their combined impact on the support and stability of the industrial sector.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Nu'man Interviewed on Unification Issues

90OL0230A AL-SHARIQAH AL-KHALIJ
in Arabic 3 Jan 90 pp 1, 15

[Interview With PDRY Prime Minister Dr. Yasin Sa'id Nu'man by Sa'id Mihyu: "PDRY Prime Minister to AL-KHALIJ: Unity or 'Splintered Two Parts'; We Expect Difficulties To Surface; Plurality Will Be Simultaneous in South and North;" first five paragraphs are AL-KHALIJ introduction; date, place not given]

[Excerpt] Aden—PDRY [Peoples Democratic Republic of Yeman] Prime Minister Dr. Yasin Sa'id Nu'man is one of the most prominent technocrats to rise in recent years and to find himself suddenly and directly confronted with the Yemeni unity issue. The reason is that the Yemeni unity plan is running into two state apparatuses which have entrenched their roots from 1962 to the present. Because technocrats in both parts of Yemen, especially in the south, head the executive agencies of the "two states," establishing unity becomes practically their responsibility.

This does not, of course, mean that the technocrats will be solely responsible for the success or failure of the unity march. The political decision is the beginning and the end. However, the institutions of the government apparatuses in the two states are the first to reflect how the unity process is progressing.

What does Dr. Nu'man say about the government agencies' role in the unity plan? He expects difficulties to surface and expects that political resolve will be needed to overcome them. He urges acknowledging the presence of such difficulties. He also believes that there are aspects of unity that can be accomplished prior to 30 November 1990 whereas other aspects will need a longer time.

Dr. Nu'man predicts that political plurality will occur in both parts of Yemen simultaneously. He also believes that it is necessary to transfer the recently issued amnesty decree from its general framework to a definite framework.

The prime minister also believes that Yemeni unity is the ultimate option because the alternative will be the presence of not just two "but several Yemens."

[AL-KHALIJ] It seems that there is ambiguity in Yemen regarding the issues of unity, reform, and democracy. The source of the ambiguity is the question: To which does the priority go, reform or unity? It is no secret that

such confusion of priorities may have obvious negative effects on the course of unity?

[Nu'man] The fact is that these three issues are strongly meshed. But the main issue at present is the unity issue. However, on the way to unity, profound political and economic reforms have to be made. The democracy issue will, in fact, be dealt with within the context of the reform. So far, we here in the south have made good strides by proclaiming party plurality and by preparing to issue the press law. We feel that continuing to move on the reform path is the way to achieve unity. Therefore, and to insure a strong and guaranteed march toward the country's unity, we must strengthen the steps for democracy and reform. In the latest meeting held in San'a' between brothers 'Ali Salim al-Bid and 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, these three meshed issues were emphasized and it was asserted that they must be accomplished at the level of the entire homeland. The question was: How can reform and democracy be expanded to include the entire homeland?

[AL-KHALIJ] But a difference in the pace of the tendency to move toward plurality and reform may surface between the two parts and it may obstruct unity.

[Nu'man] We are aware of this problem. This is why the joint statement issued by the two presidents in San'a' at the end of last December stressed the need for a unified law on this issue. The cabinets in both parts of Yemen have been entrusted with this task. This emanates, of course, from the awareness that action must start by proclaiming party plurality in the two parts simultaneously. In the 18th session of the YSP [Yemeni Socialist Party] Central Committee, we realized that it is necessary to involve the national forces in drafting the political action and insuring the course of unity in a manner that enables all these forces to participate as an influential partner. We have presented this issue to the brothers in the northern part of the country and we believe that the latest discussions in San'a' stressed the need for simultaneous plural political action and for party plurality in the two parts of Yemen.

[AL-KHALIJ] We understand from the presence of this joint coordination that plurality will be achieved after unity is established?

[Nu'man] No, plurality may begin now. Enactment of the agreement on plurality may begin now. The specialized committees are working to complete the steps by November 1990. We believe that political plurality and promulgation of the press law in both parts can be accomplished prior to 30 November. All the national forces, in addition to the YSP in the south and the People's General Congress in the north, will then prepare to participate in this process. We have actually been careful to include all these forces as a partner in these developments.

[AL-KHALIJ] So the fundamental objective is unity. But what makes the current efforts for unity different from

the efforts made in 1972 to achieve unity? How can we be convinced that the current efforts are serious?

[Nu'man] I believe that the united political resolve on the main issues allows the current talk of unity to assume a realistic character. The unity issue is no longer the product of political action alone. It seems to me that the popular dimension has taken it beyond the dilemma of vacillation by the two political leaderships to which the issue has been captive since 1972. This transformation has begun to take its form through the entrenchment of democracy by involving the masses in managing the affairs of political life. It is my assessment that this strengthens the credibility of this step, puts any current agreement on the homeland's unity beyond the control of the political leaders, and makes such an agreement the property of the masses who can defend it by themselves. This issue [unity] did actually start with the movement of citizens between the two parts—a movement which has enabled the unity issue to be transformed from an issue controlled from above to a popular issue. I believe that this transformation is one of the guarantees of achieving this unity. However, one must not underestimate the steps taken since 1972 to achieve unity, such as the efforts of the unity committees, the drafting of the constitution, and the joint action.

Popular Participation

[AL-KHALIJ] You have referred to popular participation and you have cited the movement of citizens between the two parts as evidence. But this is negative participation. Can you tell us specifically how the masses are participating practically in creating unity?

[Nu'man] I don't know if the talk of negative or positive participation means that people must come out and demonstrate. It is obvious that this is not the criterion. The criterion is in our directly encouraging the masses to express their aspiration to achieve this major goal with the various means. In rallies organized recently, the masses expressed their rejection of the partition existing in all the previous phases and responded positively to the calls for unity. I believe that the masses have participated positively in all the current efforts and in the concept that can determine the fate of this major objective. The ultimate expression of this participation lies in accomplishing this unity now. This is the criterion.

[AL-KHALIJ] But we are talking from a different position. What we mean to say is that popular participation has not yet crystallized in a manner that enables the masses not only to support the unity—they have never stopped supporting it from the beginning—but also to supervise and protect this unity, through comprehensive mobilization, from the obstacles that will inevitably rise in its path.

[Nu'man] It seems to me that insofar as the Yemeni people are concerned, the talk of unity is, perhaps, very different from the displays of popular participation. Inasmuch as it is an emotional issue, Yemeni unity does

not need this political mobilization. The issue monopolizing all the discussions is the issue of the method or the way to accomplish unity. In past years, there were, of course, efforts here and there to mobilize the masses with various means. But the issue has continued to be an issue of method. It has been agreed recently that Yemeni unity can be achieved only through a peaceful and democratic process and through strengthening the common factors between the two regimes in the north and the south. The democratic national gains made for the Yemeni people in both parts must be preserved. If we actually reach this conclusion by stressing that this major emotional objective in the hearts of the Yemeni people must be accomplished with peaceful and democratic methods and through preservation of the gains, then in this case the various links for accomplishing this objective can be made complete and the unity issue can be thus transferred from its superimposed official framework and can actually become a popular issue.

I believe that the transfer of this objective to the masses is bolstered through further democratic action and through reinforcing the democratic character of the united Yemen with the various means and methods.

[AL-KHALIJ] We notice that all the previous unity agreements, as well as the current agreement, stipulate that one year must pass before unity is established. Why the insistence on this period, keeping in mind that the major obstacles facing unity require promptness and decisiveness?

[Nu'man] The one-year period is stipulated by the united constitution. The fact is that this period is very short when compared with the tasks imposed on the two political leaderships in the current phase, especially the tasks connected with completing the main links in the committees' work and establishing the system of the united state. Therefore, I don't think that this is a long period. We are required to accomplish a major task in the two parts. The unity committees have been given two months to complete their work. In this period, all the various agencies and political and popular organizations must move in the direction of completing the tasks facing them.

We will be faced with other tasks afterward. There are political and economic tasks to be accomplished before 30 November 1990. We must accomplish the major tasks required for establishing the united state before this date. The other tasks can be accomplished later.

Merging Two Systems

[AL-KHALIJ] The San'a' meeting assigned the two cabinets to take specific measures to complete the unity tasks. Do you have a specific vision of how the two divergent political systems in the two parts of Yemen will be merged?

[Nu'man] The fact is that satisfactory and complete visions are the subject of discussions with the brothers in

the north. The unity committees concerned with discussing this issue, especially the Administration and Utilities Committee, are studying how to merge the main agencies. We believe that we can begin with the governmental and general sovereignty agencies. It is possible that some agencies of an economic nature will not be merged at present and that their work will be coordinated instead, provided that we consider afterward how to coordinate the activities of the economic agencies. The main agencies that reflect the sovereignty of the united state, such as the central ministries and agencies, the transport, post and communication ministries, the government agencies, and the two airline companies, will be merged.

I believe that the two cabinets face a major task which requires them to start working promptly as of the beginning of this year.

[AL-KHALIJ] But how will the main positions be divided between the north and the south, especially since the unity constitution makes no provision for this aspect, and keeping in mind that some interests will be harmed as a result of the merger?

[AL-KHALIJ] According to the constitution, the Supreme People's Assembly Presidium and the Consultative Assembly will be united in a single presidential authority and this authority will form a provisional government which will then make preparations for the election of a chamber of deputies.

The problem of the prominent officials in the two state apparatuses, in the economic agencies, and in the companies will be tackled in a manner that insures stability. We must view this problem within the context of the greater objective.

This issue has not been discussed in depth yet. But it is my personal assessment that it should pose no obstacle. I am very confident that any difficulties will be overcome.

[AL-KHALIJ] But there are extremely contradictory plans on the distribution of positions, including plans involving the population percentage and other kinds of plans?

[Nu'man] I personally do not see the need to consider population numbers, geographic area, or other aspects. This issue is not the subject of discussion at present. The fundamental thing at present is that the two parts' leaderships will inevitably discuss the issue with the development of stability and confidence.

I don't think that this issue will create a problem in the path of unity, even if difficulties surface here and there. Anyway, we must rise with our thinking above this issue and we must approach it with greater confidence, realization, and awareness that the objective of unity deserves sacrifices.

[AL-KHALIJ] But breaking up two government apparatuses that were founded more than two decades ago and

that have deep-rooted agencies and institutions is not an easy thing. What are the difficulties you expect during the merger process?

[Nu'man] I agree with you partially in this regard. But I believe that neither part established an administrative, governmental, or institutional agency with the premise that it will continue to be a permanent agency for this or that part. Creation of the government apparatus in the south has perhaps been coupled with the constant feeling that the unity issue is at the heart of the economic and social transformation. Achieving the homeland's unity has compelled the process of building the edifice to take the unity issue into its constant consideration. Even the issued laws have not taken a partitionist direction or the course of permanent division.

It is true that some tax or social laws have dealt with some problems in isolation from the comprehensive view of the homeland's unity. However, these laws have, in fact, offered a model of what form the united state can take.

Through discussions with the brothers in the north, we will see what may be suitable for the entire homeland. It is my opinion that no complete mechanism has ever

been established to make the partition and division of the two parts a fait accompli.

Insofar as the south is concerned, I don't believe that there are real obstacles. There will certainly be difficulties and they will require us to tackle them with political resolve and political action. We must also acknowledge the presence of such difficulties.

[AL-KHALIJ] Could you define some of these difficulties?

[Nu'man] For example, the social guarantees, the family law, agrarian reform, and numerous laws that govern a number of social relationships. There are the labor and pricing laws. However, the constitution indicates that these laws, whether in the northern or the southern part of the homeland, will continue to exist, excluding the laws that are incompatible with the citizen's democratic liberties.

In any case, the difficulties constitute one of the main issues that have to be discussed and examined. It is here specifically that the importance of democracy rises. The stronger this democracy grows, the more objective will the thinking on all these issues become. [passage omitted]

BANGLADESH**Paper Reports Ershad Victory Day Message to Nation**

46001182A Dhaka THE NEW NATION
in English 16 Dec 89 pp 1, 8

[Text] President H. M. Ershad has called for translating the dream of building a happy, prosperous and dignified country that inspired the nation to fight for independence by maintaining unity, discipline, tolerance and stability in national life, reports BSS.

In a message on the eve of Victory Day yesterday President said: "The nation needed all out efforts for transition from one victory to the other being glorified and inspired afresh with the great Victory Day."

President Ershad said, "Let there be out firm national commitment on the great Victory Day to reach the fruits of freedom at every doorstep."

He said, "December 16 is an unparallel glorious day in our national life—the great Victory Day."

He said, "On this day 18 years ago the nation through an unprecedented unity and sacrifices had earned victory in the armed liberation struggle. Bangladesh emerged as an independent and sovereign state in the world map, he added.

Congratulating the people on this auspicious occasion President Ershad recalled with respect on the eve of the great Victory Day lakhs of valiant shaheeds (martyrs) who had laid down their lives for the independence of the dear motherland.

The stories of their unique sense of patriotism, ideals, heroism and sacrifices would always remain as a source of inspiration of the nation.

President Ershad said, Political freedom was not the only objective of this victory achieved after a long struggle. Its inevitable aim was the economic emancipation as only such economic freedom could make the political freedom meaningful he added.

With this end in view, he said, "the nation today was engaged in a new struggle for achieving self-reliance by removing poverty and promoting extensive industrialisation."

The President said, "A steel-like firm unity and indomitable courage and determination as the nation demonstrated during the liberation war would be the source of inspiration to build the country."

"We are firmly determined to achieve success in this fresh struggle through the united efforts of the people of all walks of national life he said.

President Ershad said: "Nearly for the last eight years we have been making relentless efforts to achieve the great objective of economic emancipation."

We have been able to achieve many successes and progress in all sectors of national life," he said adding, "As a result of implementation of people-oriented reforms and welfare programmes there has been a new pace in the development process in the country. [Quotation marks as published]

President Ershad said, "the nation is making firm progress towards economic emancipation and Bangladesh's image has been enhanced today in the international field." "We have earned the confidence of the world people," he added.

The President said, "The people of all classes deserve the credit for such successes as they were backed by sincerity, patriotism, devotion and labour of the people."

Workers Party Fourth Conference

46001186A Dhaka THE NEW NATION
in English 25 Nov 89 p 1

[Text] The three day 4th congress of the Workers Party opened at the Institution of Engineers in the city yesterday with a call for launching a movement to establish socialism and bring an end to the present 'autocratic' government.

Mr Abul Basher, president of the party, formally inaugurated the congress by hoisting the party flag. He also presided over the inaugural session which was addressed by party leaders Radhed Khan Menon, Haider Akbar Khan Rono, Saiful Hoque and Khalequzzaman Bhiya, convenor of BSD [Bangladesher Samajtantrik Dal], Majahidul Islam Selim of CPB [Communist Party of Bangladesh], Fayez Ahmed and DUCSU [Dhaka University Central Student Union] General Secretary Mustaque Hossain.

Addressing the inaugural session Workers Party General Secretary Rashed Khan Menon said the bourgeois political parties were not sincere in their struggle for establishing a true democratic government.

He stressed the need for unity of the left forces to steer the movement to the desired goal.

Situation on Dhaka University Campus Considered**Government Help Offered**

46001184A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 5 Dec 89 pp 1, 10

[Text] The government on Monday offered all out cooperation to the Dhaka University authorities in restoring congenial academic atmosphere on the campus, reports UNB.

The decision to extend cooperation came at an inter-ministerial meeting in the office room of Home Minister

Mahmudul Hasan, which reviewed the law and order situation in the campus bedevilled by continuing unrest and violence.

Education Minister Sheikh Shahidul Islam, Home Secretary Azimuddin Ahmed and senior Education Ministry officials were present at the meeting.

The latest violence which claimed the life of Arif Ahmed, an outstanding student, resulting in the suspension of all classes and examinations of the University for seven days from December 1.

At least 30 students and some outsiders had been killed in armed violence in the Dhaka University campus since independence.

While reviewing the law and order situation of the campus, the meeting expressed determination to find out the killers of Arif Ahmed, who was shot dead on November 29, at any cost and put them on trial under the law of the land.

The Home Minister said in the meeting that the government was committed to ensure peace in the educational institutions.

The law enforcing agencies have been kept alert to face any untoward eventuality, he added.

Campus Violence Deplored

46001184A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 5 Dec 89 p 5

[Editorial: "A Desperate Campus Need"]

[Text] We are writing today on campus violence with the same sense of urgency with which the Dhaka University Syndicate appears to have appealed to the government and political parties and leaders "to come to a consensus on the issue of maintaining a congenial atmosphere on the campus". The tragic death of a brilliant university student has set off a chain of reactions among teachers, students, the university authorities and the general public.

It is also painful to see charges and countercharges levelled by student organisations against each other over who are responsible for the tragedy. This will get them or the nation nowhere. Instead it will lead to further exacerbation of relations among students. The fact is all the deaths campus violence has so far claimed are as tragic as the latest one. Students carrying on their studies at a university, either as a community or as individuals, belong to a select group of young citizens committed to a higher pursuit of knowledge and culture. They are the flowers of the nation and for them to be so wantonly cut down by personal or party vendetta is a first rate national tragedy.

More than once in the past we have appealed directly to students, their leaders as well as social and political leaders and the government to put their heads together

and call a halt to this dance of death on the campus. But all this seems to have been a cry in the wilderness. It is impossible to see what the students killing each other are gaining or how far the cause for which they are professedly fighting will advance by this cynical personal or party hate. Nor can it be conceived by any stretch of the imagination to be a contribution to overall national politics.

Students, particularly in Third World countries, will not keep out, or be forced out, of national politics. They have been very much in it practically in all Afro-Asian countries in political transition from China to South Korean to Pakistan. But students belonging to rival groups gunning down each other or dislocating seriously their study programmes are never seen occurring in those countries.

A stable answer to campus violence cannot be provided by the law and order authorities treating it as a routine law and order issue. For it is as clear as anything the roots of the trouble lie dug in politics. If the right approach to it is delayed further more deaths of students are bound to occur on the campus while perhaps leaders or the administration will be looking away from them and violence will leap from one level of intensity to another.

If all concerned—student leaders, university authorities, political parties and social leaders, leading academicians—have any real intention of calling off this violence they should lose no time to sit together in a summit to find an answer to it.

Students for themselves had better take a fresh look at the grievous loss their fratricidal violence has meant for them and society. This disposition for them to rethink their position seriously can be instilled in them by non-partisan senior social leaders banding together and acting as arbitrators in a bid to end this murderous campus violence. All this is perhaps a desperate proposal in a desperate situation. The danger is should there be no serious bid made by any quarters—political, administrative, social and academic—acting together there will be a violent end not only to university education, but interminable anarchy among students at the cost of many more lives on the campus among other serious consequences for the nation.

One solution still worth consideration is the advice offered in 1948 to the Education Ministry (by the then Finance Ministry) for expansion and establishment of residential facilities for students outside the administrative, political and business capital. This would be in line with similar arrangements, for instance, in countries like the UK, the U.S., Germany, with enough space for all the adjuncts that go with a residential university from play fields to laboratories.

INDIA

India Finances Three Agalega Island Projects

90EF0187Z Port Louis WEEK-END
in French 7 Jan 90 p 13

[Unattributed article: "India Is Financing Three Projects"; passages within slantlines published in English]

[Text] The Indian Government will finance three projects at Agalega within the framework of an agreement of the fifth mixed Indo-Mauritian Commission. The three projects appearing in that cooperation agreement are: A garbage dump and a system for stocking and distributing drinking water, facilities for the manufacture of coconut cord, and a causeway to connect the two islands of Agalega.

Pursuant to the recommendations contained in the techno-economic study of Agalega completed in 1988, the Indian Government, at its expense, has made up plans for a garbage dump, and for a system for the stocking and distribution of drinking water in the Mauritian dependency. It was also decided that India would provide machines for the manufacture of coconut cord. The list of equipment is made up as follows: /husk bursting machine, turbo-shifter, fiber cleaning machine, dust extracting unit, spare bobbin for curling machine./ At first, India will assign an expert for a period of about two months for the installation of this equipment. Subsequently, a second expert will provide training to the workers and arrange to put the system into operation.

The Indian Government will prepare, again at its own expense, plans and specifications for the construction of a causeway that will connect the north and the south of Agalega, which actually are two separate islands.

The /Outer Islands Development Corporation/ had, however, presented as a priority project the construction of a jetty and an anchorage point to permit supply ships to come alongside. Agalega has no natural port, which makes the transfer of merchandise very difficult and costly. It is not yet known why India rejected the corporation's proposal to transfer the funds from plans for the causeway in order to carry out those for a wharf.

Two other corporation projects were not accepted by the mixed Indo-Mauritian Commission. These were proposals for the sending of experts in two sectors, namely [one] for coconut plantations, and a civil engineer for infrastructure development.

IRAN

Economic Talks Held With Austria in Tehran

90OI0144A Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 14 Jan 90 p 4

[Text] Mr. Erich Wittmann, Austrian deputy minister of government economy and transportation, who came to

Tehran at dawn yesterday at the head of an economic delegation, began his first round of talks yesterday morning with 'Ali Ashraf Afkhami, deputy minister of industries and acting director of the Iranian National Industries Organization.

According to the report from the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY, at this meeting, attended by members of the delegations from both countries, the two sides declared their readiness to cooperate in industrial, economic, and commercial areas.

Mr. Afkhami began this meeting with a discussion of the five-year economic expansion program, and he emphasized: During this program the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran will invest \$120 billion in industry and development, of which \$30 billion will be allocated to the industrial sector and to fundamental affairs.

Concerning economic relations between the two countries, he said: Iran and Austria have had good relations in the past, and these relations have seen considerable movement recently.

Concerning ensuring and stabilizing economic relations between Iran and Austria, the deputy minister of industries proposed: Cooperation between the two countries should be strengthened with the use of the buy-back method, and while creating sound competition in commercial relations, the two sides will be able to bring about the necessary equilibrium.

The acting director of the Iranian National Industries Organization discussed cooperation between the two countries. He said: The Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to cooperate with Austria in paper manufacture, food industries, heavy industries, mines, the utilization of Iran's vacant industrial capacity, as well as research and training, and the Austrian delegation agreed with this.

At the conclusion of his talk, he also proposed: In view of the direction of the talks, at the conclusion of the Austrian delegation's visit a note of mutual understanding should be signed. This was accepted.

According to this report, Mr. Wittmann said that the trip by the Austrian economic delegation will lead to sincere and fruitful cooperation between the two countries in all areas. He said: In the first nine months of the current year, Iran's exports to Austria increased 65 percent and Iran's imports from Austria increased 24 percent.

The Austrian deputy minister of government economy and transportation also added: In view of the period of reconstruction in Iran, his country is prepared to assist and cooperate with Iran in the reconstruction of Industry.

As areas of cooperation between the two countries, he mentioned paper manufacturing in Karun and Mazandaran, metallurgy, cement, machinery construction, cellulose factories, as well as mines.

According to this report, Mr. Wittmann also proposed: In view of growing relations, the two countries should make preparations to establish a joint economic cooperation commission in early 1990.

Minister on New Refineries, Oil Income, Winter Consumption

90OI0105A Tehran KEYHAN
in Persian 17 Dec 89 p 18

[Text] Economic Service—Income from the sales of oil increases year by year and the favorable conditions of the market have enabled us to sell oil in advance. As a result, our oil income has increased by \$2 billion. The export of oil products instead of crude oil is one of our significant programs about to be carried out by the Petroleum Ministry, and in this area to date we have had \$800 million in foreign currency savings. During the first six months of the current year we exported fuel oil worth more than \$100 million produced by the Abadan Refinery, and as of the first half of next year, Iran will become one of the first major exporters of liquid gas in the world. During the five-year plan most of the regions of the country will be supplied with gas. The Refinery of Bandar 'Abbas with an output capacity of 220,000 barrels per day will start work shortly, and finally the constraints in the distribution of liquid gas will soon be removed, and this year people shall have no anxieties regarding the supply of their winter heating fuel. These were all glad tidings given by the petroleum minister in his interview with KEYHAN.

On last week's final day we had the opportunity to listen to the words of the petroleum minister and to inquire for the latest news regarding Iran's petroleum industry.

The vast land of Iran, with its proud cities, with its blessed oil wells, its busy ports and docks is portrayed on the wall over a splendid map. A little further, intricate oil pipelines and great oil drilling platforms stretching over the blue waters of the Persian Gulf are depicted within a frame called 'Endeavor'. In another corner various books—all of them on hydrocarbons—lean on one another, reminding one of the world history of oil and the story of the first well to hit oil, reminding one of OPEC and its active role in world markets. These are all eye-catching items which attract our attention on our first visit to Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the petroleum minister, in his work room. He is the one who with one hand drills oil with the help of an oil worker from the Kharg Island, and with his other hand he confirms the unity and integrity of OPEC together with the petroleum ministers of other member countries.

Here is the account of an interview with him:

[KEYHAN] To what extent is the five-year plan, recently introduced to the Islamic Consultative Majles, supported by oil income, and considering the major changes in the world price of oil, how would you evaluate the impact of this price increase on the five-year plan?

[Petroleum Minister] The amount of oil income remained unchanged during the administration of Engineer Musavi and the current administration of Mr. Hashemi. No alterations are made in this regard in the bill introduced to the Majles. According to an overview of the trends of OPEC and its future in the world markets, I think that a price increase as well as an increase in oil production capability within the country is attainable. The rate of confidence in this area is high too. It is noteworthy that there have been some changes in the Majles regarding oil incomes, which of course were not made based on the Petroleum Ministry's confirmation. The decision to increase oil incomes by approximately \$2.6 billion is the outcome of calculations and forecasts performed by this commission. Also, during the administration of Mr. Hashemi there was word that due to favorable conditions, which still continue, the idea of advance oil sales would be an applicable policy. That is to sell oil in advance, to receive the money, and to deliver the goods one or one and a half years later. Based on this the approximate amount of \$2.6 billion income from the advance sales of oil has been estimated to accrue—which can not be deemed as an oil income, and perhaps it might be deemed as a maneuverability tool. As far as numbers and figures are concerned, according to statistics of the plan booklet, and also based on numbers and figures calculated by the plan and budget commission of the Majles a total income of approximately \$83.016 billion has been projected (between the years 68 [21 March 1989-20 March 1990] and 72 [21 March 1993-20 March 1994]) which amount should be distributed pro rata among: direct oil income, gas exports to the USSR, the sales of gas liquids, the sales of fuel oil and also crude oil sent overseas for refinement. It should be noted that I have already supplied the relevant commission of the Majles with the needed explanations on these points. The income program was finally planned with the collaboration of the Plan and Budget Organization, and based on this I think that income generated by the sales of oil enjoys a valid support. I think two significant issues concerned here are worthy of consideration and should be elaborated: First, oil income in the five-year plan is more likely to be production-oriented, and in view of an increase in the demand for oil in the world markets, this income shall increase by the year in the said plan because our income will increase based on our capacity to produce. I should point out that in this projection we have not overstated oil price increases that much. For example, the forecast for the 1368 [21 March 1989-20 March 1990] oil price per barrel is \$15.30 (mean oil price for calculating income), whereas the current year's transactions indicate the per barrel price to exceed \$16.00. We have therefore predicted prices for the coming year that are realistic and are not farfetched—although as you know currently the oil price has an upward trend enjoying favorable market conditions. For instance, the minimum per barrel price of \$18.00 which was decided to be implemented during OPEC's recent summit, as of the beginning of the new year (January) has already materialized. In view of all the transpired facilities, we shall design our planning effort

for the expansion of our production capacity within the country, because over the next one and a half or two years the quota system of OPEC shall become extinct. This is to say that by that time, as it has been decided, each OPEC member may produce to the full extent of its production capacity. Presently the majority of OPEC members have already attained their maximum production capacities, and a few of its members (Persian Gulf countries) will enjoy a favorable production capacity for a long time.

Second, the significance of investiture in the oil sector. If during the five-year plan, investment in the oil sector faces any interruption—e.g., if the rial or foreign currency of the plan is not supplied—we cannot deem the generation of these incomes likely, because the entirety of those programs and plans are designed on the basis of a special amount of investment. Also our production capability for investment on oil industries' projects are based upon the same thing. I think conditions are now favorable for doing the work and launching the desired investment. In brief, the oil income shall accrue only when all of those programs are launched.

[KEYHAN] In view of the imminent programs you mentioned, what has the Petroleum Ministry devised in connection with substituting national gas resources and domestic fuel for petroleum, the distribution of petrol without coupons, the extension of gas pipelines, and basically, is there any hope that areas already pipelined for gas may become operable by 11 February next year?

[Petroleum Minister] The issue of substituting gas for other types of fuel enjoys a special prerogative in our country and in our plans. We are at a point of rapid growth in this area. For instance six years ago our branching out capability nationwide was approximately 60,000 branches. Today this figure has reached 220,000. In addition to figures proposed by the government in this regard for the five-year plan, the plan and budget commission of the Majles and also the president of the republic have specifically emphasized that we further expand and develop our activity in this regard. In turn, we have predicted that over the five-year plan the greatest part of the country will be able to use gas. In this regard, we will shortly announce the cities and regions that will be able to use gas during the five-year plan, in a separate interview.

We also predict that during the initial program the consumption load of oil products shall drop and the burden shall be placed on gas consumption.

As regards the operability of gas consumption in areas where gas pipelines have already been installed, I should say that presently I am not going to specify 11 February for this purpose, but I am sure that a good number of these regions shall soon be able to exploit gas. We are currently deciding the inauguration and gas exploitation dates of these regions. We believe that each gas tower that is erected is a harbinger of the message of our Revolution. Considering the ease involved in using gas,

the consumer's comfort, its safety for the environment and also its various economic advantages, delivering gas to its consumers enjoy a specific importance. On the basis of imminent plans we have accelerated the installation of gas pipelines in the city of Tehran, so that the municipality as well as other relevant agencies will be able to carry out their urban beautification and street development duties with ease.

[KEYHAN] Based on what you said concerning the effort to have more national regions covered by urban gas, in that case consumers shall have less need for petroleum products, and therefore presently the exports of petroleum products instead of crude oil may be propounded. Has the Petroleum Ministry given any thought to this issue?

[Petroleum Minister] The exports of oil products instead of crude oil is among the country's vital and important policies. This is because the added value for refining these products returns to the country. To this end we have envisaged three major projects. One is the establishment of the Arak Refinery which is currently in rapid progression. It is predicted that it will be operable during the first plan with a daily output capacity of 150,000 barrels.

The other project is the construction of a refinery in Bandar 'Abbas which will become operable with an output capacity of 230,000 barrels per day. During this project the completion of the Abadan Refinery is expected to take place. Upon the authorization of security and war zone officials we shall complete the works of the Abadan Refinery. All of these projects shall enable us to export oil products instead of crude oil. I should remind that since both the Abadan and Bandar 'Abbas refineries are situated by the sea, and because the construction of dockyards alongside both refineries has been planned, the exports of oil products will be easily attainable.

Here I should bring a few points to the attention of the Iranian people regarding the fruits of rendering operable the Abadan Refinery which was completed in less than five months.

At the Abadan Refinery we produce gasoil, benzine, white petroleum, and fuel oil. In the very near future the grease-producing unit of the refinery will become operable. Out of the refinery's total amount of production during the first six months of the current year, we have had more than \$100 million worth of fuel oil only, and due to the operation of this great refinery, we have had a foreign currency savings of \$800 million in the imports of oil products. We have therefore decreased the special budget for the imports of such products by \$800 million per year. In other words, the crude oil which we used to send abroad every year to be transformed into oil products, is now being refined at the Abadan Refinery and is made into oil products. All of these achievements were attained at a cost of only \$40 million spent on the said refinery's renovation. On top of those worthy results we

should also acknowledge the political value of those achievements, the symbolic worth of the refinery, and the show of strength and capability of our specialized workforce, who are worthy of our admiration.

[KEYHAN] Now that, as you mentioned, the construction of refineries is one of your important imminent programs, why doesn't the Petroleum Ministry proceed to construct refineries at the southeastern ports of Iran considering that the execution of such projects in these regions would be adequately safe, and would in the meantime create new jobs for the deprived people of the region bringing forth economic prosperity.

[Petroleum Minister] Paying attention to the deprived areas is an issue in which the Petroleum Ministry is interested. We are prepared to take up some measures in poor areas. I think that investing in those areas would be meaningful and useful from many standpoints. But first let me say that all of the projects and works to be accomplished have already been determined in the initial plan. The construction of new facilities in poverty stricken regions should by all means be considered in succeeding programs. Besides, the Plan and Budget Organization as well as all other related agencies are responsible in this respect. Among other tasks, they should launch a land evaluation program to determine the logistics of these regions, and to determine the viability and optimization of the most adequate areas of such regions for investment. To the extent that concerns us we have provided certain methods in our programs for the execution of those plans, but it is obvious that the said agencies should specify what can be done for the deprived areas and in what way.

[KEYHAN] What is the latest news about oil exploration in the Caspian, and so far what results have been reaped from these efforts? In your opinion what would be the impact of rendering fully operable these projects on the economy of regional cities?

[Petroleum Minister] The seismographic works in the Caspian Sea for the purpose of discovering hydrocarbons reserves were performed 20 years ago and based on the state of the art at that time some 40 reserves of what geologically resembles hydrocarbons were discovered. Unfortunately during this time no further work was carried out there due to various reasons. In view of the fact that the Caspian is a vast and fertile entity, we decided to commence the initial exploration efforts to discover hydrocarbons (oil and gas substance) within a pre-specified area in the lake. As you know each reserve consists of several layers. Each layer may contain oil and gas. At the first layer we hit methane gas, but our target was the second layer, and we are presently continuing to excavate to reach it during coming months. The result of our efforts shall be brought to public attention and we shall issue a full report when time comes. I should point out that we have a long-term plan at hand for the exploration of oil and gas in the Caspian. We must evaluate all of the reserves of the Caspian to know whether they contain hydrocarbons or not. For this

reason we have made a considerable investment near the Neka Powerplant and we have decided to construct a shipyard and an oil derrick manufacturing plant there, so that we may be able to carry out the exploration and excavation works for gas and oil on a permanent basis. If we succeed in discovering gas and oil in the Caspian, there certainly will be changes in the regional economy and the situation of the people of the area will improve. There will be new jobs and for this same reason we are optimistic toward the future of these projects.

[KEYHAN] Are you going to use foreign experts in these projects?

[Petroleum Minister] To carry out excavations on the Caspian we have rented a drilling mast from the USSR and Iranian supervising engineers are working upon it. But because we have rented the derrick from the Soviets it is managed by their workforce as we do not have a derrick there. On the other hand the entire exploration activity within the country, be it on land or sea, has been carried out by ourselves for years, and if we also had an excavation derrick on the Caspian, we would not need foreign workforce. As I said, the construction of a derrick manufacturing plant in Neka shall satisfy our need in that region.

Iran will become a liquid gas exporter from the first half of next year.

[KEYHAN] Through their contacts with KEYHAN, people complain about the situation of gas distribution. They say that since the elimination of liquid gas coupons and the free distribution of gas cylinders they are experiencing constraints in purchasing them. What are your plans for removing such problems?

[Petroleum Minister] Liquid gas has a production sector and a distribution sector. Currently we have no shortages whatsoever in producing liquid gas in the country. Today we produce liquid gas in adequate quantities to meet domestic demand. It should be noted that as of the first half of next year, after rendering operable the first Iran-Japan Complex Unit, Iran will become one of the first major liquid gas exporters of the world. What creates constraints for consumers pertains to the distribution mode of liquid gas. The Petroleum Ministry is only in charge of producing this commodity. Its distribution is carried out by various public and private companies, such as the Toban Company which has a major share in distributing liquid gas nationwide. There are also other private sector distribution companies some of which are related to the Martyrs Foundation. Two companies—i.e., Persigas and Irangas—also have a share in distribution. In a meeting I had with the managers of all of these companies, they also were exasperated by a series of problems, such as the shortage in tires, cylinders, trucks, tanks, and the like, which constraints in their entirety impede the distribution of gas in adequate quantities nationwide by these companies despite their efforts. They also had a problem with the price of liquid gas. Whereas last year the Economic

Council decided for uniform prices for the entire country, this was effectuated province by province.

Recently the price of gas has become uniform in the majority of the provinces. But this has not been effected in Tehran as yet. I should point out that the new prices have nothing to do with the gas company and the Petroleum Ministry. That rate is a distribution premium which accrues to those companies. In other words, it does not mean a price increase for us and we are in the same condition as before. As regards the distribution problems, I was recently informed that these have partly been removed, and the companies have promised me that distribution constraints shall be removed altogether in the near future.

[KEYHAN] Some citizens use urban gas and during these cold days their homes are warm, some of them use gasoil as fuel and are better off this year than they were last year, but households that use kerosene as fuel want to know what the Petroleum Ministry has done for providing them with their winter fuel.

[Petroleum Minister] We promise the people that this winter they shall have no problems regarding their winter fuel. Of course saying this at the present time may not be necessary, but with the passage of winter our work will show what we have done for the people and the warmth of their homes. But generally speaking, this year winter fuel conditions shall be better than last year, and we will even have less problems regarding white petroleum.

OPEC, Iran, Prices, and Oil Production

[KEYHAN] Although the price of oil has soared distinctly compared to what it was in the near past, the increase is negligible compared to what it was in the further past. Compared to the price of similar commodities in the world, oil has not been able to find its true value as it should have. What has the Petroleum Ministry done towards reaching to the true price of oil outside the programs and operations of OPEC?

[Petroleum Minister] You are certainly aware that recently OPEC has been in the process of entering a new phase. The new phase gives a special importance to the individual members of this organization, and among them, to Iran. The world demand for oil is on the rise by the day and the upward trend goes on with ever-increasing speed. About three years ago OPEC's production ceiling was hitting 4.5 million barrels a day. Today this ceiling has soared to 22.5 million (nominal) barrels. On the other hand in Iran we have drafted the five-year plan, and this new phase that I mentioned before, may certainly have a direct link with the better implementation of our plans.

On the other hand another interesting occurrence happening in the OPEC these days is that it is seriously entering into discussions for its longterm, 10-year, strategy. This will allow us to clearly visualize the future price, production, offer, and demand of oil, so that we

may have a lucid picture of future prices before ourselves. OPEC is also getting closer to its real production capacity, and in view of the fact that it is the ultimate producer of oil in the world, the offer and demand of oil may fall on a rational scale in the future, i.e., a specified and defined amount of oil will be produced in the world which will be balanced by a specified rate of demand. In other words, prices will enjoy a high stability. Consequently, any producer may produce any desired amount of oil, and this will not fully meet the market demand either. Ever-increasing demand shall heighten the strength and power of the price. It was decided that after returning from OPEC's recent summit, the resolutions made—namely fixing the price at \$18 per barrel—be implemented as of the first of January of next year. But the impacts of these decisions are already being felt due to conformity to the approbations and criteria set by the summit on the part of OPEC members even before the said date.

[KEYHAN] In that case, OPEC should no longer have any problems.

[Petroleum Minister] I think OPEC shall have problems just for a year or a year and a half. After that, when member countries attain their full production capacity, we shall no longer have any problems in OPEC. Because at that time any member can produce to its full capacity. When we limit a member and disallow him to produce in full capacity, this paves the ground for differences and constraints, but if countries produce to their full capacity, the grounds for differences shall disappear too. It is noteworthy that we attach a great deal of importance to OPEC—particularly at the current time. Of course certain activities have begun in the world, such as problems connected with the environment, whereby "they" are trying to decrease the world oil consumption by resorting to this chimerical pretext. Why? Because they are afraid of OPEC's future and of what it has to offer in the long run. Industrial countries are fearful of OPEC finding a new strength in the future, whereas OPEC with its new strength shall have a positive role. OPEC is presently trying to obtain a true evaluation of the world offer and demand to consider proper market prices, and it finds itself mandated before the world's future energy, and all of its efforts are directed towards preventing any crises in the area of energy in the future of the world.

Oil Income Increases 30 Percent

90OI0155A Tehran KEYHAN
in Persian 8 Jan 90 pp 1-2

[Text] Economic Service—The world increase in the price of oil and its growing strength in every free international market will naturally have an effect on the oil income of oil-producing nations such as Iran.

According to Minister of Petroleum Aqazadeh, Iran's revenue situation this year is good, with an increase of 30 percent this year over last year.

While discussing world oil markets yesterday and the reasons for rising prices for this substance, Gholamreza Aqazadeh noted: The cold weather in America, decreased rainfall in Europe, as well as the recent OPEC decision to set the price of oil at \$18 per barrel are some of the factors in the increased price of oil. Aqazadeh advised OPEC members to refrain from dealing hastily with the rapid increase in the price of oil.

Our nation's minister of petroleum proposed that OPEC members show restraint and remain committed to the goals that were set at the last OPEC meeting.

He also said: Iran's oil production is now 3.15 million barrels per day, and Iran's average oil exports in the current month is more than 2.5 million barrels per day.

The minister of petroleum emphasized that Iran's revenue situation is good, and that its income has increased 30 percent over last year.

IRI's Largest Oil Platform To Be Reconstructed

90OI0155E Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Jan 90 p 2

[Text] Economic Service—Iran's largest oil platform in the Persian Gulf is being rebuilt by the Ministry of Petroleum at a cost of \$250 million. This was announced by the National Iranian Oil Company continental shelf acting director.

Mostafa Kho'i discussed the importance of rebuilding the Salman Oil Platform which is located over an oil field shared by Iran and Abu Dhabi. He said: Following studies conducted to prevent the continued migration of oil from this oil field, we offered the work of rebuilding this platform for international bidding eight months ago. In this connection, qualified international contractors have been identified to rebuild the Salman platform, and negotiations are now in the final stages with two Japanese and Italian contractors. In the near future the winner of this competition will be announced, and when the contract is signed the full reconstruction of this oil platform will begin.

Concerning the cost of rebuilding this platform, the National Iranian Oil Company continental shelf acting director said: We expect the reconstruction of the Salman platform will cost about \$250 million, which will be obtained through the sale of oil from this field.

It is worth noting that the Salman Oil Field is one of the largest in the Persian Gulf and it is shared by Iran and Abu Dhabi. The oil platform in this field was attacked repeatedly during the imposed war by American and Iraqi forces.

Mines Ministry Prepared To Produce Required Aluminum

90OI0144E Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 14 Jan 90 p 4

[Text] Arak—The minister of mines and metals announced in Arak: This ministry is now fully prepared to provide the aluminum needed by the people and the nation's industries.

Engineer Mahluji, minister of mines and metals, who had come to Arak to study the progress of the Arak Aluminum factory's stages of production, gave an interview to the correspondent from the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY in which he made the foregoing announcement and said: Currently the Arak Aluminum factory produces and markets 10,000 tons of aluminum each month.

He added: With the marketing of this quantity of aluminum, the artificial price of this metal on the free market has been broken and its price is going down.

The minister of mines and metals discussed the production capacity of the Arak Aluminum factory. He said: This factory is capable of producing 45,000 tons of polished aluminum at the Ahiya Factory and 120,000 tons of various aluminum alloys at its foundry.

He said: As of the first of next year [21 March 1990] this factory's annual production of polished aluminum will increase from 45,000 tons to about 70,000 tons.

Engineer Mahluji added: The Ministry of Mines and Metals' new project to turn mines over to the private sector has been welcomed by the private sector and a great many applications have come to the appropriate offices for investment in the mining sector.

Engineer Mahluji discussed expanding the export of mining materials. He said: We hope that next year, with amendment of the laws and regulations, the current problems in export affairs will be eliminated.

In conclusion he said: With the reform of the current crippling laws, in the future the export of mined materials will flourish, and our nation will obtain its true place in the international markets.

New Facilities for Export of Industrial Goods Announced

90OI0155F Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 22 Jan 90 p 3

[Text] Economic Service—New government provisions for exporting industrial goods have been announced by the minister of heavy industries.

KEYHAN's economic correspondent reports that the minister of heavy industries gave the details of these provisions in an interview with the central news unit.

The above provisions include exemption from regulations on price studies at the centers for procurement and

distribution for imports of raw materials, parts, equipment, and all materials needed to produce export goods, certification of non-manufacture from the ministries of industry, the granting of loans and foreign exchange to exporters of industrial goods, and the publication of a pamphlet on the size of foreign exchange contracts for exported industrial goods.

He predicted that in the first year of the five-year plan exports of heavy industrial goods, in accordance with the plan, will reach \$120 million.

Unit To Be Added to Zargan Power Plant in Ahvaz

90OI0143C Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 15 Jan 90 p 4

[Text] Ahvaz—With the addition of a steam-powered 145-megawatt electrical plant to the existing units in the Zargan power plant of Ahvaz, the drop in voltage and electrical fluctuation, particularly in the summer, in the Province of Khuzestan will be greatly reduced.

The head of the Zargan power plant announced this statement in an interview with an IRNA [Islamic Republic News Agency] correspondent and said: This electricity production unit which is being installed will be ready for operation late next year, provided no problems occur.

Referring to the activities under way in the reconstruction of the facilities and the damaged units of the Zargan power plant, he said: With the completion of the reconstruction of the two gas units of this power plant simultaneous with the operation of the 145-megawatt Zargan power plant, it is anticipated that the reconstruction of this power plant will be completed.

Stating that at the present time one 145-megawatt steam unit and two gas units with a production of 60 megawatts are on the circuit, the head of Zargan power plant said in this interview: This power plant requires the procurement of parts in order to expedite reconstruction, particularly in regard to the reconstruction of the two gas units. If these parts are procured, reconstruction will be completed more rapidly.

Industrial Area To Be Built in Zanjan

90OI0144D Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 14 Jan 90 p 2

[Text] Zanjan—IRNA [Islamic Republic News Agency]—An industrial village with a capacity for more than 200 production units is to be built in Zanjan.

This was announced during an inspection by the minister of industries of several factories in the Province of Zanjan.

According to IRNA, the site, which will occupy 150 hectares with a capacity for expansion to 400 hectares, was inspected yesterday by the minister of industries.

This report states: Mr. Ne'matzadeh also visited the Pars-Switch factory in Zanjan.

With production running at 20 percent above nominal capacity, this factory produces and markets 1,200 semi-lubricated keys [? kilid-e nimeh rowqani], used on telephone poles.

During this inspection, the acting director of the Pars-Switch factory announced: Currently 96 percent of the parts needed for this key are made within the country, and under plans that have been made, 12 more parts will be made within the country by 1370 [21 March 1991-20 March 1992].

He said: Since the first of the year 900 24-volt semi-lubricated dejector keys [?] were made and marketed in this unit.

He noted: There are more than 50 factories in the country that make frames [? karkhaneh-ye qablo-sazi] whose activity depends on the production of the Pars-Switch factory.

According to this report, the Abhar textile factory under construction was also inspected by the minister of industries. Using this factory, with an investment of 1.8 billion rials and an annual production of 15 million meters of cloth, 3,000 people will be employed.

Mr. Ne'matzadeh also visited the Abhar kaolin factory [? karkhaneh-ye chini his-e Abhar].

This factory, which began experimental production on the first of Azar this year [22 November], was built with investment of three million rials and will produce 1,500 tons of kaolin annually.

This production unit also provides employment for 400 people.

Industrial Area Inaugurated in Arak

90OI0143A Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 15 Jan 90 p 4

[Text] Four other industrial compounds will be built in Central Province.

Arak—For the purpose of centralizing the industrial units, at an expense of 1.3 billion rials, construction was completed on the Arak industrial compound, with a 70-industrial-unit capacity, and it was put into operation.

The general manager of the industrial compounds of Central Province made the above announcement in an interview with the CENTRAL NEWS UNIT of Arak and added: This compound, which is located on 40 hectares of land, includes production units for food, chemicals, cellulose, metal and nonmetal industries, with a total value of 5 billion rials.

He added: In this compound, a sewer system and a system for the transfer of industrial waste have been designed to be environmentally safe.

Referring to other industrial projects under way, the general manager of the industrial compounds of Central Province said: Also, the operations have begun on the construction of two other compounds in the villages of Abikabad and Kheyraabad of Arak, with a total capacity of 700 industrial units and a volume of investments of 8.4 billion rials, which will help considerably to reduce migration from villages to the city of Arak, creating jobs for villagers and centralizing industrial units.

Pointing out that the construction of two other industrial compounds in Delijan and the "Vafs" district of Arak is in the five-year plan of this company, he stated that attracting local investments, influencing the growth of the region, security and the creation of trust for investors are among the important factors in building industrial compounds.

Regulations for Sending Patients Abroad Announced

90OI0155B Tehran KEYHAN
in Persian 8 Jan 90 pp 1-2

[Text] Report Service—For eye patients sent abroad, \$4,000 to \$8,000, infertility patients, about \$3,000, and for heart patients from \$10,000 to \$18,000 will be paid at the government or the service rate. Likewise, the limit on foreign exchange to be paid for bone graft is \$70,000.

Dr. Massih Hashemi, supervisor of the Supreme Council of Physicians, took part in a press conference this morning in which he announced the above and explained this council's policies with regard to sending patients abroad. He began by stating that only patients with life-threatening illnesses who cannot be treated in Iran will be sent abroad. He said: Patients with complex and difficult to treat illnesses, even if they are not covered under this council's foreign exchange policies, will have access to provisions such as exemption from repayment of costs, and service foreign exchange will apply to persons of this kind. Concerning the method of setting a foreign exchange ceiling for patients, he said: The foreign exchange ceiling has been set based on average patient costs in the European countries. The cost of treatment and two month's residence will be calculated as a single figure for patients, and after completion of treatment accounts will be settled with patients on the basis of their treatment bills.

He added: Treatment costs in America are three to four times that of other countries, and they differ in Europe as well depending on the type of country. For example, treatment costs in England are 1.5 times German costs. Of course patients may go to whatever country they wish for treatment, but we advise them not to go to America or England because of the enormous costs.

Continuing, he said: Due to the unfavorable surgery conditions in Spain, authorization will not be given to go to that country.

Dr. Hashemi then discussed policies for sending patients abroad. He said: Our criterion for sending patients is not one of foreign exchange, because there are no severe limits on foreign exchange for sending patients.

However, to protect the dignity and prestige of Iran's physician community, we will not authorize any patient with any illness to go abroad. If the number of patients being sent exceeds ordinary limits, Iran will become known as a sick and sickly society, and Iranian medicine will be considered weak. At the same time, to prevent the cultural influences of the West from affecting patients, we will avoid sending patients when it is unnecessary or will bear little result. He then noted that some patients mistakenly imagine that any illness at any level of severity or at any stage can be treated abroad. He said: According to statistics, in the last year only 40 percent of eye patients have been cured in the last year and the treatment results were negative for the rest. Likewise of 23 eye patients sent to West Germany, only eight of them had positive treatment results.

He added: The rate of treatment success for infertility patients in the world's best treatment centers is between 15 and 17 percent, and the treatment success for nervous disorders and heart ailments and the possibility of survival for this kind of patient after surgery is about 60 percent. For example, of 100 patients sent for Caesarean section, only ten children were produced.

Continuing the interview, Dr. Hashemi discussed the fact that in the first six months of the current year 20,000 files were studied in the Supreme Physician's Council, of which about 1,000 were covered by regulations for sending patients abroad, and most of those were heart and eye patients. He said: The files for heart patients, because of their abundance and the problem of their occurrence in two stages, are being studied within a two-month period, while the others are being studied in about one month. Urban patients are referred to this council by the province physician's council, and it has been decided that to make provisions for Tehran patients, if a specialist physician sees the need to send the patient abroad a file will be prepared and the patient will be sent after confirmation from a reputable physician. Of course the council will agree to requests for foreign exchange from patients with difficult to treat illnesses when they apply to be sent abroad. Continuing, he added: This year \$50 million in medical and health care equipment has been purchased for hospitals and medical universities. Likewise, medical equipment needed by patients will be provided to them by the Red Crescent Center for Medical Emergencies.

In conclusion Dr. Hashemi announced that in the last 20 days \$518,000 in service foreign exchange has been allocated for patients to be sent abroad, and the letter of agreement has been issued.

Production of Certain Agricultural Products Rises*90OI0155D Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 22 Jan 90 p 2*

[Text] Economic Service—Selected results from the public agricultural census of 1367 [21 March 1988 - 20 March 1989], based on a survey of 2.5 percent of active agricultural families, have been published.

In this publication, all of the information obtained from the public agricultural census is presented in the form of various tables and graphs for preliminary use by researchers, scholars, and the public pending publication of the detailed census results.

Some of the statistics and figures in this publication show that in 1367 [21 March 1988 - 20 March 1989] the nation's agricultural lands totaled 16,871,509 hectares, 7,387,114 hectares of which are cultivated by irrigation and 9,484,397 hectares of which are cultivated by dry farming. In the same year the number of farms was more than 3,312,714, and the number of farming families was figured to be in excess of 3,308,681. Most of the farming families were in the Province of Khorasan with 413,840, and the smallest number was in the Province of Bushehr, with 29,976.

At the same time the amount of wheat produced in 1367 [21 March 1988 - 20 March 1989] was more than 5,775,427 tons, barley 2,589,810 tons, rice (paddy) 1,227,325 tons, and 815,813 tons of potatoes. There were about two million tractors, 1.6 million harvesters, and one million pesticide sprayers in use for agricultural work.

In 1367 [21 March 1988 - 20 March 1989] the nation's date production was 165,819 tons, most of which was produced in the provinces of Bushehr, Kerman, and Hormozegan. The nation's production of citrus fruits in 1367 was estimated at more than 756,493 tons, 432,939 tons of which was oranges and 223,554 tons of which was sour oranges and sweet and sour lemons.

In this census the nation's total of sheep and lambs was figured at 40.7 million head, 6.7 million head of which were in the Province of Khorasan, five million in the Province of East Azarbaijan, and 3.4 million head in the Province of West Azarbaijan.

Increase in Wheat Production Predicted*90OI0144F Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 14 Jan 90 p 4*

[Text] Yasuj—In the nation's five-year development plan, \$11.24 billion has been set aside for the agricultural sector.

According to the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY, the above announcement was made by the deputy minister of agriculture for parliamentary affairs at ceremonies commemorating Education and Agricultural Promotion Week, held yesterday morning in Yasuj.

He said: To support farmers for the purpose of raising production in the national five-year development plan, 100 billion rials have been added to the capital of the Agriculture Bank.

He noted: In this plan, 300,00 hectares expansion of cultivated area is planned, and two million hectares of land used for dry farming will be converted for irrigated farming.

At these ceremonies, attended by representative production officials and a group of farmers and livestock keepers from Kohkiluyeh va Boyer Ahmad, the deputy minister of agriculture for parliamentary affairs added: In the nation's five-year plan, by observing the proper planting and harvesting procedures, it is expected that domestic wheat production will increase to 11.04 million tons.

This report states that during these ceremonies, the exhibition for agricultural and animal husbandry products and by-products, established on the occasion of Education and Agricultural Promotion Week at the Kohkiluyeh va Boyer Ahmad Central Agriculture Office at Yasuj, was opened and inspected.

According to this report, in conclusion prizes were given to the province's second-rank farmers and livestock keepers.

Conversation With Chief Justice on New Judicial Decisions*90OI0105B Tehran KEYHAN
in Persian 16 Dec 89 p 19*

[Interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam Moqtada'i, the Chief Justice; by KEYHAN correspondent; date and place not specified.]

[Text] KEYHAN's Social Service—The qualitative study of the functions of judges, the recruitment of judicial cadres, the shortage in the number of judges, the bill for the establishment of common courts and the elimination of the public prosecution offices as well as the other bottlenecks of the Judiciary were issues in point discussed during talks held between KEYHAN and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

In this interview, Hojjat ol-Eslam Moqtada'i, the Chief Justice, was asked to elaborate on his recent announcements made during a seminar in Esfahan in reference to the qualitative orientation and auditing of judgments passed by judges, to which he made the following response:

Since my days in the Judiciary High Council, I realized generally there is a quantity-oriented scrutiny in our judicial system. For instance, we have the statistics of cases handled in various branches, but we lacked another type of orientation, i.e., a qualitative overview. For example the judge who has handled one hundred cases, has he finalized them well enough, or were his verdicts

annulled by higher authorities due to being unlawful or unsubstantiated or defective, or due to a disregard of legal procedure?

Of course sometimes sporadic surveys by delegations assigned by the High Judicial Council are carried out as investigations, but these do not yield the optimum results. It struck me that the most appropriate body to perform a qualitative control of verdicts would be the High Court of Justice. Moreover, Article 161 of the Constitution too has assigned the High Court of Justice with the task of supervising the proper administration of the laws. We, therefore, decided to make an ongoing qualitative orientation of verdicts passed part of the permanent functions of the High Court of Justice. Due to this we prepared a plan with the confirmation of the head of the Judiciary to establish a supervisory unit in the organization of the High Court of Justice, and thanks to God the task has been accomplished. The functions of the Supervisory Unit are: Certain forms are prepared and made available to the various branches of the High Court of Justice. Each form is specified to a single branch and to a single judge. The particulars of the judge, the case file, and the issue of the case as well as the aftermath of the judgment passed upon the case are transcribed on the form. Was the judgment confirmed, or was it rejected, and if rejected on what grounds. These are all reflected on the form. The form is prepared by the auditing member of the branch who also makes it accessible to the branch office. The branch office in turn sends the form to the supervisory unit. Index slips are prepared in the supervisory unit for every judge working throughout the nation. A summary of the form is transcribed on its relevant index slip. In this manner even though a judge's jurisdiction changes his records will be compiled in the same place. Later on—for instance after three months—we survey the slips and find that a certain judge of a certain jurisdiction with a certain number of verdicts over time has had so many of his verdicts confirmed and so many of them rejected, and what were the grounds for their rejection. We then may correspond with the judge and warn him to avoid mistakes. No doubt the judge may take care not to repeat mistakes. If these warnings prove effective, so much the better, our purpose has been served—since our purpose was to upgrade judgments and to ensure the observance of legal and canonical injunctions. On the other hand, if we find that mistakes are repeated, we may take other measures, such as assigning the erring judge to retraining. In case training proves ineffective, we may recommit the judge to administrative assignments. On the contrary, judges with 80 plus percent confirmed verdicts shall be rewarded—from bolstering their records to awarding them with prizes.

These records will also be effective in promotions and reassignments. In the meantime if we detect the occurrence of infringements in the handling of a certain case—e.g., non-observance of legal procedures, passing judgment in contradiction to legal or canonical injunctions, passing a malevolent judgment—we may rightfully

refer the case to the Judicial Disciplinary Court. The 551st Article of the Code for Civil Procedure stipulates that in case the branch auditor finds personal motives or ignorance of legal principles or infringements in a judgment, he may with the agreement and help of the deputy public prosecutor of the High Court of Justice—who should pass a judgment on the case at the branch—prepare a report against the violating judge, the violating prosecutor or his deputy, or the violating interrogator—who may have had a role in the case and may have violated the law. The branch auditor and the deputy public prosecutor function as the prosecutors of the Judicial Disciplinary Court. Their report is sent directly to the said court without the intervention of the Judicial Disciplinary Prosecutor.

With the accomplishment of this task and the establishment of the said unit whose groundworks have already been laid, I think that when judges throughout the nation realize that their verdicts are audited at the High Court of Justice, they will no doubt take care to make their judgments immune to objections rendering them unannullable. As a result the quality of court findings will be upgraded nationwide and judgments shall become fairer and nearer to the administration of justice. The better justice is administered the more people will become satisfied. Also redundancy in handling court cases will be reduced. Right now we have an instance where a case has been to the High Court of Justice and sent back 11 times. By eliminating redundancy the speed and progression of work shall increase. As regards controlling cases and judgments of second degree penal, civil, and military courts whose verdicts are not referred to the High Court of Justice due to being conclusive and are only investigated by higher courts for revision only in cases of being objected to, in fact their position compared to second degree civil, penal, and military courts is similar to that of the High Court of Justice compared to first degree civil, penal, and military courts. We are planning to issue a circulatory letter addressed to all chief justices throughout the nation instructing all first degree civil and penal courts to send a copy of the cases they handle for revision to the supervisory unit, so that their verdicts too will undergo scrutiny.

[KEYHAN] A bottleneck propounded at the Judiciary is the shortage in the number of judges. In view of the fact that there exist many law schools throughout the nation which produce numerous law graduates every year, together with graduates from the Faculty of Judicial Science and the Qom Theological Center, why is it that in spite of the abundance of the number of people educated in the field of law, we are still confronted with such a constraint?

[Hojjat ol-Eslam Moqtada'i] The reason for this is quite clear, and the congestion in the backlog of cases is rather great. One reason is the increase in population. This no doubt entails a multiplication in the number of claims and felonies. Another reason is that we had a war going for several years and we have a large number of war migrants who have their special problems. Yet another

reason is Afghanistan and its war which made many Afghanis transients seeking refuge in Iran in large numbers bringing in certain problems. On the other hand many offenses were not recognized as offenses during the previous regime in Iran. Some were even encouraged—such as the case of vices, which even though legally prohibited were not prosecuted in actuality. This in turn has helped increase the number of cases. Yet another reason is the superpowers' policy in spreading narcotics—a most powerful element in making the whole country crime-prone, causing a number of people to become blemished due to importing, manufacturing, distributing, and dealing in drugs, while causing others to become addicted.

A source from which we provide judges is the Faculty of Judicial Sciences which was the first school of law to have been made operable after the Revolution. To date it has produced 100-200 judges every year. Our other sources are the theological centers in Qom, Mashad, and certain other cities, and finally clergymen throughout the country who present an adequate source of judges. Perhaps between 800 to 900 clergymen have already been recruited by the Judiciary. Because we had these sources, we apparently did not make use of the law schools since they lacked the special courses conducted by the Faculty of Judicial Sciences to familiarize students with the basic principles of Islamic Jurisprudence. If law students pass these units they may join the Ministry of Justice, otherwise they can not. Therefore, although we have had these sources we are still confronting shortages. For the future we are planning to have a larger number of graduates from the Faculty of Judicial Sciences by expanding it. Moreover, a committee has already been formed at the Qom Theological Center, which is trying to recruit qualified personnel for the Judicature from among the clergy.

[KEYHAN] Sometimes we come across judgments passed by these same judges which lack adequate judicial standing. No doubt law school graduates whom you deem to be lacking in judicial competence would certainly not have passed such judgments had they been on the bench. In view of the fact that we have 400-500 graduates from various law schools nationwide each year and the country is in dire need of judicial cadres, if they are not absorbed by the Justice administration, what other vocations should they take up? How could one justify allotting budgets and capabilities to training them without making proper use of them?

[Hojjat ol-Eslam Moqtada'i] The need for jurists is certainly great in our country and this need is not specific to the justice sector. These gentlemen may be absorbed by bodies, agencies, and institutions that require jurists. One of the causes of our judicial constraints is that many ministries and institutions such as Finance, Registration Administration, Industries and the like, reach out to the Judiciary for fulfilling their

needs and invite judges to participate in their committees. And since this is lawful, the Judiciary is obliged to send its people to these places, bringing their work at the courthouse to a halt.

If graduates from law schools who are not absorbed by the Judiciary were recruited by those other agencies at no cost to the work of the judges of the Justice Ministry, in my opinion the purpose for their training would be served, since they are needed in other organizations. Yes, it is true that after the Revolution, due to our pressing need for judges, certain acts of negligence were committed in their selection. They were not undergoing any training or they experienced brief training sessions. Therefore some individuals were recruited by the Judicature whose performance proved fruitless. We have asked a group of these people to resign, and we laid off some of them and their commissions were annulled. We have had such instances. We are currently using more care in selecting judges, the exams conducted at theological centers are carried out with more strictness, and those selected undergo at least six months of training besides attending (special) classes.

[KEYHAN] Recently the bill for establishing common courts and eliminating the organization of the Public Prosecution Office was propounded. What is Your Excellency's view regarding this bill? After the approval of the bill what shall become of the Public Prosecution Office, the public prosecutors themselves, the interrogators, the deputies to public prosecutors? Who would take over their duties? On what grounds do the introducers of this bill consider the office of the public prosecutor redundant, and plan to eliminate it altogether?

[Hojjat ol-Eslam Moqtada'i] Common courts are based on a backdrop of Islam's judiciary system. At the initial stage of a litigation both sides of a claim should appear before a judge. This is the current procedure in civil courts. In other words, here there is no public prosecutor and the court handles the case directly. That in felonies the case should initially go to the public prosecutor's office before being referred to the court, has not been adopted from Islamic law, it has been adopted from French law and from laws that are not prohibited by Islam.

[KEYHAN] That has not been prohibited by Islam either.

[Hojjat ol-Eslam Moqtada'i] No it has not. But a comparison of the current route of case files, interrogations, investigations, issuance of indictments by the office of the public prosecutor prior to the case being referred to a court, with a system where just as in civil cases, the case goes straight to the court to be tried before a judge... which of the two systems is better? One of the constraints of the current system is the role of admission. Islam says that admission, to be meaningful, should take place before a judge. For instance, an offender has committed a felony, he has been apprehended and taken to the interrogator's office. Since he has just committed the

wrongful act, under pressure of his emotions and conscience he confesses and honestly admits he has committed a certain offense. Then an interlocutory decision is reached in his case and he is sent to prison. There he meets people who coach him on what to say to evade punishment. Or he hires an attorney and the attorney coaches him on the course he should take. To deny and.... Eventually he appears in court and denies his crime. Here the judge becomes confused. Based on the previous admissions of the accused supported by circumstantial evidence he is an admitted felon, but in court he is defiant. At this point the judge fails to resolve the case. In order to settle the problem, the judge decides on the basis of his own knowledge of the case. The decision is referred to the High Court of Justice and is rejected. The judge is asked: How did you find knowledge? The circumstantial evidence that has come to your attention is not conventional evidence. Contrarily, if the accused is brought straight before a judge and pleads guilty, he will be judged on the basis of his own admission. He will thus be bound by his own admission avoiding all bottlenecks and procedural stages. Besides, there exists a redundancy in the present system which may be avoided. For example, a case file may remain on the backlog of the public prosecutor's office for many months before being handled. Many interrogatory meetings, summoning of witnesses, site investigations, etc., are performed before an indictment is issued to be placed on the backlog of a court. When its turn transpires, the same proceedings and the same words are resumed once more. Such redundancy may entail certain mischiefs. We have therefore envisaged the establishment of a court system in which in criminal cases too the accused will be brought directly before the judge. Here the judge will investigate. If the accused pleads guilty and if the evidence against him is complete and the documentation of the case are compiled in their entirety, the judge will pass a judgment and the case will be finalized. Then the case will be submitted for enforcement. On the other hand, if the judge finds there is need for further investigation, such as examining witnesses, site investigation, examination of a corpse and the like, these will be referred to branches substituting the public prosecutor's office—which shall be organized of the same elements and which shall be called Investigatory Branches functioning under court supervision. In this way procedures shall be carried out with more speed and precision and the accused shall not be able to deny his guilt later.

Of the present workforce of the public prosecutor's office a group who are now skilled and dignified individuals will work in court branches, while beginners shall work at Investigatory Branches under the supervision of a judge.

[KEYHAN] Who will perform the duties of the Public Prosecutor in certain cases such as tax offenses?

[Hojjat ol-Eslam Moqtada'i] The duty will be carried out either by the judge himself or by the head of the Justice Department. According to canonical criteria it is the judge who performs these duties. The relegation of such

duties to the prosecutor is done where there is a regime that has prosecutors, whereas we don't have such a regime. Who did perform these tasks at the time of the Prophet of Islam (upon whom be peace) or during the time of 'Ali (peace be upon him)? The same person who holds the position of judge shall perform these duties. Certainly during those times governors and governor-generals held certain powers—such as Hassabeh. There were agents who carried out these functions, but at any rate these agents functioned under the supervision of the judge.

Goals Set To Boost Tribal Economy

90010143B Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 15 Jan 90 p 4

[Text] Tehran—IRNA [Islamic Republic News Agency]:

With the implementation of the joint programs of the Iranian tribal affairs organization and the Ministry of Construction Jihad which are carried out for the revitalization of nearly 30 million hectares of tribal pasture land, in addition to a part of the protein needs of the country being provided, the exit of \$400 million annually for the import of 200,000 tons of meat will be prevented.

These statements were made by Dr. 'Ali Qanbari, the deputy minister of construction jihad and the head of the Iranian tribal affairs organization in an interview with an IRNA correspondent.

Referring to the place of the tribes in the five-year plan, he said: At the present time, with the attention of the president given to compensating for the destruction of the pastures of the country, instead of importing meat, the Iranian tribal affairs organization will procure the fodder needed from foreign countries, and, by expanding animal husbandry throughout the country, especially in the tribal areas, it will double the weight of the existing livestock in a fattening program.

He added: Not only will this increase revenues for the tribes, but it will create jobs for them, in addition to fostering the self-sufficiency of the country and increasing national revenues.

He said: With 24 million heads of livestock in 22 provinces of the country, the tribes have nearly three-fourths of the land in the country under their migration domain and provide a significant part of the protein needs of Iran. In the handicraft industry sector and with regard to secondary animal husbandry products as well, the tribes have significant potential and value.

The head of the Iranian tribal affairs organization added: The preservation of the tribal population on the basis of a balance between livestock and the capacity of pastures and providing productive work for the surplus tribes in the population centers, with priority given to rural areas, and determining and preparing appropriate places with consideration for the peculiarities of tribal production

are part of the five-year plan for this organization, all of which have been anticipated in the general goals of the regime.

He added: The extension of social insurance to tribes and vulnerable groups, the establishment of circuit courts in tribal regions, as well as purchasing the animal husbandry products of tribes, in particular meat, strengthening the animal husbandry system, and preserving and revitalizing tribal pastures are among the other programs of the Iranian tribal affairs organization which have been anticipated in the five-year economic, social, and cultural plan of the government.

Dr. Qanbari pointed out: The Iranian tribal affairs organization has taken serious steps to achieve these goals in regard to the reconstruction of the tribal affairs organization, with the support of the Ministry of Construction Jihad at the level of deputy minister and the establishment of the central office of tribal affairs in the provinces as well as the establishment of the central offices of plan and budget, livestock affairs, developmental and fundamental affairs, cooperative affairs, financial and administrative affairs, and social affairs in the central organization. The seminar held (21 Dey [2 January]) concerned the new changes and the promotion of the organization.

At the conclusion of this meeting, the head of the Iranian tribal affairs organization said: The establishment of the supreme council of tribes headed by the honorable president in the capital and the tribal councils of provinces headed by governors-general are among the steps taken by the government to eliminate the shortcomings in the tribal societies and make use of the economic and social potential of this productive stratum.

Funds Allocated To Expand Tourism Industry

*90OI0144B Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 14 Jan 90 p 4*

[Text] Tehran—Central News Unit—In view of the nation's genuine tourist attractions and the sense of necessity to revitalize the tourist industry, Mr. Bokhara'i, acting director of the Iranian Tourism Organization, in an interview with the Central News Unit, stressed the importance of tourism for the policies of this organization, which is charged of conducting this industry. He said:

In view of the advantages of the tourist industry for the creation of employment, earning rials and foreign exchange, filling the leisure time of the people in the proper way and teaching the people of the world about Iran, its heritage, civilization, and Islamic culture, \$250 million has been set aside to rebuild the war-stricken areas, and 1.5 billion tomans credit has been set aside for the reconstruction and equipping of hospitality and residential units, especially for the tourist attractions in the nation's various cities.

He added: Recently, the Iranian Tourism Organization, in view of the historic, religious, cultural, and artistic attractions, as well as the political attractions and the nation's various climatic attractions, has begun conducting domestic and foreign tours, and it is carrying out programs to expand tours in some parts of the various nations of the world.

In conclusion he said: Based on recent Majles legislation to expand this industry in the five-year plan, 45 billion tomans have been provided in the budget, 34 billion tomans of which are allocated to the private sector, eight billion tomans to the banking system, two billion tomans in the credit budget.

Qazvin Glass Factory to Double Production Level

*90OI0144C Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 14 Jan 90 p 2*

[Text] Zanjan—IRNA [Islamic Republic News Agency]—The Qazvin glass factories, with an annual production capacity of 150,000 tons of simple construction and engraved glass, comprise 75 percent of the nation's entire glass production capacity.

According to IRNA, this statement was made yesterday by the acting director of the Qazvin Glass Corporation during an inspection of various parts of this production unit by Mr. Ne'matzadeh, minister of industries. He added: The nominal capacity of the Qazvin glass factories is 120,000 tons of glass per year, and currently with the operation of all four existing furnaces, the level of production at these factories exceeds the nominal capacity by 25 percent.

He noted that a plan is being studied and implemented to expand the factory's production by means of the "flute" method. He added: It is expected that the agreement in principle to carry out the expansion plan will be issued next month.

He said emphatically: With this project, in the next five years the factory's production will increase by 120,000 tons of glass per year reaching double the current level of production, and this matter will play an important part in alleviating the glass shortage during the period of reconstruction.

He mentioned optical glass, glass fiber, and ceramic glass as other plans being studied for these factories. He said: By producing products like these, not only will our level of dependence for these products be significantly reduced, but there will also be a significant annual savings in foreign exchange.

Concerning this year's production in the factory, he said: Since the first of this year, 202,808,000 square meters of two-millimeter glass have been produced in this factory and marketed. This is about a 10 percent increase over production for the same period last year.